| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
|
| Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available byTouch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions |
|
|
|
|
|
This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
|
You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Schiel v. Union Oil Company of California (11/20/2009) sp-6436
Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Readers are
requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
of the Appellate Courts, 303 K Street, Anchorage,
Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
| JOSEPH SCHIEL, | ) |
| ) Supreme Court No. S- 13058 | |
| Plaintiff, | ) |
| ) U.S. District Court No. | |
| v. | ) 3:07-cv-00030 TMB |
| ) | |
| UNION OIL COMPANY OF | ) O P I N I O N |
| CALIFORNIA, | ) |
| ) No. 6436 - November 20, 2009 | |
| Defendant. | ) |
| ) | |
Certified Question from the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska,
Timothy M. Burgess, Judge.
Appearances: Peter R. Ehrhardt, Kenai, for
Plaintiff. Erin B. Marston, Marston & Cole,
P.C., Anchorage, for Defendant. John W.
Erickson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General,
Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney
General, Juneau, for Amicus Curiae State of
Alaska. Gary M. Guarino, Assistant United
States Attorney, and Nelson P. Cohen, United
States Attorney, Anchorage, and Gregory G.
Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, C.
Frederick Beckner III, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, J. Patrick Glynn, Director,
Torts Branch, David S. Fishback, Assistant
Director, Adam Bain, Senior Trial Counsel,
Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for
Amicus Curiae United States of America.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Eastaugh,
Carpeneti, Winfree, and Christen, Justices.
CARPENETI, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
We accepted certification in this case to determine
whether the 2004 amendments to AS 23.30.045(a) and AS 23.30.055
violate the plaintiffs right to equal protection or due process
under the Alaska Constitution. Applying minimum scrutiny, we
hold that they do not.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Joseph Schiel sued Union Oil Company of California
(UNOCAL or the company) for injuries he suffered when he was
working on UNOCALs Grayling Drilling Platform. Schiel was an
employee of Peak Oilfield Services at the time of the injury. He
lost two fingers when he was going down a ladder and put his hand
on a skid rail for balance; a rig jack moved on the skid rail and
crushed his hand. Peak paid workers compensation benefits to
Schiel. Schiel brought a third-party tort action against UNOCAL
in superior court, and the company removed the case to the United
States District Court. After removal to federal court, UNOCAL
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Alaska Workers
Compensation Act1 barred Schiels tort claims because the company
was Schiels statutory employer and therefore immune from suit.
Schiel opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,
contending that the 2004 amendments to the act, which expanded
its exclusive liability provisions to include project owners,
violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Alaska Constitution. At the same time he filed his summary
judgment motion, Schiel moved the United States District Court,
citing Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 407,2 to certify to
this court the question of the constitutionality of these
statutory amendments.
United States District Court Judge Timothy M. Burgess
issued a certification order requesting that we answer two
questions: (1) whether the 2004 amendments to AS 23.30.045(a) and
.055 violate the Equal Protection provisions of the Alaska
Constitution; and (2) whether the 2004 amendments to AS
23.30.045(a) and .055 violate the Due Process provisions of the
Alaska Constitution. We agreed to accept certification, heard
oral argument on the matter, and now answer both questions in the
negative.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A decision by this court to accept a certified question
from another court under Appellate Rule 407(a) involves
determinative questions of Alaska law for which there is no
controlling precedent.3 In deciding a certified question of law,
we must stand in the shoes of the certifying court, yet exercise
our independent judgment. 4 We exercise our independent judgment,
selecting the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of
precedent, reason, and policy.5
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Alaska Statutes 23.30.045(a) and 23.30.055 Do Not
Violate Schiels Right to Equal Protection Under the
Alaska Constitution.
