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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Bradshaw v. State, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (1/29/2010) sp-6456

Bradshaw v. State, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (1/29/2010) sp-6456, 224 P3d 118

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


JOSEPH L. BRADSHAW, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 13262
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No. 3AN-07-8214 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, DEPART- )
MENT OF ADMINISTRATION, ) No. 6456 January 29, 2010
DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, )
and DUANE BANNOCK, Director, )
)
Appellees. )
)
          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Third   Judicial    District,
          Anchorage, Craig Stowers, Judge.

          Appearances:   Joseph L.  Bradshaw,  pro  se,
          Anchorage.   Krista  S.  Stearns,   Assistant
          Attorney  General, Anchorage, and Richard  A.
          Svobodny,  Acting  Attorney General,  Juneau,
          for Appellees.

          Before:   Carpeneti, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
          Fabe, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.

          EASTAUGH, Justice.

I.   INTRODUCTION
          In  1995  the  Alaska Division of Motor Vehicles  (DMV)
suspended  Joseph Bradshaws drivers license because  he  violated
Alaskas  mandatory  insurance and financial responsibility  laws.
When Bradshaw applied for license reinstatement in 2007, DMV told
him  that he had to pay a $100 reinstatement fee.  Bradshaw  sued
the  state,  arguing  that the ten-year  statute  of  limitations
barred  DMV  from charging him the $100 reinstatement  fee.   The
superior  court  granted  summary  judgment  to  the  state   and
dismissed Bradshaws complaint.  Alaska Statute 28.15.271(b)(3)(A)
is  the authority for a $100 reinstatement fee.  Because imposing
the  $100 reinstatement fee was not an action within the  meaning
of  the statute of limitations, and because Bradshaws license had
been suspended within the meaning of AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(A) within
the ten years preceding his reinstatement application, we affirm.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
          Joseph  Bradshaw was involved in a February 1995  motor
vehicle accident that resulted in over $2,000 in property damage.
DMV  ordered  that  Bradshaws drivers license  be  suspended  for
ninety days because he was uninsured at the time of the accident,
a  violation  of the Alaska Mandatory Automobile Insurance  Act.1
Because Bradshaw had also failed to comply with the Motor Vehicle
Safety  Responsibility Act,2  DMV ordered  that  his  license  be
suspended  for  three  years or until proof of  future  financial
responsibility is provided.3
          In  June  1995 the Department of Public Safety held  an
administrative  hearing  to  review  DMVs  decision  to   suspend
Bradshaws license.  The hearing officer affirmed the decision  to
suspend   Bradshaws  license  under  both  the  Alaska  Mandatory
Automobile   Insurance   Act  and  the   Motor   Vehicle   Safety
Responsibility Act.  The hearing officer issued written decisions
stating that Bradshaws license would be suspended effective  July
15, 1995.
          Bradshaws  suspension was ostensibly for  three  years.
But  AS  28.20.240,   Bradshaws orders  of  suspension,  and  the
hearing  officers decisions all stated that any suspension  would
continue  after the initial suspension period until  he  provided
proof  of financial responsibility for the future.4  Most drivers
demonstrate   proof   of  future  financial   responsibility   by
purchasing insurance and an additional special service from their
automobile liability insurer, which agrees to inform DMV  if  the
insurance lapses.  The insurer provides the driver with an  SR-22
certificate confirming the purchase of this specialized service.5
          Bradshaw  was  eligible to seek  reinstatement  of  his
drivers  license  as  early  as  February  1996  because  he  had
shortened  his three-year suspension by paying the  other  driver
for  the damage Bradshaw caused.  He took steps to reinstate  his
license in 1998, but according to a DMV supervisors affidavit, he
complained about having to purchase SR-22 insurance coverage  and
did  not  complete the reinstatement process.6  Because  Bradshaw
failed   to   provide   DMV  proof  of   his   future   financial
responsibility, his license remained suspended.
          In  June  2007  Bradshaw formally applied  to  DMV  for
reinstatement.   [Exc.  8]   He  indicated   on   his   certified
application  that  his license had been suspended  and  that  the
suspension  was  still  in  effect.  In  response,  DMV  informed
Bradshaw  that he had to pay a $100 reinstatement fee in addition
to the customary $15 or $20 renewal fee.
          The  authority for charging the $100 reinstatement  fee
is  AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(A), which states that a person who applies
for  reinstatement of a drivers license under AS 28.15.211  shall
pay  a  fee  of  . . . $100 if the persons drivers  license  has,
          within the 10 years preceding the application, been suspended,
revoked, or limited under the provisions of this chapter  .  .  .
only once.  (Emphasis added.)
          Bradshaw objected to paying the $100 reinstatement  fee
and sued the Department of Administration, DMV, and its director,
Duane  Bannock, in superior court.  Bradshaw alleged that because
the  incident that is involved in this matter happen[ed] over  10
years  ago, the reinstatement fee did not apply to him.  He  also
sought damages of more than $1.5 million.
          In  March  2008 the superior court granted  the  states
motion  to  dismiss Director Bannock from the  case  because  the
complaint did not state a cognizable claim against him.7  In July
2008 the state filed a motion for summary judgment.  The superior
court  granted the motion and dismissed Bradshaws complaint  with
prejudice.   The  court  held that to have  his  drivers  license
reinstated,   Bradshaw  had  to  pay  both  the  statutory   $100
reinstatement fee and the $20 renewal fee.
          Bradshaw appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
     A.   Standard of Review
          We  review grants of summary judgment de novo,  drawing
all  permissible factual inferences in favor of, and viewing  the
facts  in the light most favorable to, the non-prevailing party.8
We  affirm  grants of summary judgment if there  are  no  genuine
issues  of material fact and the prevailing party is entitled  to
judgment as a matter of law.9
          Questions  regarding the interpretation and application
of  a  statute  are  questions of  law  to  which  we  apply  our
independent judgment.10  Our goal when interpreting a statute  is
to  give  effect to the intent of the law-making  body  with  due
regard for the meaning that the language in the provision conveys
to  others.11   We  will  adopt the rule  of  law  that  is  most
persuasive  in  light  of  precedent, reason,  and  policy  after
considering  the  plain meaning of the statute,  the  legislative
purpose  of  the statute, and the intent of the statute.12   When
reviewing  an  agency decision involving statutory interpretation
and   determination   of  legislative  intent,   we   apply   the
substitution  of judgment standard.13   But we may  defer  to  an
agencys  interpretation  of a statute if undefined  or  ambiguous
terms appear in the statute.14
     B.   Whether  the  Statute of Limitations Bars Imposing  the
          $100 Restatement Fee on Bradshaw
          
