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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Pebble Limited Partnership v. Parnell (9/18/2009) sp-6415

Pebble Limited Partnership v. Parnell (9/18/2009) sp-6415, 215 P3d 1064

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
               
PEBBLE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, )
acting through its General Partner, )
PEBBLE MINES CORPORATION, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 13059
Appellant, )
) Superior Court No.
v. ) 4FA-07-02696 CI
)
SEAN PARNELL, LT. GOVERNOR )
OF ALASKA, the STATE OF )
ALASKA, DIVISION OF )
ELECTIONS, JOHN H. HOLMAN, )
JACK G. HOBSON, and LUKI )
AKELKOK, )
)
Appellees. )
)
COUNCIL OF ALASKA          )
PRODUCERS,                    )
                              )    Supreme Court No. S-13060
               Appellant,          )    (Consolidated)
                              )
     v.                       )
                              )
SEAN PARNELL, LT. GOVERNOR    )
OF ALASKA, the STATE OF            )
ALASKA, DIVISION OF                )
ELECTIONS, JOHN H. HOMAN,     )    OPINION
JACK G. HOBSON, and           LUKI      )
AKELKOK, ASSOCIATION OF       )
ANCSA REGIONAL                )    No. 6415 - September 18, 2009
CORPORATIONS   PRESIDENTS/    )
CEOS INC., ALASKA             )
FEDERATION OF NATIVES,        and  )
PEBBLE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,   )
                              )
               Appellees.          )
_______________________________ )

          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Fourth   Judicial   District,
          Fairbanks, Douglas L. Blankenship, Judge.

          Appearances:  Howard S. Trickey  and  Matthew
          Singer,  Jermain Dunnagan & Owens, Anchorage,
          for  Appellant  Pebble  Limited  Partnership.
          Thomas   P.   Amodio,  Reeves   Amodio   LLC,
          Anchorage,  for Appellant Council  of  Alaska
          Producers.     Michael    Barnhill,    Senior
          Assistant  Attorney  General  and  Talis   J.
          Colberg,   Attorney  General,   Juneau,   for
          Appellee   Sean  Parnell,  Lt.  Governor   of
          Alaska.    Jeffrey  M.  Feldman   and   Susan
          Orlansky, Feldman Orlansky & Sanders, Timothy
          McKeever and Scott M. Kendall, Holmes  Weddle
          &  Barcott,  PC,  Anchorage,   for  Appellees
          John  H.  Holman,  Jack G. Hobson,  and  Luki
          Akelkok.   James D. Linxwiler and Michael  S.
          McLaughlin, Guess & Rudd P.C., Anchorage, for
          Appellees   Association  of  ANCSA   Regional
          Corporation Presidents/CEOs, Inc. and  Alaska
          Federation of Natives, Inc.  James E. Fosler,
          Fosler Law Group, Inc., Anchorage, for Amicus
          Curiae Alaska State Legislature.

          Before:   Matthews, Eastaugh, Carpeneti,  and
          Winfree, Justices. [Fabe, Chief Justice,  not
          participating.]

          CARPENETI, Justice.


               