In 2004 the Twenty-Third Alaska State Legislature
amended the Alaska Workers Compensation Act, extending liability
for workers compensation coverage to project owners and providing
immunity from tort liability to both general contractors and
project owners.6 Before enactment of these amendments, a general
contractor was liable for workers compensation benefits to a
subcontractors employee when the subcontractor failed to secure
workers compensation;7 in addition, an injured worker could sue a
general contractor for negligence even though the general
contractor had paid workers compensation benefits because the
general contractor was not an employer as defined in former AS
23.30.055.8
Alaska Statute 23.30.045(a) now provides:
An employer is liable for and shall secure
the payment to employees of compensation
payable under AS 23.30.041, 23.30.050,
23.30.095, 23.30.145, and 23.30.180
23.30.215. If the employer is a
subcontractor and fails to secure the payment
of compensation to its employees, the
contractor is liable for and shall secure the
payment of compensation to employees of the
subcontractor. If the employer is a
contractor and fails to secure the payment of
compensation to its employees or the
employees of a subcontractor, the project
owner is liable for and shall secure the
payment of the compensation to employees of
the contractor and employees of a
subcontractor, as applicable.[9]
The 2004 amendments expanded the definition of employer for
purposes of the exclusive liability provision of the workers
compensation act to include any person who is potentially liable
for securing payment of compensation.10
Schiel argues that the 2004 amendments to AS
23.30.045(a) and .055 violate his right to equal protection under
the Alaska Constitution because they impermissibly classify
injured workers into two classes those who can sue in tort and
recover full damages for their injury and those who are limited
to receiving workers compensation benefits.11 UNOCAL asserts that
the workers compensation statute already makes this
classification, so any equal protection challenge should focus on
the statutes classification of potential third-party defendants.
We agree with Schiel that he meets the threshold showing of
different treatment of similarly situated individuals.12 As
Schiel points out, if a project owner and subcontractor are
equally negligent in causing a job site accident that injures
their employees, the project owners employees can potentially
recover both tort damages and workers compensation benefits,
while the subcontractors employees are limited to workers
compensation benefits. But the question before us is whether
this disparate treatment violates the constitution.
Article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution
provides in part that all persons are equal and entitled to equal
rights, opportunities, and protection under the law. To
determine whether a statute violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Alaska Constitution, we apply a sliding scale approach
which places a greater or lesser burden on the state to justify a
classification depending on the importance of the individual
right involved.13 Equal protection analysis involves a three-step
process under the Alaska Constitution, in which the court
determines the weight of the individual interest at stake, the
importance of the governments interest, and the closeness of the
fit between the statute and the governments objective.14 For
individual interests that are not very important, the state only
needs to show that its objectives are legitimate and that the
legislation bears a substantial relationship to its purpose.15 On
the other hand, if the legislation impairs one of the most
important individual interests, the statute must further a
compelling state interest and be the least restrictive means
available to accomplish the states purpose.16 Legislation that
impacts important rights must have a close relationship to an
important state interest.17
1. Schiels interest is economic.
Schiel asks us to consider his interest important
rather than simply economic, relying on cases that have
identified the ability to engage in a particular occupation or
trade as important. UNOCAL and amicus curiae the State of Alaska
contend that the interest involved is economic and only entitled
to minimum scrutiny, although they characterize the economic
interest differently. The state identifies Schiels interest as
the right to receive benefits for a work-related injury, while
UNOCAL classifies it as the right to seek tort damages.