          This    case   turns   primarily   on   the   statutory
interpretation  of  AS  28.15.271.  But  we  must  first  resolve
Bradshaws   contention  that  Alaskas  statute   of   limitations
altogether bars DMV from imposing the reinstatement fee  on  him.
Bradshaws complaint asserted that [t]he incident that is involved
in  this  matter  happen[ed] over 10 years ago.  Bradshaw  argues
that  the  ten-year  statute  of  limitations  contained  in   AS
09.10.100   prevents   the   state  from   enforcing   the   $100
reinstatement fee provision in AS 28.15.271 because this case  is
based  on  information that is over 11 years old.  The  uninsured
accident and Bradshaws license suspension both occurred in  1995,
more  than ten years before he applied for reinstatement in 2007.
It is unclear whether he considers the accident or the suspension
the event that triggered the ten-year statute.
          DMV argues that statutes of limitations act as defenses
to  causes of action, that DMV has not brought an action  against
Bradshaw, and that statutes of limitations do not apply  to  fees
DMV must charge administratively.
          Alaska Statute 09.10.100 is Alaskas general statute  of
limitations  provision.15  It states that  a  party  must  bring,
within  ten  years, any action for a cause not  provided  for  in
another  statute.  Statutes of limitations attempt  to  strike  a
balance between ensuring that claimants have enough time to  file
claims  and  protecting  persons from due process  concerns  that
arise from stale charges.16  They do so by barring untimely causes
of  actions  or,  in the words of section .100, action[s]  for  a
cause.17    A  cause of action is a situation or state  of  facts
which  entitles a party to sustain an action and  gives  him  the
right to seek judicial interference in his behalf.18
             But  a government agency responsible for charging  a
fee when an applicant seeks a license is not asserting a cause of
action  when  it  requires the applicant to  pay  the  fee  as  a
condition  of  license  reinstatement.   Nor  is  it  seeking  an
affirmative  remedy  or judicial relief.  DMV  only  imposes  the
reinstatement fee when a person applies for a reinstated license.19
DMV  could  not  have  filed  a  lawsuit  to  force  Bradshaw  to
affirmatively seek reinstatement.  And DMV did not  sue  Bradshaw
to  collect  the  fee.  It was not attempting to obtain  judicial
relief  against Bradshaw; its administrative attempt  to  collect
the  fee  only responded to Bradshaws administrative  application
for   reinstatement.   DMVs  attempt  to  enforce  section   .271
consequently  is  not  an  action  subject  to  the  statute   of
limitations, and AS 09.10.100 does not prevent DMV from  charging
Bradshaw the reinstatement fee.
     C.   Whether,  Within  the  Meaning of  AS  28.15.271(b)(3),
          Bradshaws   License  Had  Been  Suspended  Within   the
          Previous Ten Years
          