I.   INTRODUCTION
          The  superior  court  ruled that a proposed  initiative
relating to the regulation of large scale metallic mineral  mines
was constitutionally and statutorily permissible and could appear
on  the  ballot.  The parties challenging the initiative appealed
that ruling,  asserting that the initiative (1) would violate the
constitutional   prohibition  against  initiatives   that   would
appropriate  public  assets,  (2)  would  enact  constitutionally
impermissible special legislation, and (3) is invalid because its
summary  and cost statements are defective.  Shortly  after  oral
argument  we  issued  an order affirming the superior  court  and
indicating  that an opinion would follow explaining  our  reasons
for affirmance.  This is that opinion.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
          On  April 25, 2007, the Lieutenant Governor of  Alaska,
Sean Parnell, was presented with an application for an initiative
entitled  An Act to protect Alaskas clean water (07WATR).   After
reviewing  07WATR, the Department of Law advised  the  lieutenant
governor  that he should not certify the initiative  application.
The  Department  of  Law concluded that the  initiative  did  not
comply  with  the  standards  for  initiatives  laid  out  in  AS
15.45.040  because it included prohibited subjects by  making  an
appropriation of state assets through designation of the uses  of
public land and water.  Relying on the Department of Laws advice,
the   lieutenant  governor  denied  certification  of  initiative
07WATR.
          On  July  9,  2007, the sponsors of 07WATR  filed  suit
against the lieutenant governor seeking a declaration that 07WATR
met  all  statutory  requirements  for  initiatives  and  seeking
certification of the initiative.  The parties filed cross-motions
for  summary judgment.  On October 12, 2007, Superior Court Judge
Fred  Torrisi  issued  a  decision and judgment  concluding  that
07WATR  was  not  an appropriation and granting judgment  to  the
sponsors.   Consistent with his decision, Judge  Torrisi  ordered
07WATR   certified,  and  ordered  the  lieutenant  governor   to
immediately prepare a sufficient number of sequentially  numbered
petitions  to  allow full circulation throughout the  state.   On
January 14, 2008, the sponsors of the initiative submitted to the
lieutenant  governor  a petition with over 30,000  signatures  in
support  of  07WATR.   The lieutenant governor  then  prepared  a
summary and cost statement for the 07WATR initiative.
          On  October  9, 2007, before Judge Torrisi  issued  his
decision  on  07WATR, another application for an initiative  with
the  title  An  Act to protect Alaskas clean water  (07WTR3)  was
filed with the lieutenant governor.  07WTR3 reads:
          THE ALASKA CLEAN WATER INITIATIVE (III)
          FOR AN ACT ENTITLED
          An Act to protect Alaskas clean water.
          BE  IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE  OF
          ALASKA:
               Section 1. Purpose. The purpose of  this
          Act   is  to  protect  the  statewide  public
          interest  in  water quality by  limiting  the
          discharge   or   release  of  certain   toxic
          pollutants  on  the land and  waters  of  the
          state,   and   by   establishing   management
          standards  and other regulatory prescriptions
          to  ensure  that Alaskas waterways,  streams,
          rivers  and lakes, an important public asset,
          are not adversely impacted by new large scale
          metallic  mineral mining operations and  that
          such prospective operations are appropriately
          regulated to assure no adverse effects on the
          states clean waters.
               Section    2.    Regulatory    standards
          affecting streams and waters.
               (a)  Notwithstanding any other provision
          of  law,  approvals, authorizations, licenses
          and  permits  for a prospective  large  scale
          metallic  operation may  not  be  granted  or
          issued  to  a  person  or  entity  to   allow
          activity that directly or indirectly:
                    (1)  releases or discharges a toxic
          pollutant  or  pollutants,  in  a  measurable
          amount  that  will  effect  human  health  or
          welfare  or  any stage of the life  cycle  of
          salmon,   into,  any  surface  or  subsurface
          water, or tributary there to; or that
                    (2)  stores or disposes of metallic
          mineral  mining wastes, including overburden,
          waste  rock, and tailings in a way that could
          result   in  the  release  or  discharge   of
          sulfuric acid, other acids, dissolved metals,
          toxic  pollutants or other compounds  thereof
          that  will  effect, directly  or  indirectly,
          surface  or  subsurface water or  tributaries
          thereto used for human consumption or  salmon
          spawning, rearing, migration or propagation.;
               (b) This measure is intended to regulate
          the  operations described herein  to  prevent
          the  release or discharge of toxic pollutants
          and  other chemicals into the waters  of  the
          state.  This measure shall not result in  the
          appropriation of lands or waters of the state
          in  any  fashion  associated with  new  large
          scale  mining operations. Use of the  surface
          and  subsurface waters and the  land  of  the
          state  for a prospective large scale metallic
          mining  operation  is not prohibited  but  is
          subject to regulation to ensure protection of
          human health, and welfare and conservation of
          other state resources which also rely on  the
          waters and land of the state.
               Section 3. Scope. Section 2 of this  Act
          does   not  apply  to  existing  large  scale
          metallic mineral mining operations that  have
          received  all  required federal,  state,  and
          local permits, authorizations, licenses,  and
          approvals on or before the effective date  of
          this  Act or to future operations of existing
          facilities at those sites.
               Section  4. Savings Clause.  It  is  the
          intention  of the people of Alaska that  each
          of  the provisions of this Act or any portion
          thereof shall be independent of each  of  the
          others,  so  that  the  invalidity   of   any
          provision or portion thereof shall not affect
          the  validity of the remaining provisions  or
          portions   thereof,  and   that   all   valid
          provisions  and  portions  thereof  shall  be
          effective  irrespective of the invalidity  of
          any  other provision or portion thereof. Upon
          enactment,  the state shall take all  actions
          necessary     to    ensure    the     maximum
          enforceability of this act.
               Section 5. Definitions.
               (a)  large scale metallic mineral mining
          operation  means  a  mining  operation   that
          extracts  metallic minerals or  deposits  and
          utilizes  or disturbs in excess of 640  acres
          of  lands  or  waters,  either  alone  or  in
          combination   with  adjoining,   related   or
          concurrent  mining activities or  operations.
          This term includes all components of a mining
          project, including but not limited to:
                    (1)    mining,   processing,    the
          treatment   of   ore   in   preparation   for
          extraction   of  minerals,   and   waste   or
          overburden storage or disposal;
                    (2)  any  construction or operation
          of  facilities,  roads,  transmission  lines,
          pipelines, separation facilities,  and  other
          support and ancillary facilities;
                    (3)  any mining or treatment  plant
          or  equipment  connected  with  the  project,
          underground   or   on   the   surface,   that
          contributes   or   may  contribute   to   the
          extraction or treatment of metallic  minerals
          or other mineral product; and
                    (4)    any   site   of   tunneling,
          shaft-sinking,  quarrying, or  excavation  of
          rock   for  other  purposes,  including   the
          construction  of  water or  roadway  tunnels,
          drains  or underground sites for the  housing
          of industrial plants or other facilities.
               (b)   toxic   pollutants   means   those
          substances    or    substance   combinations,
          including disease-causing agents, which after
          discharge   and  upon  exposure,   ingestion,
          inhalation,  or assimilation  into  a  human,
          fish  or  wildlife organism, either  directly
          from   the   environment  or  indirectly   by
          ingestion through food chains, will,  on  the
          basis  of information available, cause death,
          disease,        malignancy,        behavioral
          abnormalities, abnormalities, or malfunctions
          in    growth,   development,   behavior,   or
          reproduction,   cancer,  genetic   mutations,
          physiological  malfunctions  or  physical  or
          physiological  abnormalities or  deformations
          in  such organisms or their offspring;  toxic
          pollutants includes the following substances,
          and any other substance identified as a toxic
          pollutant under 33 U.S.C. 1317(a):
               2-chlorophenol;      2,4-dichloraphenol;
               2,4-dimethylphenol;        acenaphthene;
               acrolein;                 acrylonitrile;
               Aldrin/Dieldrin;   ammonia;    antimony;
               arsenic;  asbestos; benzene;  benzidine;
               beryllium;        cadmium;        carbon
               tetrachloride;  Chlordane;   chlorinated
               benzenes;    chlorinated    naphthalene;
               chlorinated      ethanes;      chlorine;
               chloroalkyl      ethers;     chloroform;
               chlorophenols; chlorophenoxy herbicides;
               chromium; copper; cyanide; DDT; Demeton;
               dichlorobenzenes;     dichlorobenzidine;
               dichloroethylenes;      dichloropropane;
               dichloropropene;         dinitrotoluene;
               diphenlyhydrazine;  Endosulfan;  Endrin;
               ethylbenzene;   fluoranthene;   Guthion;
               haloethers;   halomethanes;  Heptachlor;
               hexachlorobutadiene;
               hexachlorocyclohexane;
               hexachlorocyclopentadiene;    isphorone;
               lead;   Lindane;   Malathion;   mercury;
               methoxychlor; Mirex; napthalene; nickel;
               nitrobenzene;              nitrophenols;
               nitrosamines; p-dioxin; Parathion; PCBs;
               pentachlorophenol;   phenol;   phthalate
               esters;       polynuclear       aromatic
               hydrocarbons; selenium; silver; sulfuric
               acid,   tetrachloroethylene;   thallium;
               toluene;  Toxaphene;  trichloroethylene;
               vinyl chloride; and zinc[.]
The  Department of Law reviewed 07WTR3 and advised the  lieutenant
governor  to  certify the initiative application.  In  making  its
recommendation,  the Department of Law noted that the  differences
between 07WTR3 and 07WATR highlight the line between impermissible
appropriation and permissible regulation.  The Department  of  Law
also  interpreted the word effect in section two to mean adversely
[a]ffect1  in order to make the initiatives substantive  standards
consistent  with  the  initiatives stated  purpose  to  assure  no
adverse  effects on the states water.  In making the  decision  to
construe  the  language  of the initiative  in  this  manner,  the
Department  of  Law noted that [w]ere we to construe  [effect]  to
mean  any  effect,  we  would  have  to  find  this  standard   an
impermissible  appropriation.  Relying on the Department  of  Laws
advice, the lieutenant governor certified initiative 07WTR3.
          The  lieutenant governor prepared the following  summary
for the 07WTR3 initiative petition:
          BILL PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF WATER QUALITY
          This  bill imposes two water quality standards
          on  new  large  scale metallic mineral  mining
          operations in Alaska.  The first standard does
          not  allow such a mining operation to  release
          into   water  a  toxic  pollutant  that   will
          adversely  affect  human health  or  the  life
          cycle of salmon.  The second standard does not
          allow  such a mining operation to store mining
          wastes   and   tailings  that  could   release
          sulfuric  acid, other acids, dissolved  metals
          or other toxic pollutants that could adversely
          affect  water  that is used by  humans  or  by
          salmon.   The  bill  defines  a  large   scale
          metallic  mineral mining operation to  mean  a
          metallic mineral mining operation that  is  in
          excess of 640 acres in size.  The bill defines
          toxic  pollutants to include  substances  that
          will  cause  death and disease in  humans  and
          fish,   and  includes  a  list  of  substances
          identified  as toxic pollutants under  federal
          law.
          Should this initiative become law?
The  cost statement prepared by the lieutenant governor for 07WTR3
stated that, because [t]his initiative appears to propose language
that  does  not  differ significantly from existing water  quality
standards,  there  will not be significant fiscal  impact   either
revenues or costs  as a result of this initiative.  On January 14,
2008,  the  sponsors of the initiative submitted to the lieutenant
governor  a  petition with over 30,000 signatures  in  support  of
07WTR3.
          On  November  8, 2007, the Council of Alaska  Producers
(the  Council)  filed a complaint for declaratory and  injunctive
relief  naming  the  lieutenant  governor  and  the  Division  of
Elections and seeking to enjoin both 07WATR and 07WTR3 from being
placed  on  the  ballot.   The  Council  alleged  that  the   two
initiatives violated constitutional restrictions on  the  use  of
the initiative by making an appropriation and by enacting special
legislation.  The Council further alleged that the summaries  and
cost   statements  for  both  initiatives  were  inaccurate   and
misleading.   On  November  21, 2007, the  Association  of  ANCSA
Regional   Corporation  Presidents/CEOs,  Inc.  and  the   Alaska
Federation of Natives, Inc. (collectively the Association)  filed
a  complaint  for  declaratory and injunctive relief  naming  the
lieutenant governor and the Division of Elections and seeking  to
enjoin  both  07WATR and 07WTR3 from being placed on the  ballot.
The  Association made similar allegations to those  made  by  the
Council.   On  December 4, 2007, the Pebble Limited  Partnership,
acting  through  its  general partner  Pebble  Mines  Corporation
(Pebble),  filed  a complaint in intervention making  allegations
similar  to  those made by the Council and the Association.   The
sponsors  of the two initiatives also moved to intervene  in  the
action.  On December 6, 2007, the superior court consolidated the
Councils  action  with  that brought  by  the  Association.   The
superior court also granted Pebbles and the sponsors requests  to
intervene,  and  both  Pebble and the  sponsors  were  joined  as
parties.
          On  January  4,  2008,  the Council,  Pebble,  and  the
Association  each  moved  separately for  summary  judgment.   On
January  18, 2008, the sponsors and the lieutenant governor  each
cross-moved for summary judgment.
          On  February 28, 2008, Superior Court Judge Douglas  L.
Blankenship  issued  a decision concluding in  part  that  07WATR
would  make  an  impermissible appropriation  and  was  therefore
invalid  and  could not be placed on the ballot, and that  07WTR3
was  a  permissible  regulatory measure that would  not  make  an
appropriation  and therefore could be placed on the  ballot.   In
concluding  that  07WTR3 would not make an  appropriation,  Judge
Blankenship  adopted the approach of the sponsors and  the  state
and  construed the references to effects in section two  to  mean
adversely  affects.  Judge Blankenship issued final  judgment  on
March  12,  2008,  finding that (1) 07WTR3  is  not  an  improper
appropriation,  (2) 07WATR and 07WTR3 are not  local  or  special
legislation, (3) [t]he subject matter of 07WTR3 is proper for  an
initiative, (4) 07WTR3 does not constitute an unlawful  amendment
of  the Alaska Constitution, and (5) [t]he bill summary and  cost
statement  appearing on the 07WTR3 initiative petitions  are  not
defective.
          The sponsors appealed the portion of Judge Blankenships
decision that concluded that 07WATR would make a constitutionally
impermissible  appropriation.  The Council  and  Pebble  appealed
portions  of  Judge Blankenships decision construing  07WTR3  and
concluding   that   07WTR3  would  not  make  a  constitutionally
impermissible  appropriation,  would not  enact  constitutionally
impermissible special legislation,  and that the summary and cost
statement were impartial and accurate.  The Association  did  not
appeal  any  portion  of  Judge Blankenships  decision,  but  did
respond to the sponsors appeal.  The lieutenant governor appealed
Judge  Torrisis decision on 07WATR.  We granted consolidation  of
all  four appeals.  The legislature has submitted a brief  amicus
curiae.
          On  June 6, 2008, the five parties filed a joint motion
to dismiss the sponsors appeal of Judge Blankenships decision, to
dismiss  the states appeal of Judge Torrisis decision, to  vacate