We have held both that an interest in workers
compensation benefits and the right to seek tort damages are
economic interests subject to minimum scrutiny.18 Therefore, the
interest at stake here is subject only to minimum scrutiny. We
have also held that there is no fundamental right to sue a
specific party.19
The cases on which Schiel relies in arguing that his
interest is important are distinguishable. Malabed v. North
Slope Borough20 and State, Departments of Transportation and Labor
v. Enserch Alaska Construction, Inc.21 involved constitutional
challenges to laws that restricted employment opportunities for
some workers. Malabed involved a challenge to a North Slope
Borough ordinance that created mandatory employment-related
preferences for Native Americans in borough government.22 Enserch
Alaska Construction, Inc. concerned a challenge to a state
statute that created certain local-hire preferences in public
works projects.23
Schiel does not show how his inability to sue the
project owner for negligence is tied to employment. Instead, he
asserts that his loss of earning capacity from the work-related
injury and his inability to be fully compensated for the injury
impair his ability to sustain himself and therefore affect an
important economic interest.24 But as UNOCAL points out, a
damages award against a third party is not the same as a source
of sustaining income.25 Schiels argument could apply to many
injured workers who have never been able to sue a third-party
tortfeasor the amount of workers compensation benefits may not
fully compensate an injured worker for his loss and the injury
may prevent him from returning to work in a specific industry,
thereby interfering with his ability to sustain himself. Yet we
have held that the interest in receiving workers compensation
benefits is an economic interest that is subject only to minimum
scrutiny.26 We recognize that the workers compensation system may
yield inequities in some cases: As we noted in C.J. v. State,
Department of Corrections, [w]orkers whose wages are low, who
have been the victims of blatantly negligent conduct, or who
suffer exceptional noneconomic injuries bear the brunt of a
system that may benefit their co-workers or employers but
certainly does not benefit them.27 Schiels interest is no
different from that of the worker in Glover v. State, Department
of Transportation, Alaska Marine Highway System:28 the right to
sue the entity of his choice and potentially the ability to
collect a greater amount of money.29 That interest is economic.30
The 2004 amendments to AS 23.30.045 and .055 are therefore
subject to minimum scrutiny.
2. The states objectives are legitimate.
The next step of equal protection analysis is to
identify the states objectives to see if they are legitimate.31
We consider the challenged statutory provisions in light of the
purposes of the entire workers compensation act as well as the
2004 amendments.32 Based on statements made by legislators during
consideration of the 2004 amendments,33 the parties and amici
curiae identify several legislative objectives: to ensure or
expand workers compensation coverage for workers, to increase
workplace safety, to prevent double dipping, and to provide
protection from tort liability to those who are potentially
liable for securing workers compensation coverage. All of these
purposes are legitimate.
Schiel concedes that extending workers compensation
coverage is a legitimate state interest but contends that absent
some evidence that there was a significant problem with employers
failing to provide coverage, the legislature was simply solving a
nonexistent problem. Schiel also asserted at oral argument
before us that the amendments were unnecessary because AS
23.30.165 gave an injured employee the right to file a lien on
property related to his job, making a property owner potentially
liable for workers compensation benefits even before the 2004
amendments.34 Whether legislative action is necessary to solve a
specific problem does not determine whether a legislative goal is
legitimate. A legislative goal is legitimate if it properly
falls within the police power of the state.35 We have recognized
that the purpose of the Alaska Workers Compensation Act ensuring
the quick, efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of
indemnification and medical benefits to injured workers at a
reasonable cost to employers is a legitimate goal.36 Expanding
or ensuring coverage for workers is also a legitimate goal.
Schiel takes issue with two of the identified
objectives: preventing double dipping and providing protection
for entities that are only potentially liable, rather than
actually liable, for workers compensation benefits. Schiel
argues that double dipping, in the sense of an injured worker
getting a double recovery, was legally impossible before the 2004
amendments, so elimination of that type of double dipping would
not be a legitimate objective of the legislation. Our review of
the legislative history leads us to conclude that the legislature
was concerned with employers having to pay both for workers
compensation benefits and for tort damages.37
Even though an employer who secured workers
compensation insurance was immune from suit under the former
statute, it could agree in a contract to indemnify a potential
third party for damages arising from a work-related accident.38
The master services contract between UNOCAL and Peak had an
indemnification provision requiring Peak to indemnify UNOCAL for
any damages related to personal injury at the work site. The
legislature appears to have been interested in protecting
contractors who paid workers compensation benefits from having to
indemnify the project owner for damages: Senator Ralph Seekins,
sponsor of the legislation, cited an example of a subcontractor
who had to pay workers compensation benefits but, because of an
indemnification agreement, also had to defend against a tort suit
the worker filed against the project owner.39
Several witnesses testified in favor of the bill
because it would prevent companies from having to pay both
workers compensation benefits and tort damages. Jack Miller,
counsel to the Alaska State Chamber of Commerce, testified that
the state, municipalities, and private companies all imposed
liability for both workers compensation and tort remedies onto
the subcontractor or contractor, so that these employers had a
double liability under current law. Eden Larson, president of
the Associated Builders and Contractors, supported the
legislation because of concerns about contractors having to pay
both workers compensation benefits and tort damages under
indemnification agreements.