          We  next  turn  to  the meaning of AS  28.15.271(b)(3).
Alaska  Statute 28.15.271(b)(3)(A) requires a person who  applies
for  license reinstatement to pay a $100 reinstatement fee if the
applicants drivers license has, within the 10 years preceding the
application, been suspended . . . only once.20
          Bradshaw  argues that DMVs $100 reinstatement fee  does
not  apply to him because this case is based on information  that
is  over 11 years old.  Bradshaws argument is very terse, and  he
is pro se.  We interpret his argument as contending that the $100
reinstatement fee would only apply if he had sought reinstatement
within  ten  years  of  the  administrative  act  of  suspension.
Because DMV suspended his license on July 15, 1995, more than ten
years   before  he  sought  reinstatement  in  2007,   subsection
.271(b)(3)(A)  does  not  apply to  him.   Therefore  DMV  cannot
condition reinstatement on payment of the $100 fee.
          DMV  argues  that  the  language of  the  fee  statute,
section .271, unambiguously provides that the fee applies if  the
persons license was in the state of suspension at any time during
the   preceding   ten  years.   It  further  argues   that   this
construction  is correct because the legislature  did  not  draft
section  .271 to make the date of suspension the critical  event,
as  it did in a comparable statutory provision.21  It also argues
that imposing the fee here does not create an anomalous result.
          [T]he  threshold question in ascertaining  the  correct
interpretation  of  a  statute is whether  the  language  of  the
statute  is  clear or arguably ambiguous.22  Read  in  isolation,
subsection  .271(b)(3)(A) does not clearly indicate  whether  the
statutes  use of the phrase been suspended refers to  as Bradshaw
implies   the  act of suspension, or  as the state contends   the
status  of suspension.  Suspended could be read to refer  to  the
initial administrative act of suspending a drivers license.  This
would  mean  the $100 fee would apply only if the  first  day  of
suspension  were  within the ten-year period  before  the  driver
applied  for  reinstatement.  Under this interpretation,  if  DMV
suspended a license on January 1, 2000, DMV could not charge  the
$100 reinstatement fee if the driver applied for reinstatement on
January 2, 2010.
          Alternatively, suspended could be permissibly  read  to
refer  to  the status of suspension.  If so, the $100  fee  would
apply if the drivers license had been in a state of suspension at
any  time in the ten years before application, even if the  first
day  of suspension were more than ten years before.  Because  the
statute  uses  the  phrase  has . . .  been  suspended,  this  is
probably   the   best  interpretation  of  the  statutes   words.
(Emphasis   added.)    Nonetheless,  both   interpretations   are
grammatically permissible under a plain reading of  the  statute,
if its words are read in isolation.
          The  legislatures use of the phrase has been  suspended
in  another  section of AS 28.15 helps indicate the  most  likely
meaning  of  the  phrase as it is used in AS  28.15.271.   Alaska
Statute 28.15.211(a) states that a person whose drivers license .
.  . has been suspended . . . may not apply for a new license . .
.   until   the  expiration  of  a  statutorily  defined  period.
(Emphasis added.)   This subsection implies that it is the  state
          of suspension that matters.  And AS 28.15.211(c), which permits a
suspended  driver  to seek reinstatement upon  payment  of  fees,
including   a  reinstatement  fee,  refers  to  the   period   of
suspension, implying that it is the status of suspension, not the
date  of  suspension, that is important in the context of license
reinstatement.  Also, as DMV argues, the legislature demonstrated
when  it wrote AS 28.20.150(a) that it knew how to make the  date
of  suspension  the  critical event.23  Considered  together,  AS
28.15.271(b)(3),  AS  28.15.211,  and  AS  28.20.150(a)   provide
textual  clues  that  the legislature considered  the  status  of
suspension  to  be the trigger (or at least one of the  triggers)
for imposing a reinstatement fee.
          When  interpreting a statute, we look to the  statutory
purpose.   The  apparent purpose of the reinstatement  provisions
helps   convince  us  that  DMVs  interpretation  of   subsection
.271(b)(3)  is  correct.   As  we noted  above,  AS  28.15.211(c)
permits a driver to seek reinstatement upon payment of the proper
fees,   including  a  reinstatement  fee.  Subsection  .271(b)(3)
specifies  the  applicable reinstatement  fee.   That  subsection
contains  four  subsections that impose  different  reinstatement
fees,   ranging   from   $100  to  $500.24    For   example,   AS
28.15.271(b)(3)(A)  imposes  a  $100  reinstatement  fee  and  AS
28.15.271(b)(3)(B) imposes a $250 reinstatement fee.
          Nothing  in subsection .211(c) or subsection .271(b)(3)
implies  that  drivers seeking reinstatement of  their  suspended
drivers  licenses may be excused from paying at  least  the  $100
reinstatement  fee.    Although suspensions can  be  for  varying
lengths of time,25 all suspensions last until the applicant gives