Judge  Torrisis  decision,  to issue  an  order  dismissing  with
prejudice the sponsors complaint in the original 07WATR  lawsuit,
to  issue  an order that all parties to the dismissed cases  will
bear  their own costs and attorneys fees, and to issue  an  order
substituting  the  named  parties in  the  sponsors  appeal.   We
granted  the joint motion in full on June 9, 2008.  As a  result,
the  only appeal remaining before us is the appeal by the Council
and  Pebble  of  those  portions of Judge  Blankenships  decision
construing  07WTR3 and concluding that 07WTR3 would  not  make  a
constitutionally  impermissible appropriation,  would  not  enact
constitutionally impermissible special legislation, and that  the
summary and cost statement are impartial and accurate.2
          We  heard  oral argument on June 16, 2008 and issued  a
dispositive order on July 3.3
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          I.   We review a superior courts decision on summary judgment de
novo,  drawing all inferences in favor of, and viewing the  facts
in  the  record  in the light most favorable to,  the  non-moving
party.4    We   review   questions   of   law,   including    the
constitutionality of a ballot initiative, using  our  independent
judgment,  adopting  the rule of law that is most  persuasive  in
light  of precedent, reason, and policy.5  The interpretation  of
the  constitutional term appropriation is a question  of  law  to
which   we  apply  our  independent  judgment.6   When  reviewing
          initiatives, we will construe voter initiatives broadly so as to
preserve  them  whenever possible. However, initiatives  touching
upon the allocation of public revenues and assets require careful
consideration   because  the  constitutional  right   of   direct
legislation  is limited by the Alaska Constitution.7   We  use  a
deferential standard of review for challenges to the adequacy  of
a  petition summary.8  We apply a deferential standard of  review
for  challenges  to the adequacy of a petition summary  and  will
uphold a summary unless we cannot reasonably conclude that it  is
impartial  and accurate.9  Those attacking the summary  bear  the
burden to demonstrate that it is biased or misleading.10
IV.  DISCUSSION
          Article XI, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution grants
to  the people the power to propose and enact laws by initiative.
This  power  is not without limitations, however, as article  XI,
section  7 of the Alaska Constitution restricts initiatives  that
make   or   repeal  appropriations  or  enact  local  or  special
legislation.  Additionally, the constitution  and  statutory  law
describe the procedural steps that must be followed in order  for
an initiative to be placed on the ballot.  Here, the opponents of
the  initiative argue that 07WTR3 would appropriate public assets
and  would  enact  local  or special legislation,  and  that  the
summary and cost statement for 07WTR3 are defective.
     A.   The  Superior Court Correctly Concluded that Initiative
          07WTR3 Would Not Appropriate a Public Asset.
          A.   Article XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution prohibits
initiatives  that  make . . . appropriations.   The  Council  and
Pebble   assert   that  07WTR3  would  make  a   constitutionally
impermissible appropriation by allocating or designating the  use
of  state assets.  Judge Blankenship concluded that 07WTR3  would
not  make a constitutionally impermissible appropriation.  We use
a  two-part inquiry in such cases.11  First, we determine whether
the initiative deals with a public asset.12  Second, we determine
whether the initiative would appropriate that asset.13
          1.   Initiative 07WTR3 deals with a public asset.
          Initiative 07WTR3 directly concerns the use  of  public
land  and  water  by large scale metallic mineral  (LSMM)  mines.
Initiative 07WTR3 seeks to protect the statewide public  interest
in  water quality by limiting the discharge or release of certain
toxic  pollutants on the land and waters of the state.   We  have
previously  determined that public land,14  public  revenue,15  a
municipally-owned  utility,16 and wild salmon17  are  all  public
assets  that cannot be appropriated by initiative.  We have  not,
however, had an opportunity to determine whether waters   in  the
form of waterways, streams, rivers and lakes  are a public asset.
          In  Anchorage  Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality
of  Anchorage,18 we considered two criteria, either one of which,
if  satisfied, would qualify taxicab permits as a public asset.19
First,  we  considered  whether  the  municipality  own[ed]   the
underlying  resource the permits authorized  holders  to  take.20
Second,  we  considered  whether issuing  the  permits  served  a
regulatory  rather  than a revenue-raising function.21   In  that
case,  the  taxicab permits at issue satisfied neither  criterion
and  we concluded they were not public assets.  In this case,  in
          contrast, the waters of the state qualify as a public asset under
either criterion.
          First,  the state has a property-like interest  in  the
waters of the state.22  In holding that salmon are a public asset
in  Pullen  v.  Ulmer, we relied on article VIII  of  the  Alaska
Constitution.23  We held that common law principles  incorporated
in  the  common use clause impose upon the state a trust duty  to
manage  the fish, wildlife and water resources of the  state  for
the  benefit  of all the people.24  We reasoned that  the  public
trust responsibilities imposed on the state by the provisions  of
article VIII of our constitution compel the conclusion that  fish
occurring  in their natural state are property of the  state  for
purposes  of carrying out its trust responsibilities.25   Because
public trust responsibilities are sufficient to create a property-
like  interest  in a natural resource, the waters  of  the  state
qualify  as  a public asset under the public ownership  criterion
identified in Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform.
          Second,  the  waters  of the state provide  a  revenue-
raising function.  In Pullen, we noted that if the states  salmon
population precipitously declines, the fishing industry would  be
devastated,  causing  . . . harm to Alaskas economy  and  revenue
base,  and  that [t]he state benefits from the harvest of  salmon
through  the  collection of taxes imposed on business enterprises
engaged  in  the  fishery  and license  fees  imposed  on  sport,
personal  use,  and  commercial  fisheries.26   This  same  logic
certainly applies to the quality of the states waters, with  harm
to  these  waters  having the potential to   at  the  very  least
devastate   Alaskas   tourism   and   fishing   industries    and
significantly  reduce  revenues raised  from  related  taxes  and
licenses.   The  waters  of the state, therefore,  qualify  as  a
public asset due to their revenue-raising function under the test
described in Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform.27
          Because the state has a property-like interest  in  the
waters  of the state, and because the waters of the state play  a
revenue-raising function for the state, the waters of  the  state
are  a public asset under either factor of the Anchorage Citizens
for Taxi Reform test.28  Accordingly, both the land and waters of
the  state  are  public assets for the purposes of constitutional
appropriations analysis, and 07WTR3 deals with public assets.
          2.   Initiative  07WTR3  would  not  appropriate  those
               assets.
          On   the  second  part  of  the  inquiry,  whether  the
initiative  would appropriate those assets, we look primarily  to
the two core objectives of the constitutional prohibition against
initiatives  that  would  make  an  appropriation.29   The  first
objective  is  to prevent give-away programs that appeal  to  the
self-interest  of voters and endanger the state treasury.30   The
second  objective  is  to  preserve  legislative  discretion   by
ensur[ing]  that  the  legislature,  and  only  the  legislature,
retains  control  over  the  allocation  of  state  assets  among
competing  needs. 31  Our analysis of the second  objective  also
includes consideration of whether the initiative would set  aside
a  certain  specified amount of money or property for a  specific
purpose or object in such a manner that is executable, mandatory,
          and reasonably definite with no further legislative action.32
          No  party  argues that 07WTR3 is a give-away program.33
We  agree  that  07WTR3 would not give away  public  assets.   No
provision  of  the  initiative targets any  particular  group  or
person or entity . . . to receive state money or property, nor is
there  any indication that by passing this initiative, the voters
would be voting themselves money [or property].34  The initiative
merely  seeks  to  preserve the status quo by  maintaining  water
quality at levels suitable for consumption by humans and for  use
as habitat by salmon.
          The  primary question before us, therefore, is  whether
the  initiative narrows the legislatures range of freedom to make
allocation  decisions  in  a  manner  sufficient  to  render  the
initiative an appropriation.35  To answer this question, we  must
interpret the meaning of the initiative.
          Judge  Blankenships conclusion that  07WTR3  would  not
make  a constitutionally impermissible appropriation derived from
his  decision  to  construe the language  of  the  initiative  by
applying  language  from section one of  the  initiative  to  the
substantive  restrictions  in  section  two.   In  distinguishing
07WTR3  from  07WATR,  Judge Blankenship found  07WTR3  to  be  a
permissible  management or regulatory policy.   The  Council  and
Pebble  challenge this construction of the initiative and  assert
that,  by  its plain language, 07WTR3 would prevent any discharge
or release of toxic pollutants into state waters and is therefore
as  proscriptive  as 07WATR.  The Council and Pebble  then  argue
that under this interpretation the plain language of 07WTR3 would
make  a constitutionally impermissible appropriation for the same
reasons  Judge Blankenship cited in concluding that 07WATR  would
make an appropriation.
               a.   The  superior court did not err in construing
                    effect   to   mean   adversely   affect    in
                    interpreting 07WTR3.
          In  order to determine whether initiative 07WTR3  would
make  a  constitutionally impermissible  appropriation,  we  must
first  determine  which interpretation of  the  language  of  the
initiative is correct.
          We  have held that the duty of a court in conducting  a
preelection review of an initiative is similar to the courts duty
when reviewing an enacted law.36  When interpreting a statute  or
municipal  ordinance,  we employ a sliding scale  approach  under
which   [t]he  plainer  the  statutory  language  is,  the   more
convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent
must be.37  Whenever possible, we will construe a statute in light
of  its purpose,38 and will interpret each part or section  of  a
statute  with  every other part or section, so  as  to  create  a
harmonious  whole.39  And we have sought to preserve the  peoples
right  to  be  heard  through  the  initiative  process  wherever
possible:
          In   reviewing   an   initiative   prior   to
          submission to the people, the requirements of
          the  constitutional and statutory  provisions
          pertaining  to the use of initiatives  should
          be  liberally  construed so that  the  people
          (are)  permitted  to vote and  express  their
          will on the proposed legislation . . . . When
          one   construction  of  an  initiative  would
          involve  serious constitutional difficulties,
          that  construction should be rejected  if  an
          alternative interpretation would  render  the
          initiative constitutionally permissible.40
          In  construing the initiatives use of effect in section
two to mean adversely affect, Judge Blankenship looked to section
one  of  the  initiative which states that  the  purpose  of  the
initiative is to insure that the states waters are not  adversely
impacted   by  new  [LSMM]  mining  operations  and   that   such
prospective operations are appropriately regulated to  assure  no
adverse  effects  on  the  states clean waters.   Although  Judge
Blankenship did not specifically comment on the ambiguity of  the
language of section two, he did observe that [t]o infer that  the
initiative prohibits beneficial effects or neutral effects is  at
odds  with  common sense and the purpose of the  initiative.   We
agree with Judge Blankenship and conclude that his interpretation
of  the initiative is the interpretation most consistent with the
initiatives stated purpose.
          When reviewing a ballot initiative that has been passed
by the voters, we look to any published arguments made in support
or  opposition to determine what meaning voters may have attached
to the initiative.41  This initiative has not yet been put before
the  voters, but over 30,000 voters signed the petition to  place
initiative 07WTR3 on the ballot.  The summary statement  provided
by  the  lieutenant governor for this petition stated that  [t]he
first  standard does not allow such a mining operation to release
into  water  a  toxic pollutant that will adversely affect  human
health  or  the  life  cycle of salmon,  and  that  [t]he  second
standard  does not allow such a mining operation to store  mining
wastes  and  tailings  that could release  sulfuric  acid,  other
acids,  dissolved  metals or other toxic  pollutants  that  could
adversely  affect  water that is used by  humans  or  by  salmon.
(Emphasis  added.)  When considered along with  the  language  of
07WTR3s purpose statement in section one of the initiative,  this
language  from the summary statement strongly suggests  that  the
voters  who  signed the petition to place the initiative  on  the
ballot   understood  the  initiative  to  prohibit   only   those
discharges that would adversely affect humans, salmon, and  those
waters used by humans or salmon.
          Finally, construing the language of section two of  the
initiative  to  prohibit  only  adverse  effects  preserves   the
constitutionality of the initiative.  Quoting Anchorage  Citizens
for  Taxi  Reform, Judge Blankenship correctly observed  that  we
will  construe a voter initiative broadly so as to preserve  [it]
whenever possible.42
          Because  the conflict between the language of  sections
one and two of the initiative can be resolved in a manner that is
consistent  with the purpose of the initiative and that  is  most
likely  to  preserve the constitutionality of the initiative,  we
hold that Judge Blankenship did not err in concluding that 07WTR3
prohibits only  adverse effects.
               b.   The  superior court did not err in concluding
                    that 07WTR3 would not make an appropriation.
          All  of the parties agree that if section two of 07WTR3
is  read to preclude only discharges of toxic chemicals and other
mine  waste  that  cause adverse effects to humans,  salmon,  and
waters  used  for  human consumption or as salmon  habitat,  then
07WTR3  would  not make an appropriation.  We  concur.   We  have
previously   noted  that  natural  resource  management   is   an
appropriate  subject for a public initiative.43  In holding  that
the  initiative  process  was  not  clearly  inapplicable  to  an
initiative  banning the use of wolf snares,  we  noted  that  the
legislative  history  of the drafting of the Alaska  Constitution
and  the  language  of  the  constitution  itself  evidences  the
delegates intent that natural resource issues would be subject to
the initiative.44
          Further,  the  prohibition  against  initiatives   that
appropriate public assets does not extend to prohibit initiatives
that  regulate public assets, so long as the regulations  do  not
result in the allocation of an asset entirely to one group at the
expense of another.45  In holding that an initiative that required
the Board of Fisheries to reserve a priority of wild salmon stock
for  personal, sport, and subsistence fisheries before allocating
any   stock   for   commercial  fisheries  was  an  impermissible
appropriation, we distinguished the initiative as written from  a
presumptively constitutional hypothetical initiative  that  would
simply amend a series of general legislative criteria to add more
specific  ones  to  guide the Board of Fisheries  in  its  future
allocation  decisions.46   Here, as Judge  Blankenship  observed,
07WTR3 leaves to the legislature, the Department of Environmental
Conservation,  and  the  Department  of  Natural  Resources   the
discretion to determine what amounts of specific toxic pollutants
may or may not be discharged at a mining site.  Initiative 07WTR3
as  interpreted to prohibit only discharges that adversely affect
humans,  salmon,  and waters used for human  consumption  and  as
salmon  habitat  therefore prohibits harm to public assets  while
permitting  the use of public assets and exhibiting  no  explicit
preference among potential users.
          We have long recognized that [t]he general rule is that
a   court  should  not  determine  the  constitutionality  of  an
initiative  unless and until it is enacted.47   This  is  because
[t]he  rule  against  pre-election review is  a  prudential  one,
steeped  in  traditional policies recognizing the need  to  avoid
unnecessary  litigation, to uphold the peoples right to  initiate
laws directly, and to check the power of individual officials  to
keep the electorates voice from being heard.48  There are only two
exceptions   to  this  rule:  First,  where  the  initiative   is