Prevention of double payment by an employer is a
legitimate state interest because it protects the basic trade-off
that underlies the workers compensation system: workers receive
compensation for work-related injuries regardless of fault, and
employers have limited liability.40 Preventing double payment is
also related to the workers compensation acts purpose of ensuring
the quick, efficient, fair, and predictable delivery of indemnity
and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to
the employers who are subject to the provisions of this chapter.41
Some witnesses questioned whether preventing double payment was a
legitimate legislative goal because those who were paying twice
were contracting away their own rights, but there is no question
that double payment is an issue appropriate for legislative
action, even if it might have been addressed differently
elsewhere.42
Providing protection from tort liability for those who
are potentially liable for workers compensation benefits is also
consistent with the basic trade-off that underlies the workers
compensation system43 and is related to providing coverage to
workers at a reasonable cost to employers. The legislature
extended liability for workers compensation to project owners and
in exchange provided them with protection from tort suits.
Although a project owner may rarely pay workers compensation
benefits, as Larsons treatise notes, a general contractor or
project owner is under a continuing potential liability; it has
thus assumed a burden in exchange for which it might well be
entitled to immunity from damage suits, regardless of whether on
the facts of a particular case actual liability exists.44 For all
of the reasons we have discussed, we conclude that the
legislatures objectives in enacting the 2004 amendments to AS
23.30.045 and .055 are legitimate.
3. The legislation bears a fair and substantial
relationship to the states objectives.
The final step in equal protection analysis involving
an economic interest is to determine whether the challenged
legislation bears a fair and substantial relationship to the
states objectives.45 We hold that the 2004 amendments have a fair
and substantial relationship to the states objectives. The
amendments plainly further the acts goal of ensuring provision of
workers compensation benefits at a reasonable cost to employers
by (1) preventing double payment by subcontractors because the
general contractor and project owner can no longer be sued for
tort damages and (2) shielding those who are potentially liable
for benefits from negligence claims.
Schiel argues that the 2004 amendments do not have a
sufficiently close fit to the legislatures goals to withstand an
equal protection challenge, maintaining that they took away
rights from injured workers without any meaningful quid pro quo.
He contends that the legislature should have extended the
exclusive remedy provision only to those general contractors or
project owners who actually paid workers compensation benefits,
not to all who might be potentially liable for payment of
benefits, essentially saying that the legislature should have
provided a closer fit between the objectives and the legislation.
But we have never required a perfect fit between a
legislative classification and a goal when applying minimum
scrutiny.46 As we noted in C.J. v. State, Department of
Corrections,47 policies reviewed under minimum scrutiny are not
unconstitutional simply because a litigant is able to propose a
regulation that would further the legislative goal in a more
rational manner.48 Although it may not happen in many cases, a
contractor may not have workers compensation insurance. By
extending liability for workers compensation to project owners,
the 2004 amendments provide workers with more entities that can
be held liable for workers compensation.49 In addition, in an
instance where no employer has obtained workers compensation
insurance, a general contractor or project owner may have more
income or assets available to pay an injured worker, which could
benefit some injured workers.50 The justification for permitting
the employee of a project owner to sue a subcontractor for
negligence but not permitting the employee of a subcontractor to
sue the project owner is that the subcontractor would never be
liable to the project owners employee for workers compensation
benefits while a project owner might be liable for workers
compensation benefits to the subcontractors employee. Even
though the change in policy adversely impacts some injured
workers, like Schiel, it may benefit others.