proof   of   future  financial  responsibility.26    Interpreting
subsection  .271(b)(3)(A)s  ten-year  period  to  be  a   special
administrative statute of limitations that begins running on  the
date of DMVs suspending act would therefore mean no reinstatement
fee  could  be  assessed against an entire class of drivers  with
suspended licenses, i.e., those drivers whose licenses have  been
in  suspended status for more than ten years.   This result would
appear  to  be  contrary to subsection .211(c), which  permits  a
suspended  driver  to seek reinstatement  upon payment  of  fees,
including  a  reinstatement fee.  Subsection .211(c)  appears  to
require  any  driver  seeking  license  reinstatement  to  pay  a
reinstatement fee.  Nothing in the statutory scheme implies  that
anyone  seeking  reinstatement of a suspended license  may  avoid
paying  the  basic reinstatement fee of $100.  It is not  obvious
why  the passage of time would altogether excuse the holder of  a
suspended license from paying any reinstatement fee.
          Implicit  in  Bradshaws apparent argument  may  be  the
assumption  that  subsection  .271(b)(3)(A)  provides   suspended
drivers a ten-year statute of repose, after which the DMV may not
impose the $100 reinstatement fee.  In this he may be relying  on
the  phrase  within  the  10  years  preceding  the  application,
contained   in  both  subsection  .271(b)(3)(A)  and   subsection
.271(b)(3)(B).  To understand the meaning of that phrase,  it  is
necessary    to   read   the   statute   carefully.    Subsection
.271(b)(3)(A) imposes the $100 fee on drivers whose licenses have
been  suspended  only once within the past ten years;  subsection
          .271(b)(3)(B) imposes the $250 fee on drivers whose licenses have
been  suspended  two  or more times within the  past  ten  years.
Assuming   a   driver  with  multiple  suspensions   (necessarily
requiring  at  least  one  prior  reinstatement)  can  avoid  the
enhanced  $250  fee if the prior suspension ended more  than  ten
years  before the current reinstatement application, that driver,
despite  the  multiple  suspensions, pays  only  the  basic  $100
reinstatement fee.  The phrase within the 10 years preceding  the
application in subsection .271(b)(3)(B) sets a time period  after
which  past  suspensions   do  not  trigger  the  enhanced   fee.
Applicants with old suspensions who do not have to pay  the  $250
fee  must  still pay the $100 reinstatement fee under  subsection
.271(b)(3)(A).
          If  the  legislature had not included the phrase within
the   ten   years   preceding  the  application   in   subsection
.271(b)(3)(A), applicants with multiple suspensions who   do  not
have to pay the $250 fee would also not have to pay the $100  fee
because  the driver had not been suspended only once.  It appears
that  the  legislature intended the  phrase within the  10  years
preceding  the application in subsection .271(b)(3)(A) to  ensure
that  multiple  offenders would have to pay at least  $100.   The
legislature did not intend to provide for a period of repose  for
applicants with suspended licenses to avoid paying the basic $100
reinstatement fee.
          We  also consider legislative history when we interpret
a  statute.   But  the  legislative history of  this  statute  is
essentially neutral.  The requirement of a $100 reinstatement fee
in  AS  28.15.271(b)(3) was added in 1994 as part of a bill  that
provided  for  the revocation of drivers licenses of  minors  who
illegally  possessed  controlled substances  or  alcohol.27   The
purpose of the bill was deterring teenagers from engaging in  the
use  and  abuse  of  controlled  substances.28   Nothing  in  the
statutory  history shows any legislative intent  reflecting  what
suspended means in section .271.  The history therefore does  not
conflict with our interpretation of the statute.
          Thus,   although   DMV   and  Bradshaw   both   advance
grammatically permissible interpretations of the statute  and  AS
28.15.271(b)(3)s  meaning  is not immediately  self-evident,  our
analysis  shows  that  DMVs  reading best  gives  effect  to  the
legislatures  apparent intent.  Furthermore, we would  reach  the
same  result  even if we thought the statute were ambiguous.   We
give some deference to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute
by  the  agency charged with enforcing it.29  DMVs interpretation
and application of subsection .271(b)(3) is plausible, consistent
with   the   apparent  legislative  purpose,  and   grammatically
permissible.
          We  therefore conclude that section .271 looks  to  the
status  of  suspension for the purpose of measuring the  ten-year
period  for  imposing reinstatement fees.  If at any time  within
the  ten  years before reinstatement is sought, the  license  has
been  in  the  status  of suspension, the  reinstatement  fee  is
payable.    Bradshaw  indicated  in  his  application  that   his
suspension  was  still in effect as of 2007.  The superior  court
did  not  err in concluding that Bradshaw must pay the  $100  fee
          required by AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(A).
     D.   Whether AS 28.15.271(b)(3) Applies to Suspensions Under
          Chapters 20 or 22
          