challenged  on the basis that it does not comply with  the  state
constitutional  and  statutory provisions regulating  initiatives
as  in  this  case  courts are empowered to conduct  pre-election
review.49  Second,  courts are empowered to conduct  pre-election
review   of   initiatives   where  the  initiative   is   clearly
unconstitutional or clearly unlawful.50  There is nothing clearly
unconstitutional  or  clearly  unlawful  about   regulating   the
discharge of toxic materials into state waters.
     B.   07WTR3 Would Not Enact Special Legislation.
          Pebble,  the  Council, and the Association  argue  that
07WTR3  is special legislation and therefore should not be placed
on  the ballot.  The lieutenant governor and the sponsors ask  us
to uphold the superior courts determination that 07WTR3 would not
enact special legislation.
          Article  XI,  section  7  of  the  Alaska  Constitution
provides in part that [t]he initiative shall not be used to . . .
enact   local   or   special  legislation.   That  constitutional
provision  is  echoed  in  AS 15.45.010:  The  law-making  powers
assigned  to  the  legislature may be  exercised  by  the  people
through  the  initiative.   However, an  initiative  may  not  be
proposed to . . . enact local or special legislation.
          This  courts  benchmark  special  legislation  case  is
Boucher  v.  Engstrom.51  In Boucher, Lieutenant Governor  H.  A.
Boucher  appealed  a  superior court decision  that  enjoined  an
initiative from being placed on the ballot.52  The superior court
had  found that the initiative, which sought to relocate  Alaskas
capital from Juneau to any Alaska site west of meridian 141  west
longitude   excluding   Anchorage  or  Fairbanks,   was   special
legislation  and  therefore unconstitutional  under  article  XI,
section 7 of the Alaska Constitution.53  The superior court based
this  ruling  on  the  fact  that Anchorage  and  Fairbanks  were
excluded as possible relocation sites.54  We reversed the  ruling
that the initiative was special legislation.
          Boucher, considered in light of the discussion  at  the
Alaska   Constitutional  Convention,  establishes   a   two-stage
analysis for determining whether proposed legislation is local or
special  legislation barred by article XI, section 7.  The  first
stage   is  a  threshold  inquiry  as  to  whether  the  proposed
legislation is of general, statewide applicability.55  In Boucher,
we  looked  to  the intent of the delegates to the constitutional
convention  regarding special legislation.   We  noted  that  the
Report  of  the  Committee on Direct Legislation,  Amendment  and
Revision56 stated that special laws are of interest to  only  one
group  of  people or people in only one portion of  the  state.57
Thus,  if  we  find that a proposed initiative is legislation  of
statewide application, we will hold that the initiative would not
enact  special  legislation and it is not  necessary  to  inquire
further.58
          However,  if we determine that the proposed  initiative
is  not  of  statewide application, we then move on to  a  second
inquiry.   In  this  second stage, we determine the  relationship
between  the  narrow  focus of the proposed legislation  and  the
purpose  of  the proposed legislation.  As we stated in  Boucher,
[l]egislation,  whether  enacted by the  legislature  or  by  the
initiative, need not operate evenly on all parts of the state  to
avoid  being  classified  as local or special.59   Therefore,  we
address   the   reasonableness   of   the   regulation   or   the
classification of the subject matter.60  We analogized this second
inquiry  to  the  rational  basis review  we  employed  in  equal
protection cases at that time.61
          In  State  v.  Lewis,62 we updated this  standard:  the
inquiry  in  this  second stage assesses whether the  legislation
          bears a fair and substantial relationship to legitimate purposes.63
          In  Boucher, we held that an initiative was not  to  be
classified  as  special or local legislation  merely  because  it
operated  on only a limited number of geographical areas,  rather
than  being widespread in its operation throughout the state.  64
Rather,  such a finding of limited applicability meant  that  the
inquiry  must move to a second stage, in which the reasonableness
of  the  limited  scope  was  to  be  scrutinized:  the  test  of
constitutionality  of  the  subject  initiative  is  not  whether
Anchorage  and  Fairbanks  were treated differently,  but  rather
whether  there  is  a  reasonable  basis  for  the  disparity  in
treatment.65   In  the end, we concluded that  [t]he  initiatives
exclusion of Anchorage and Fairbanks was not arbitrary,  but  was
premised  on  the view that the new capital should be  a  planned
capital  and  one  that should not be located in  the  relatively
heavily urbanized areas of Anchorage and Fairbanks.66
          In  State  v.  Lewis, we considered whether legislation
enacting  a  three-way  exchange of land  between  the  State  of
Alaska,  the  United States Government, and a Native  corporation
violated  the prohibition against enactment of local and  special
acts  under  article II, section 19 of the Alaska constitution.67
Plaintiffs  argued  that the statute violated the  constitutional
prohibition on local and special legislation because it  affected
only  a  limited geographic region of the state.68   Because  the
statute  did  in  fact  deal  with  only  a  limited  region,  we
scrutinized the reasonableness of that limited scope, finding the
statute valid because it was
          designed  to  facilitate statewide  land  use
          management and to resolve a host of  pressing
          legal  issues arising in the context of  [the
          Alaska  Native Claims Settlement  Act].   The
          conflict between [the Native corporation] and
          the  government  concerning the  adequacy  of
          withdrawals  for Native selection  implicated
          both  future  state selections  and  existing
          state  patents.  Clouds on title  could  have
          resulted   in   protracted   litigation   and
          impaired effective planning for a variety  of
          state needs.[69]
          Accordingly,   we   found  a   fair   and   substantial
relationship  between permissible legislative  purposes  and  the
means used to advance them.70
          We  applied this two-stage inquiry again in  Baxley  v.
State,71  where we considered the constitutionality of a  statute
that  allowed for the modification of four oil and gas leases  in
the Northstar Oil Field.72  We found that the statute focused on a
single  entity, and thus failed the first inquiry: It was  not  a
law of general or statewide application.73  We then proceeded  to
the second inquiry, and found that because the specific leases in
question were substantially different from any other oil and  gas
leases, the statutes modification of these specific leases fairly
and substantially relate[d] to legitimate state purposes.74  Thus,
because  the statute satisfied the second inquiry the legislation
was not special legislation.75
          Turning to 07WTR3, we look first to whether the subject
matter  is  of statewide application.  We find that it  is.   The
initiative  proposes new regulation on pollutant discharges  from
new  large  scale metallic mining operations.  It  defines  large
scale  metallic  mining  operation as  a  mining  operation  that
extracts  metallic minerals or deposits and utilizes or  disturbs
in  excess  of 640 acres of lands or waters, either alone  or  in
combination   with   adjoining,  related  or  concurrent   mining
activities  or operations.  It is not by its terms limited  to  a
particular area or community of the state, but would apply to any
such mine anywhere in the state.
          Pebble  fails  to present any evidence to  support  its
assertion  that this initiative is not of statewide  application.
Pebble  contends that the initiative applies only to  the  Pebble
and  Donlin  Creek mines.  However, 07WTR3 does not  specifically
relate  only  to the Pebble and Donlin Creek mines.  Indeed,  the
Council  and  the Association intervened in this  matter  because
they  believe  that  07WTR3 has greater implications  beyond  the
Pebble  and  Donlin Creek mines.  Although the Pebble and  Donlin
Creek mines may be the only proposed mines currently affected  by
07WTR3, the language of the initiative is sufficiently broad that
it would apply to any new LSMM mines.
          Since   07WTR3   proposes  legislation   of   statewide
application,  it  is  not  necessary for  our  decision  here  to
determine  whether it has a fair and substantial relationship  to
legitimate  state  purposes.  We nevertheless note  that  if  the
initiative  were evaluated under the test, it would pass  muster.
The initiatives stated purpose is to protect the statewide public
interest in water quality by limiting the discharge or release of
certain toxic pollutants on the land and waters of the state.
          Like the location of the state capital in Boucher,76 the
issue  of  water quality affects all Alaskans; declines in  water
quality affect the availability of water for uses including human
consumption, agriculture, and habitat for fish and wildlife.  And
there  is  a strong statewide interest in protecting the  fishing
industry.  As we establish above in part IV.A.1., public land and
water are public assets in which the state has an interest.   And
this  initiative serves a much broader interest than that of  the
land  exchange  at  issue  in Lewis, which  we  found  to  be  of
statewide  interest  even  though it  only  directly  affected  a
particular land deal.
          Pebble also asserts that the initiative fails the  fair
and   substantial  relationship  test  because  it   is   grossly
underinclusive   and   there  is  no   good   reason   for   this
underinclusive classification.  Pebble argues that the initiative
is  impermissibly underinclusive because it treats  (1)  existing
mines  different[ly]  from prospective  mines,  (2)  non-metallic
mines  different[ly]  from metallic mines,  (3)  640  acre  mines
different[ly]  from  639 acre mines, and (4) mines  different[ly]
from all other potential polluters.
          However,  we  agree with the lieutenant  governor  that
legislatures    routinely   must   draw    lines    and    create
classifications.  As the United States Supreme Court has noted in
the  equal  protection  context, we are guided  by  the  familiar
          principles that a statute is not invalid under the Constitution
because  it  might  have  gone  farther  than  it  did,  that   a
legislature  need not strike at all evils at the same  time,  and
that reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the
phase  of  the problem which seems most acute to the  legislative
mind.  77 Treating existing uses differently from new uses  is  a
fairly routine legislative practice known as grandfathering  that
can  be  readily  justified  in terms  of  enhancing  compliance,
avoiding economic disruption, and protecting settled expectations
and  investments.   Thus, we have noted in the  equal  protection
context  that [a]cts conferring grandfather rights have generally
withstood  equal protection challenges.78  As for  distinguishing
metallic  from  non-metallic mines, the sponsors point  out  that
there  is a policy basis for paying special attention to metallic
mining because it poses its own characteristic risks, such as the
high  toxicity of metallic discharges for fish populations.   The
National  Research  Council has noted  that  different  types  of
exploration and different types of mining and processing  present
different  levels  of  environmental risk and  require  differing
regulatory approaches.79  We do not consider it arbitrary to draw
a  line based on mine size either.  Legislation often draws lines
based  on  size  or quantity (such as income tax  brackets).   It
stands  to reason that larger mines pose greater pollution  risks
than  smaller  ones  and might be subject to greater  regulation.
Nor is it unconstitutional to single out the mining industry in a
regulatory  initiative.  The fact that the initiative is  limited
to  a  particular  industry  makes it  no  more  constitutionally
suspect than Alaskas Title 27, which also singles out mining,  or
Title 17, which singles out food and drugs.
          Because  on  its  face 07WTR3 is of  general  statewide
applicability, we conclude that it is not prohibited  special  or
local  legislation.  Although this alone is determinative on  the
question of whether it is barred under article XI, section 7,  we
also  conclude that the initiatives provisions bear  a  fair  and
substantial relationship to legitimate state purposes.
     C.   The Superior Court Correctly Concluded that the Summary
          and Cost Statement Are Not Defective.
          The Alaska Constitution and Alaska statutes require the
lieutenant  governor,  after certifying  an  application  for  an
initiative,  to  prepare  a  true and impartial  summary  of  the
proposed  initiative and an estimate of the cost to the state  of
implementing the proposed law.  Judge Blankenship concluded  that
the  lieutenant governors summary and cost statement  for  07WTR3
satisfied  these  requirements.  The Council  contends  that  the
court  erred in reaching that conclusion because the summary  and
cost statements were inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading.   We
disagree.
          1.   The summary statement
          The  superior  court  concluded  that  the  ballot  and
petition  summary  for  07WTR3 is  a  fair,  true,  neutral,  and
impartial  explanation of the main features  of  the  initiatives
contents.   The Council argues that Judge Blankenships conclusion
is  in  error  because the summary is inaccurate and  misleading.
Specifically,  the Council asserts that the summary  states  that
          the  provisions of 07WTR3 apply only to new LSMM mining
operations,  when  it  in fact applies to  existing  LSMM  mining
operations  that  either (1) require any  additional  permit,  or
permit  renewal or amendment, or (2) build an additional facility
or  expand operations.  The Council also argues that the  summary
states  that  [the initiative] includes the same  list  of  toxic
pollutants as found in federal law, when in fact [the initiative]
adds  an additional substance, sulfuric acid, that is not on  the
federal  list.  The sponsors respond by arguing that the  Council
waived its specific arguments about the deficiency of the summary
statement  by  not  raising  them in  the  superior  court.   The
sponsors  further assert that even if the Council did  not  waive
its  arguments,  (1)  the Councils argument that  the  initiative
applies  to  existing  LSMM operations lacks  merit  because  the
Council  has  not  shown  that specific existing  mines  will  be
subject  to  07WTR3,   and  (2) the Councils  argument  that  the
summarys  description  of toxic pollutants  is  misleading  lacks
merit because the summary explicitly mentions that the initiative
prohibits storing materials that could release sulfuric acid.
          Article  XI,  section  3  of  the  Alaska  Constitution
provides that after certification of an initiative application, a
petition  containing  a summary of the subject  matter  shall  be
prepared  by  the  lieutenant governor  for  circulation  by  the
sponsors.  Alaska  Statute  15.45.090(a)(2)  requires  that   the
lieutenant  governors  summary of the petition  be  an  impartial
summary  of  the  subject  matter of the  bill.   Alaska  Statute
15.45.180(a) likewise requires that the actual ballot  contain  a
true and impartial summary of the proposed law.80
          We explained in Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc.
v.  State81  that the basic purpose of the ballot summary  is  to
enable voters to reach informed and intelligent decisions on  how
to  cast their ballots.82  A summary should be complete enough to
convey  an  intelligible  idea of the scope  and  import  of  the
proposed  law and ought to be free from any misleading  tendency,
whether  of  amplification, of omission, or  of  fallacy.83   The
summary  need not recite every detail of the proposed  measure,84
but if the information would give the elector serious grounds for
reflection it is not a mere detail, and it must be disclosed.85
          We   apply   a  deferential  standard  of  review   for
challenges  to  the  adequacy of a lieutenant governors  petition
summary  and  will  uphold a summary unless we cannot  reasonably
conclude that it is impartial and accurate.86  Those attacking the
summary  bear  the burden to demonstrate that  it  is  biased  or
misleading.87
          Here,  the  lieutenant  governors  summary  for  07WTR3
states:
          This bill imposes two water quality standards
          on  new  large scale metallic mineral  mining
          operations  in  Alaska.  The  first  standard
          does  not  allow such a mining  operation  to
          release  into  water a toxic  pollutant  that
          will  adversely affect human  health  or  the
          life  cycle  of salmon.  The second  standard
          does  not  allow such a mining  operation  to
          store  mining wastes and tailings that  could
          release   sulfuric   acids,   other    acids,
          dissolved  metals  or other toxic  pollutants
          that  could  adversely affect water  that  is
          used  by  humans  or  by  salmon.   The  bill
          defines a large scale metallic mineral mining
          operation  to mean a metallic mineral  mining
          operation that is in excess of 640  acres  in
          size.   The bill defines toxic pollutants  to
          include substances that will cause death  and
          disease  in  humans and fish, and includes  a
          list   of  substances  identified  as   toxic
          pollutants under federal law.
          
