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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham (2/11/2011) sp-6538

Taylor v. Moutrie-Pelham (2/11/2011) sp-6538, 246 P3d 927

        Notice:  This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 
        Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 303 
        K   Street,   Anchorage,   Alaska   99501,   phone   (907)   264-0608,   fax   (907)   264-0878,   email 
        corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us. 

                 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

BRIAN L. TAYLOR,                                   ) 
                                                   )    Supreme Court No. S-13432 
                        Appellant,                 ) 
                                                   )    Superior Court No. 3AN-07-06797 CI 
        v.                                         ) 
                                                   )   O P I N I O N 
KAREN MOUTRIE-PELHAM,                              ) 
                                                   )   No. 6538 - February 11, 2011 
                        Appellee.                  ) 
                                                   ) 

                Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 
                Judicial District, Anchorage, Sen K. Tan, Judge. 

                Appearances:       David R. Edgren, Edgren Law Offices, LLC, 
                Anchorage, for Appellant.  No appearance by Appellee. 

                Before:    Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Fabe, Winfree, Christen, 
                and Stowers, Justices. 

                WINFREE, Justice. 

I.      BACKGROUND 

                Brian Taylor sued Karen Moutrie-Pelham, alleging that:               (1) he gave her 

$30,000 for a down payment on a home she agreed to help him buy, but she neither 

helped   him   nor   returned   the   money;   and   (2)   she   breached   a   lease   agreement   for   a 

property   she   leased   to   him.  Moutrie-Pelham   counterclaimed,   alleging   that   Taylor 

breached the lease agreement.        After a bench trial, the trial court noted its difficulty in 

deciding     the  case   because    both    parties  lacked    credibility,  provided     inconsistent 

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information, and appeared to make up facts.  The court determined that Moutrie-Pelham 

converted $23,000 received from Taylor, but also determined that Taylor owed $10,574 

in damages to Moutrie-Pelham for breaching the lease agreement.  The court concluded 

"that neither party prevailed in this litigation."  When final offset judgment was granted 

in favor of Taylor, no attorney's fees were awarded.             Taylor appeals the trial court's 

prevailing party determination.        Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that neither party prevailed in this case, we affirm that determination. 

II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW 

                We   review   a   trial   court's   prevailing   party   determination   for   abuse   of 
discretion.1   We will reverse a prevailing party determination only if it is arbitrary, 

capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or improperly motivated.2 

III.     DISCUSSION 

                Under Alaska Civil Rule 82, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law or 

agreed to by the parties, the prevailing party in a civil case shall be awarded attorney's 
fees."3  "The prevailing party is the one who has successfully prosecuted or defended 

against the action, the one who is successful on the 'main issue' of the action and 'in 
whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and the judgment entered.' "4              "[W]here 

each party has prevailed on a main issue the court retains discretion to refrain from 

characterizing either as the prevailing party, and a denial of attorney costs and fees in 

        1       Fernandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1, 5 (Alaska 2002). 

        2       Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 878 (Alaska 1979). 

        3       Alaska R. Civ. P. 82(a). 

        4       Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rel. Peter, 195 P.3d 1083, 1092 (Alaska 2008) 

(quotingHillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1321, 1327 (Alaska 1993)). 

                                                 -2-                                              6538 

----------------------- Page 3-----------------------

such instances is appropriate."5 

               Taylor argues the trial court should have named him the prevailing party, 

thereby allowing him to obtain attorney's fees, because he "substantially prevailed" on 

the main issue in the litigation - his claim for $30,000 - even though he did not 

recover the full $30,000 he sought.  Taylor speculates the trial court improperly counted 

claims, calculating that Moutrie-Pelham simply won on more individual claims than 
Taylor, to deny him prevailing party status.6        He also asserts the trial court improperly 

considered   Moutrie-Pelham's   recovery   of   $7,000   for   unpaid   rent   under   the   lease 

agreement because Taylor did not contest that claim. 

                Taylor fails to recognize that the trial court could reasonably conclude that 

the lease dispute, which he lost, was a "main issue" in this case and not just a peripheral 

one. First, Taylor raised the issue in his complaint by claiming Moutrie-Pelham breached 

the lease agreement.  Taylor originally alleged that he had not abandoned the leasehold 

property   and   that   Moutrie-Pelham   unlawfully   entered   the   premises   and   seized   his 

personal property, although he now attempts to downplay the lease dispute by asserting 

that such claims were minor and "flowed from" his $30,000 claim.  Second, Moutrie- 

Pelham raised the lease dispute in her counterclaim, alleging that Taylor "violated the 

lease agreement by failing to pay rent, damaging the structure[,] and . . . abandoning the 

residence without notice." Third, the trial court awarded $10,574 in damages to Moutrie- 

Pelham for Taylor's breach of that agreement, nearly half of Taylor's own $23,000 

recovery on his conversion claim. 

        5       Tobeluk, 589 P.2d at 877 (citing City of Valdez v. Valdez Dev. Co., 523 P.2d 

177, 184 (Alaska 1974)). 

        6       Cf. State, Dep't of Corr. v. Anthoney, 229 P.3d 164, 167-68 (Alaska 2010) 

(noting courts should not count claims to determine prevailing party status). 

                                                -3-                                             6538 

----------------------- Page 4-----------------------

                Although the trial court did not explain its determination that neither party 

was the prevailing party, taking this litigation as a whole its conclusion is not manifestly 
unreasonable   -   each   party   prevailed   on   a   main   issue   in   the   litigation.7 We   reject 

Taylor's argument that the trial court should not have considered Moutrie-Pelham's 

recovery of $7,000 in unpaid rent because he did not contest the issue.                In considering 

prevailing party status the trial court should ask the "objective question . . . whether [the 
party] obtained the relief it sought,"8 and here Moutrie-Pelham sought and obtained relief 

for unpaid rent. 

                The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to name either 

Taylor or Moutrie-Pelham the prevailing party in this case because "where each party has 

prevailed on a main issue[,] the court retains discretion to refrain from characterizing 

either as the prevailing party, and a denial of attorney costs and fees in such instances is 
appropriate."9 

IV.     CONCLUSION 

                We AFFIRM the trial court's prevailing party determination. 

        7        The trial court provided sufficiently detailed findings "to give [this] court 

a clear understanding of the basis of . . . [its] decision, and to enable [this court] to 
determine the ground on which the trial court reached its decision."  Hanlon v. Hanlon, 
871 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Lang v. Lang, 741 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Alaska 
1987)).   This case is distinguishable from Cooper v. Carlson, a case we remanded after 
the superior court failed to specify the prevailing party and declined to award attorney's 
fees, because in that case we were "confronted with the difficulty of not knowing whether 
the court denied the fee in the exercise of its discretion or under the mistaken belief that 
Cooper was not the prevailing party." 511 P.2d 1305, 1307, 1311 (Alaska 1973). 

        8       Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. State, 940 P.2d 916, 922 (Alaska 1997). 

        9       Tobeluk, 589 P.2d at 877 (citing Valdez Dev. Co., 523 P.2d at 184). 

                                                   -4-                                               6538 
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