          Bradshaws  appeal has not raised, even implicitly,  any
issue  of  whether  AS 28.15.271(b)(3) actually  applies  to  his
suspension,  but  an  alert reader might wonder  whether  we  are
implicitly   holding  that  it  does.   Subsection  .271(b)(3)(A)
instructs DMV to impose the $100 reinstatement fee if the persons
license  has . . . been suspended, revoked, or limited under  the
provisions  of  this chapter.  (Emphasis added.)  The  emphasized
phrase  seems to refer to Chapter 15.  But Bradshaws license  was
suspended  because he violated Chapter 20, the  Alaska  Mandatory
Automobile  Insurance  Act, and Chapter  22,  the  Motor  Vehicle
Safety  Responsibility  Act.   There  is  therefore  a  potential
question whether the phrase under the provisions of this  chapter
in   AS   18.15.271(b)(3)(A)  was  satisfied.    Possibly   other
provisions  in Title 28 have the effect of rendering  suspensions
under Chapter 20 and 22 as though they are suspensions under  the
provisions of Chapter 15.  It is also unclear whether the  phrase
under the provisions of this chapter modifies all the elements of
the  list suspended, revoked, or limited, or applies only to  the
immediate antecedent element of the list, limited.30  If it  were
the  latter,  the  phrase would not apply to reinstatement  of  a
suspended  license.  In any event, these issues were  not  raised
below  and have not been briefed by any party on appeal  and  are
therefore not properly before us.
IV.  CONCLUSION
          For these reasons, we AFFIRM.
_______________________________
     1    AS 28.22.011-.321.  AS 28.22.041 governs administrative
suspension  of drivers licenses for failure to provide  proof  of
insurance.  It states in relevant part:

          if  a  person fails to provide proof required
          under   AS   28.22.021  and  28.22.031,   the
          department shall suspend the drivers  license
          of  that  person for . . . not less  than  90
          days  if, within the preceding 10 years,  the
          person   has   not  had  a  drivers   license
          suspended  for violation of AS  28.22.011  or
          former AS 28.22.200.
          
     2      AS   28.20.010-.640.    The  Motor   Vehicle   Safety
Responsibility  Act  requires the operator  of  a  motor  vehicle
involved  in an accident [to] respond for damages and show  proof
of  financial ability to respond for damages in future  accidents
as  a  prerequisite to the persons exercise of the  privilege  of
operating a motor vehicle in the state.  AS 28.20.010.

     3    The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act states that
DMV  will  suspend the license of any driver of a  motor  vehicle
involved in an accident resulting in over $501 in damage  to  any
one  persons property unless that driver has previously furnished
or  immediately furnishes security or is otherwise excepted  from
furnishing such security.  AS 28.20.260.  AS 28.20.150(a),  which
governs the duration of the resulting suspension, provides that:

          [u]nless  a  suspension is  terminated  under
          other provisions of this chapter, an order of
          suspension  by  the  department  remains   in
          effect until terminated and a license may not
          be  renewed  or  issued  to  a  person  whose
          license is suspended until proof of financial
          responsibility for the future is provided and
               (1)   the  person deposits or  there  is
          deposited   on  behalf  of  the  person   the
          security  required under [the  Responsibility
          Act]; or
               (2)   three  years elapse following  the
          date of suspension.
          
     4     Likewise,  AS 28.20.150(a)(1) states that a  suspended
license may not be renewed or issued to a person whose license is
suspended until proof of financial responsibility for the  future
is  provided  and . . . the person deposits . .  .  the  security
required under this chapter.

     5     AS  28.20.390-.420 list the ways a driver may  provide
proof of financial responsibility for the future.

     6     Bradshaw  apparently sued DMV in 1998 over  the  SR-22
requirement,  but  his  complaint  was  dismissed  for  lack   of
prosecution.

     7    Bradshaw does not appeal that ruling.

     8     Rockstad v. Erikson, 113 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Alaska 2005)
(citing  Ellis  v.  City  of Valdez, 686 P.2d  700,  702  (Alaska
1984)).

     9    Id. (citing Witt v. State, Dept of Corr., 75 P.3d 1030,
1033 (Alaska 2003)).

     10     State  v.  Jeffery, 170 P.3d 226, 229  (Alaska  2007)
(citing  Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does 1-6, 141 P.3d  719,
722 (Alaska 2006)).

     11     S. Anchorage Concerned Coal., Inc. v. Municipality of
Anchorage  Bd.  of  Adjustment, 172 P.3d 768, 771  (Alaska  2007)
(quoting  Marlow v. Municipality of Anchorage, 889 P.2d 599,  602
(Alaska 1995)).

     12    Rubey v. Alaska Commn on Postsecondary Educ., 217 P.3d
413,  415 (Alaska 2009) (citing Premera Blue Cross v. State, Dept
of  Commerce,  Cmty. & Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins., 171  P.3d  1110,
1115 (Alaska 2007)).