Schiel also argues that the 2004 amendments were not
necessary because the law already required employers to secure
workers compensation insurance and provided remedies in the event
the employer failed to do so. But the legislature could decide
that the available remedies, such as a prohibition on raising
certain defenses in a negligence action and possible fines or
stop work orders,51 did not adequately address the issue of
uninsured contractors. The legislature has the power to
substitute or add remedies to address the problem of
subcontractors or contractors who did not carry workers
compensation insurance.
In sum, because the 2004 amendments to the workers
compensation statute deal with an economic interest and bear a
fair and substantial relationship to legitimate state goals, they
do not violate Schiels right to equal protection under the Alaska
Constitution.
C. The 2004 Amendments Do Not Violate Schiels Procedural
Due Process Rights.
Schiel next argues that the 2004 amendments violate his
right to procedural due process because they deny him access to
the courts. According to Schiel, AS 23.30.055 restricts his
access to the courts by denying him the opportunity to bring a
negligence action against the project owner and fails to provide
an adequate alternative remedy for him to seek redress. UNOCAL
and amici curiae reply that Schiels alternative remedy is the
workers compensation system. Schiel responds that the state has
not provided a substitute remedy to him but has simply erased
[his] right to access the courts.
We held in Bush v. Reid52 that the Due Process Clause of
the Alaska Constitution encompasses a right of access to the
courts.53 Article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. To determine whether a
government action violates due process, we apply the three-part
test from Mathews v. Eldridge.54 As adopted for Alaska, the test
balances:
(1) the private interest affected by the
official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and (3) the governments interest,
including the fiscal and administrative
burdens that additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.[55]
Here, Schiel identifies his private interest as his
right to bring a tort claim for his injury or as a right of
access to the courts, which he says is an important right. UNOCAL
asserts that Schiels right of access to the courts is not
implicated by the 2004 amendments, noting that the right of
access to the courts is infringed only when government action
completely bars access and provides no alternative remedy.
Amicus curiae the State of Alaska asserts that Schiel still has
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner because he can bring a workers compensation
claim. (And, in fact, Schiel has done so.) Amicus curiae the
United States echoes this assertion, maintaining that Schiels due
process rights are not violated because the workers compensation
system provides a substantial and efficient remedy for injured
workers.
We hold that Schiels right to access the courts is not
infringed by the 2004 amendments to the workers compensation act
because he still has a substantial and efficient remedy
available. We previously examined whether the exclusive
liability provision of the Alaska Workers Compensation Act
violated due process by restricting access to the courts in
Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore.56 There, a worker sued a
number of parties after he fell from scaffolding at work.57 The
workers employer, a subcontractor, was immune from suit because
of the exclusive liability section of the workers compensation
statute.58 The project management company argued that the
exclusive liability provision of the workers compensation act
violated its right of access to the courts because it was unable
to raise the defense of the employers contributory negligence.59
We stated there that due process require[s] that a substantial
and efficient remedy remains available or that one be provided
when a preexisting defense is statutorily limited.60
The alternative remedy of workers compensation is a
sufficient alternative remedy for Schiel, just as it was for the
injured worker in Glover.61 Schiels case may initially appear
different from Glover because Schiel could already get workers
compensation benefits from his employer and now has no ability to
recover negligence damages from UNOCAL. In contrast, Glover
involved substituting a workers compensation claim for a civil
suit under the Jones Act.62 But Schiel has already received some
compensation for his injury, even though it is limited to workers
compensation benefits.63 The expansion of the exclusive liability
provision does not erect[] a direct and insurmountable barrier in
front of the courthouse doors64 even if it does limit the amount
of damages Schiel is able to recover for his injury.