          Because   the  Council  did  not  raise  the   specific
arguments  at  the superior court level that (1) the  summary  is
misleading  for  failing to indicate that it applies  to  certain
existing LSMM mining operations, or (2) the summary is misleading
in  its  description  of toxic pollutants, it  waived  these  new
arguments.88
          Even  if  the  Council had not waived its arguments  by
failing  to  present  them to the superior court,  the  arguments
would  still  be  without merit.  The Council  alleges  that  the
summary  is defective because (1) it fails to adequately describe
all  the  mining  operations to which it  applies,  and  (2)  its
description  of  prohibited toxic pollutants is  misleading.   We
deal with each argument in turn.
          In  regard  to  the first argument, the summary  states
that  the initiatives water quality standards apply to new  large
scale metallic mineral mining operations. (Emphasis added.)  This
statement  provides an intelligible idea of the scope and  import
of the initiative, which explicitly states that it does not apply
to  existing large scale metallic mineral mining operations  that
have  received  all required federal, state, and  local  permits,
authorizations,  licenses,  and  approvals  on  or   before   the
effective  date of this Act or to future operations  of  existing
facilities  at  those  sites.  (Emphasis  added.)   The   brevity
required  for  a  summary prevents a more specific  and  detailed
description  of the initiatives scope than that provided  by  the
lieutenant governor.  As we have stated, [t]he summary  need  not
recite every detail of the proposed measure.89  Here, the summary
adequately  discloses the important details  of  the  initiative.
Thus,  the Council fails to meet its burden of showing  that  the
summary is misleading based on its description of the initiatives
scope.
          The  Councils  second  argument is  that  the  summarys
description of toxic pollutants is misleading.  Even  if  it  had
not  been waived, this argument would likewise be without  merit.
The  Councils  argument that the summary misleads voters  by  not
mentioning  that sulfuric acid was added to the initiatives  list
of toxic pollutants ignores the explicit statement in the summary
that the initiative does not allow . . . a [new] mining operation
to  store  mining wastes and tailings that could release sulfuric
acid . . . .  Because the summary is explicit in its inclusion of
          sulfuric acid as a prohibited toxic pollutant that could
adversely  affect water that is used by humans or salmon,  it  is
not misleading.
          The  Council  fails to meet its burden of  showing  the
inadequacy of the summary prepared by the lieutenant governor for
07WTR3.  The summary provides an accurate depiction of the  scope
and  substance  of  the  initiative.  Thus,  the  superior  court
correctly  concluded  that  it was a  fair,  true,  neutral,  and
impartial  explanation of the main features  of  the  initiatives
contents.
          2.   The cost statement
               