     13    Alaska Pub. Offices Commn v. Stevens, 205 P.3d 321, 324
(Alaska  2009) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. State,  Dept
of Envtl. Conservation, 145 P.3d 561, 564 (Alaska 2006)).

     14     See, e.g., Flisock v. State, Div. of Ret. & Benefits,
818 P.2d 640, 643 n.4 (Alaska 1991).

     15    AS 09.10.100 provides that [a]n action for a cause not
otherwise  provided  for [by another statute]  may  be  commenced
within 10 years after the cause of action has accrued.

     16     Brotherton  v. Brotherton, 142 P.3d 1187,  1191  n.19
(Alaska 2006);  Long v. Holland Am. Line Westours, Inc., 26  P.3d
430,  439  &  n.13  (Alaska 2001) (Eastaugh, J.,  and  Fabe,  J.,
dissenting); West v. Buchanan, 981 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Alaska  1999)
([T]he   purpose  of  statutes  of  limitations  is  to   protect
defendants  from  the  injustices  that  may  result   from   the
prosecution of stale claims.).

     17    Roach v. Caudle, 954 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Alaska 1998) (We
have determined that the statute of limitations does not begin to
run until a cause of action accrues.).

     18    Fraticelli v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 375 F.2d
186,  188  n.6  (1st  Cir. 1967) (emphasis in original)  (quoting
Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1965)).

     19    AS 28.15.271(b).

     20    AS 28.15.271 states in pertinent part:

          (b)   In  addition to the fees under  (a)  of
          this section,
          . . . .
               (3)     a   person   who   applies   for
          reinstatement of a drivers license  under  AS
          28.15.211 shall pay a fee of
                    (A)   $100  if the persons  drivers
          license  has,  within the 10 years  preceding
          the application, been suspended, revoked,  or
          limited  under the provisions of this chapter
          . . . only once;
                    (B)   $250  if the persons  drivers
          license  has,  within the 10 years  preceding
          the application, been suspended, revoked,  or
          limited  under the provisions of this chapter
          . . . two or more times . . . .
          
     21     In  support,  DMV  cites  AS  28.20.150(a)(2),  which
provides that a license may not be renewed or issued to a  person
whose   license   is   suspended   until   proof   of   financial
responsibility for the future is provided and . . .  three  years
elapse following the date of suspension.  (Emphasis added.)

     22     Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.,  21
P.3d  344, 351 (Alaska 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting  K
Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293 n.4 (1988)).

     23    See note 21 above.

     24    AS 28.15.271(b)(3).

     25    See, e.g., AS 28.15.211(a)(1) (providing for one-month
suspension);  AS  28.15.181(g) (providing  for  suspension  until
licensee appears in court or pays fine).

     26      See  AS  28.20.240,  which  provides:  A  period  of
suspension   .   .   .   continues  until  proof   of   financial
responsibility for the future is provided.

     27     House  Bill  (H.B.) 299, 18th Leg., 2d Sess.  (Alaska
1994).

     28    An Act relating to revocation of a drivers license for
illegal  possession or use of a controlled substance  or  illegal
possession  or  consumption  of alcohol;  and  providing  for  an
effective  date:  Hearing  on H.B. 299 Before  the  H.  Judiciary
Comm.,  18th  Leg.,  2d Sess. (Alaska 1994)  (statement  of  Rep.
Cynthia Toohey).

     29     See, e.g., Flisock v. State, Div. of Ret. & Benefits,
818 P.2d 640, 643 n.4 (Alaska 1991) (stating that we may defer to
agencys  interpretation of statute where undefined  or  ambiguous
terms appear in statutory language); Municipality of Anchorage v.
Sisters  of  Providence in Wash., Inc., 628 P.2d 22,  31  (Alaska
1981)  (citing Union Oil of Ca. Co. v. Dept of Revenue, 560  P.2d
21, 25 (Alaska 1977)).

     30     The  latter reading complies with the last antecedent
rule  of statutory construction.  See 2A Norman J. Singer &  J.D.
Shambie  Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction  47.33  (7th
ed. 2007).

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