We rejected an argument similar to Schiels in McCarter
v. Alaska National Insurance Co.65 There, an injured worker
argued that his right of access to the courts was violated by AS
23.30.015(g), which required him to pay all of the proceeds of a
third-party claim to his employer to reimburse the employer for
workers compensation benefits.66 The worker also argued, as
Schiel does here, that the statute deprived him of a previously
available right.67 We found no constitutional violation there,
noting that there is no Constitutional right to retain the
proceeds of a third party settlement where the amount of the
settlement plus the compensation benefits do not grant full legal
redress to the injured worker.68 Because Schiel is still able to
get compensation for his work-related injury through the workers
compensation system, the 2004 amendments do not implicate his
right of access to the courts.
D. Alaska Statute 23.30.055 Does Not Violate Schiels
Substantive Due Process Rights.
Finally, Schiel argues that as applied to the facts of
his case, AS 23.30.055 violates his right to substantive due
process. He contends that the differential treatment he receives
because he is employed by a subcontractor rather than the project
owner has no rational relationship to legitimate state goals.
UNOCAL and amici curiae answer that the legislation is rationally
related to a legitimate government interest and therefore does
not violate Schiels substantive due process rights.
For a law to violate substantive due process, it must
have no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose.69 Because we have determined that
the 2004 amendments do not violate the equal protection clause of
the Alaska Constitution, we hold that the amendments do not
violate substantive due process.70
The 2004 amendments have a reasonable relationship to
the legitimate governmental purpose of expanding workers
compensation coverage. Schiel concedes that enhancing the
certainty that an injured worker will receive workers
compensation benefits is a legitimate legislative purpose. Even
a small increase in the number of workers receiving workers
compensation benefits would justify the legislatures action.71 By
expanding the entities that are potentially liable for workers
compensation benefits, the 2004 amendments are reasonably related
to this goal.
Alaska Statute 23.30.055 is also rationally related to
preventing payment of both workers compensation benefits and tort
damages by one employer and to shielding an employer who is
potentially liable for workers compensation benefits from suit.
As discussed above, the rationale for treating an employee of a
subcontractor differently from the employee of the project owner
is that the subcontractor is not liable for workers compensation
benefits to the project owners employee. Although Schiel is
almost certainly disadvantaged by the 2004 amendments, the
amendments do not violate his substantive due process rights.
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that the 2004 amendments to AS 23.30.045(a) and
.055 do not Hviolate Schiels rights to equal protection and due
process under the Alaska Constitution.
_______________________________
1 AS 23.30.001-.400.
2 Rule 407(a) provides:
The supreme court may answer questions of law
certified to it by the Supreme Court of the
United States, a court of appeals of the
United States, a United States district
court, a United States bankruptcy court or
United States bankruptcy appellate panel,
when requested by the certifying court if
there are involved in any proceeding before
it questions of law of this state which may
be determinative of the cause then pending in
the certifying court and as to which it
appears to the certifying court there is no
controlling precedent in the decisions of the
supreme court of this state.
3 Kallstrom v. United States, 43 P.3d 162, 164-65 (Alaska
2002).
4 Edenshaw v. Safeway, Inc., 186 P.3d 568, 569 (Alaska
2008) (quoting Berg v. Popham, 113 P.3d 604, 607 (Alaska 2005)).
5 Kallstrom, 43 P.3d at 165 (citing M.A. v. United
States, 951 P.2d 851, 853 (Alaska 1998)).
6 Ch. 80, SLA 2004.
7 Former AS 23.30.045.
8 Miller v. Northside Danzi Constr. Co., 629 P.2d 1389,
1391 (Alaska 1981).
9 This type of statute is referred to as a contractor-
under or statutory-employer statute. See 6 Arthur Larson & Lex
K. Larson, Larsons Workers Compensation Law 111.04[1][a] (2008).
10 Ch. 80, 4, SLA 2004 (codified at AS 23.30.055).
11 At oral argument before us, Schiel also argued that the
legislation impermissibly classified employers into two classes:
those who can seek reimbursement from third-party tortfeasors for
workers compensation benefits and those who cannot. Because
Schiel did not raise this argument in his briefing, it is waived.