          The  superior  court concluded that the cost  statement
for 07WTR3 is impartial and accurate to enable voters to make  an
informed  decision.   The  court  explained  that  although   new
regulations  probably  will  be  promulgated  to  implement  [the
initiative],  these  regulations may  be  little  different  than
current  water  quality standards, and [t]his suggests  that  the
state  would incur few additional costs to implement the  program
and  mining  companies  would be able  to  obtain  the  necessary
permits  to operate.  The Council argues that the cost  statement
for 07WTR3 is defective because it fails to consider the cost  of
developing  and  adopting regulations that will be  necessary  to
implement the measure.  The Council also asserts that [t]here  is
. . . likely to be substantial cost to the State in defending, in
court,  any  regulations which it adopts.  The  sponsors  respond
that  the  Council waived its arguments about the cost  statement
because  it  did  not  make  the  same  specific  arguments  when
challenging  the accuracy of the cost statement in  the  superior
court.  The sponsors also argue that the cost statement is  valid
because  even  if  state  employees do need  to  review  existing
regulations  and  develop  and  implement  some  new  ones,  DNRs
estimate  of  no significant fiscal impact is wholly  reasonable.
Finally,  the  sponsors  assert that  [j]udicial  review  of  the
Lieutenant   Governors   cost  estimate   should   be   extremely
deferential.
          Alaska   Statute  15.45.090(a)(4)  states   that   each
petition  must contain an estimate of the cost to  the  state  of
implementing the proposed law.  Although there is no Alaska  case
law interpreting the cost statement provision, other state courts
have  held  that  review  of an initiative  or  referendums  cost
statement should be deferential.90
          The   Alaska  Department  of  Natural  Resources  (DNR)
prepared the following cost  statement for 07WTR3:
          This  initiative appears to propose  language
          that   does  not  differ  significantly  from
          existing water quality standards.  Therefore,
          the   department   does   not   foresee   any
          significant  impact on the department  or  on
          activities on state-owned land.  As a result,
          there  will not be significant fiscal  impact
          either revenues or costs  as a result of this
          initiative.
          