Kellis v. Crites, 20 P.3d 1112, 1114-15 (Alaska 2001) (citing
Gunderson v. Univ. of Alaska, Fairbanks, 902 P.2d 323, 327 n.5
(Alaska 1995)).
12 See Glover v. State, Dept of Transp., Alaska Marine
Highway Sys., 175 P.3d 1240, 1257 (Alaska 2008) (citing Matanuska-
Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 397 (Alaska
1997) (stating that litigant must show different treatment of
similarly situated individuals to satisfy the threshold
requirement of an equal protection claim)).
13 C.J. v. State, Dept of Corr., 151 P.3d 373, 378 (Alaska
2006) (quoting Wilkerson v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs.,
Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 993 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Alaska 1999);
Alaska Pac. Assur. Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
14 Glover, 175 P.3d at 1256.
15 Id. at 1257 (quoting C.J., 151 P.3d at 378).
16 C.J., 151 P.3d at 378 (citing State, Depts of Transp. &
Labor v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 631-32
(Alaska 1989)).
17 Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 421 (Alaska
2003) (citing Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d at 633).
18 Williams v. State, Dept of Revenue, 895 P.2d 99, 104
(Alaska 1995) (holding that workers compensation benefits are an
economic interest); C.J., 151 P.3d at 379 (holding that
restrictions on types and amounts of damages that can be pursued
in court impair economic interests only).
19 Turner Constr. Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467, 471 (Alaska
1988).
20 70 P.3d 416 (Alaska 2003).
21 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989).
22 Malabed, 70 P.3d at 418-19.
23 Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d at 625-26.
24 Cf. Wilkerson v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs.,
Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 993 P.2d 1018, 1023-24 (Alaska
1999) (noting that construction work is a source of sustaining
income while foster care is not).
25 See C.J. v. State, Dept of Corr., 151 P.3d 373, 379-80
(Alaska 2006) (stating that noneconomic damages are not a source
of sustaining income).
26 Gilmore v. Alaska Workers Comp. Bd., 882 P.2d 922, 927
(Alaska 1994), superceded by statute on other grounds as
recognized in Dougan v. Aurora Elec. Inc., 50 P.3d 789, 797
(Alaska 2002).
27 C.J., 151 P.3d at 381.
28 175 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2008).
29 Id. at 1258.
30 Id.
31 Chiropractors for Justice v. State, 895 P.2d 962, 968
(Alaska 1995) (citing Alaska Pac. Assur. Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d
264, 269 (Alaska 1984)).
32 Id. at 969.
33 Cf. Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & Retailers
Assn v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 135 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Alaska
2006) (quoting drafter testimony and sponsor statement to show
legislative intent). The 2004 amendments had no separate
statement of legislative intent. See ch. 80, SLA 2004.
34 Schiels argument that a worker could effectively get
compensation benefits from a project owner because of the lien
provisions of the act appears to be incorrect. AS 23.30.165
permits an employee or beneficiary entitled to compensation to
file a lien on all of the property in connection with the
construction, preservation, maintenance, or operation of which
the work of the employee was being performed at the time of the
injury or death. A lien under this section extends only to the
employers interest in the property affected by the lien. AS
23.30.165(c). Before the 2004 amendments, a project owner was
not an employer under the workers compensation act. See former
AS 23.30.055, .395(13) (2004). The 2004 amendments made a
project owner an employer only for purposes of AS 23.30.055.
35 Commercial Fisheries Entry Commn v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d
1255, 1264 (Alaska 1980) (quoting State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1,
12 (Alaska 1978)).
36 Williams v. State, Dept of Revenue, 895 P.2d 99, 104
(Alaska 1995) (quoting ch. 79, 1, SLA 1988).
37 The parties agree that double dipping was used to mean
different things during the legislative hearings about the
amendments, including prevention of double payment. Double
dipping is defined as the practice of receiving compensation,
benefits, etc. from two or more sources in a way regarded as
unethical, as from a military pension and a government job.
Websters New World College Dictionary 428 (4th ed. 2004).
38 See Golden Valley Elec. Assn, Inc. v. City Elec. Serv.,
Inc., 518 P.2d 65, 67 (Alaska 1974) (holding that exclusive
remedy provision of workers compensation statute precluded
contractor from seeking indemnification from subcontractor in
absence of express contractual agreement).
39 Aside from indemnification agreements, before the 2004
amendments, a general contractor could be liable for both workers
compensation and tort damages. Miller v. Northside Danzi Constr.
Co., 629 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1981).
40 See Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82, 84-85
(Alaska 1975) (quoting Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 222
(U.S. App. D.C. 1957)) (noting that anything that erodes
exclusive liability or recovery strikes at foundation of system).
41 AS 23.30.001(1).
42 See Roberts v. Grays Crane & Rigging, Inc., 697 P.2d
985, 989-90 (Or. App. 1985) (discussing legislative history of
bill related to prohibiting indemnification agreements).
43 See Taylor v. Southeast-Harrison W. Corp., 694 P.2d
1160, 1162 (Alaska 1985) (explaining workers compensation scheme
as trade-off, wherein employer renders itself absolutely liable
in exchange for employee giving up employees other remedies at
law).
44 6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larsons Workers
Compensation Law 111.04[1][b] (2008).
45 Chiropractors for Justice v. State, 895 P.2d 962, 972
(Alaska 1995).
46 See Wilkerson v. State, Dept of Health & Soc. Servs.,
Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 993 P.2d 1018, 1024 (Alaska 1999)
(citing State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 161 (Alaska 1991); State
v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983); Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commn v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Alaska
1980)).
47 151 P.3d 373 (Alaska 2006).
48 Id. at 380 (citing Wilson v. Municipality of Anchorage,
669 P.2d 569, 573 (Alaska 1983)).
49 Ch. 80, 1, SLA 2004.
50 See AS 23.30.055 (permitting employee to sue if
employer fails to secure payment of compensation).
51 See former AS 23.30.055, .075, .080.
52 516 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1973).
53 Id. at 1217-20.
54 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
55 Sands v. Green, 156 P.3d 1130, 1134 (Alaska 2007)
(quoting Varilek v. City of Houston, 104 P.3d 849, 853 (Alaska
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 605 P.2d 426, 436-37 (Alaska 1979).
57 Id. at 427-28.
58 Id. at 427, 435-37.
59 Id. at 436.
60 Id.
61 Glover v. State, Dept of Transp., Alaska Marine Highway
Sys., 175 P.3d 1240, 1256 (Alaska 2008).
62 Id. at 1244.
63 Schiel did not argue that the amount of workers
compensation benefits was so low as to deprive him of a
substantial remedy. Counsel for UNOCAL agreed at oral argument
before us that at a certain level, inadequate benefits could
violate a workers due process rights.
64 Sands v. Green, 156 P.3d 1130, 1134 (Alaska 2007)
(quoting Varilek v. City of Houston, 104 P.3d 849, 853-55 (Alaska
2004)).
65 883 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1994).
66 Id. at 990.
67 Id. at 991.
68 Id. at 990-91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69 Premera Blue Cross v. State, Dept of Commerce, Comty. &
Econ. Dev., Div. of Ins., 171 P.3d 1110, 1124 (Alaska 2007)
(quoting Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai
Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 452 (Alaska 1974)).
70 Cf. id. at 1124-25 (stating that a statute that meets
the higher equal protection standard will always satisfy the
demands of substantive due process).
71 Cf. State v. Niedermeyer, 14 P.3d 264, 267 (Alaska
2000) (noting that even a modest statistical increase in accident
rates might give the legislature a rational basis for action
aimed at discouraging potential underage drivers from possessing
or drinking alcohol).
 |
| Case Law Statutes, Regs & Rules Constitutions Miscellaneous |
|