          The  sponsors are correct that the Council  waived  its
          argument about the cost of promulgating regulations because the
Council failed to make this argument to the superior court.91  In
its  motion for summary judgment, the Council merely argued  that
the  cost  statement was inadequate because it failed to estimate
the  cost  of  [defending against] takings claims and  failed  to
recognize the potential loss in State revenues that would  result
from  the implementation of the measure.  The potential  loss  in
revenues  referred  to the speculative loss of  revenues  if  the
initiative  ended all LSMM mining.  Because the initiative  would
not  end all LSMM mining and the cost of defending takings claims
is  a  purely speculative cost that assumes future lawsuits,  the
superior  court  was correct to conclude that the cost  statement
was valid.  The new argument made by the Council in its appellate
brief that the DNR misstated the cost of adopting new regulations
is waived because the Council failed to raise the argument in the
court below.92
          Even  if  the Council had not waived its argument  that
the  cost  statement is inadequate because it omits the  cost  of
adopting  new regulations, that argument would still  be  without
merit.  The cost statement statute merely requires an estimate of
the  cost  of  implementing the proposed  law.   Thus,  the  cost
statement  need  not document every conceivable  cost  associated
with  the  implementation of the law. In addition,  the  DNR  has
substantially  more  knowledge  about  the  relative   costs   of
developing necessary regulations than the parties or this  court,
particularly in this instance, where there is no evidence  before
us  of  the costs of implementing the regulations that  would  be
required by 07WTR3.  Thus, we defer to the DNRs expertise in this
area and uphold its reasonable conclusion that there will not  be
any substantial fiscal impact as a result of the initiative.
          The   Council   did  not  waive  its  second   argument
challenging  the  cost statement  that the cost  statement  omits
costs  associated with legal challenges to regulations  that  the
initiative  will require  because it made a similar  argument  at
the  superior court level.  Nonetheless, this argument is without
merit.  Although it is possible that companies planning to  begin
new  mining  operations  may bring legal challenges  against  the
state  based on the initiative, those potential lawsuits and  the
costs  associated with them are purely speculative.  There is  no
authority for the assertion that the estimated costs of defending
potential lawsuits involving the initiative must be described  in
the  cost  statement.  Because such costs are purely speculative,
it would be impracticable to provide an estimate of how much they
would  be.   Therefore,  the superior court reasonably  concluded
that the cost statement is not inaccurate on this ground.
          In   sum,  the  cost  statement  provides  an  accurate
estimate  of  the  likely  insignificant  costs  associated  with
implementation of the initiative.  Thus, we affirm  the  superior
courts determination that the cost statement is not defective.
 V.  CONCLUSION
          For  the reasons set out in this opinion, in our  order
of July 3, 2008 we AFFIRMED the superior courts interpretation of
07WTR3  and its conclusions that the initiative would not make  a
constitutionally impermissible appropriation and would not  enact
          constitutionally impermissible special legislation, and that the
initiatives  summary and cost statement are not  deficient.   And
because 07WTR3 does not appropriate a public asset, because it is
not  special  legislation,  and  because  its  summary  and  cost
statement  are  not defective, we AFFIRMED the  decision  of  the
superior court in all aspects.
                            APPENDIX A


             THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

Pebble Limited Partnership,        )
                              )    Supreme Court No. S-13059
               Appellant,          )
                              )                  Order
     v.                       )    Affirming Superior Court
                              )
Sean Parnell, Lt. Governor, et al.,     )
                              )
               Appellees.                                       )
)


Council of Alaska Producers,       )
                              )    Supreme Court No. S-13060
               Appellant,          )             (Consolidated)
                              )
     v.                       )
                              )
Sean Parnell, Lt. Governor, et al.,     )
                              )          Order  No. 62 - July  3,
2008
               Appellees.          )
_______________________________    )
Trial Court Case # 4FA-07-2696 CI
          
          Before:  Matthews, Eastaugh,  Carpeneti,  and
          Winfree, Justices. [Fabe, Chief Justice,  not
          participating.]


          In  October 2007 an application for an initiative  with
the  title  An Act to protect Alaskas clean water was filed  with
the lieutenant governor (07WTR3).  This was the third attempt  to
place an initiative on the ballot that would restrict or regulate
the  discharge  of  toxic  materials from  large  scale  metallic
mineral  mines in Alaska.  The Department of Law reviewed  07WTR3
and  advised  the lieutenant governor to certify  the  initiative
application.   Relying  on the Department  of  Laws  advice,  the
lieutenant  governor certified initiative 07WTR3.  The lieutenant
governor  then  prepared  a summary and cost  statement  for  the
initiative   that   incorporated   the   Department    of    Laws
interpretation.  In January 2008 the sponsors of  the  initiative
submitted to the lieutenant governor a petition with over  30,000
signatures in support of 07WTR3.
          In  November  and December 2007 the Council  of  Alaska
Producers, the Pebble Limited Partnership, and the Association of
ANCSA  Regional Corporation Presidents/CEOs, Inc. and the  Alaska
Federation  of  Natives, Inc., filed suit in the  superior  court
seeking  a  declaration that 07WTR3 violated  constitutional  and
statutory  restrictions  on legislation  by  initiative,  and  an
injunction that would prevent placement of the initiative on  the
ballot.  The sponsors of the initiative intervened in the action.
          In  February  2008  Superior  Court  Judge  Douglas  L.
Blankenship  issued  a  decision concluding  that  07WTR3  was  a
permissible regulatory measure and not an appropriation  and  was
therefore appropriate for the ballot.  In concluding that  07WTR3
was  not an appropriation, Judge Blankenship adopted the approach
of  the  sponsors and the state and construed the  references  to
effects  in  section  two  as meaning adversely  affects.   Judge
Blankenship found in his final judgment that (1) 07WTR3 is not an
improper  appropriation; (2) 07WTR3 [is]  not  local  or  special
legislation; (3) [t]he subject matter of 07WTR3 is proper for  an
initiative; (4) 07WTR3 does not constitute an unlawful  amendment
of  the Alaska Constitution; and (5) [t]he bill summary and  cost
statement  appearing on the 07WTR3 initiative petitions  are  not
defective.
          The  Council of Alaska Producers and the Pebble Limited
Partnership   appealed  those  portions  of  Judge   Blankenships
decision  construing 07WTR3 and concluding that 07WTR3 would  not
make  a  constitutionally impermissible appropriation, would  not
enact  constitutionally  impermissible special  legislation,  and
that  the  summary and cost statement are impartial and accurate.
The  Association  of ANCSA Regional Corporation  Presidents/CEOs,
Inc.  and  the Alaska Federation of Natives, Inc. did not  appeal
any  portion  of  Judge  Blankenships decision.   We  heard  oral
argument on June 16, 2008.
IT IS ORDERED:
     1.    Judge  Blankenship  did  not  err  in  construing  the
initiative broadly and reading the initiatives use of effects  in
section two to mean adversely affects.
     2.   Judge Blankenship did not err in concluding that 07WTR3
would not make a constitutionally impermissible appropriation.
     3.   Judge Blankenship did not err in concluding that 07WTR3
would    not   enact   constitutionally   impermissible   special
legislation.
     4.    Judge  Blankenship did not err in concluding that  the
summary and cost statements are not defective.
     5.     Accordingly,  the  decision  of  the  superior  court
declining  to  enjoin the placement of initiative 07WTR3  on  the
ballot is AFFIRMED.
     6.    This  court will issue a written opinion at  a  future
date explaining the reasons for this result.
     7.    Preparation of the ballots including initiative 07WTR3
need not await publication of this courts opinion.

     Entered by direction of the court.
                                   Clerk of the Appellate Courts
                                   
                                    \s\ Marilyn May
_______________________________
      1    The Department of Law uses the phrase adversely effect,
 but the grammatically correct phrasing is adversely affect and we
 adopt that phrasing.
 
      2     Subsequent to the filing of the appellant  briefs  in
 this   lawsuit,  the  sponsors  formally  requested   that   the
 lieutenant governor take such steps as are necessary  to  ensure
 that  Initiative 07WATR does not appear on the upcoming election
 ballot.   The sponsors then filed a notice of potential mootness
 with  this  court.  Because, as a result of this courts  June  9
 order,  there is no appeal of Judge Blankenships order enjoining
 the  placement of 07WATR on the ballot, the sponsors request  to
 the lieutenant governor is moot.
 
      3    We attach our July 3, 2008 order as Appendix A.
 
      4      See   Anchorage   Citizens  for   Taxi   Reform   v.
 Municipality of Anchorage,
 151 P.3d 418, 422 (Alaska 2006).
 
      5    Id.
 
      6     Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage,  139  P.3d
 1259, 1261 (Alaska 2006).
 
      7     Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform, 151 P.3d  at  422
 (quoting Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 58 (Alaska 1996)).
 
      8     See  Alaskans for Efficient Govt, Inc. v.  State,  52
 P.3d 732, 735 (Alaska 2002) (ballot summary).
 
      9    Id.
 
      10    Id.
 
      11    Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform,151 P.3d at 422.
 
      12    Id.
 
      13    Id. at 423.
 
      14     See Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 4-9 (Alaska  1979)
 (state  land  may not be appropriated by initiative);  see  also
 Alaska  Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84  P.3d
 989,  993-95 (Alaska 2004) (same); McAlpine v. Univ. of  Alaska,
 762   P.2d  81,  90-91  (Alaska  1988)  (holding  one  part   of
 initiative  that would have transferred land from University  of
 Alaska to new community college an invalid appropriation).
 
      15     See Thomas v. Rosen, 569 P.2d 793, 796 (Alaska 1977)
 (endorsing  definition  of appropriation that  involved  setting
 aside of public revenue).
 
      16     See  Alaska Conservative Political Action  Comm.  v.
 Municipality  of Anchorage, 745 P.2d 936, 938 (Alaska  1987)  (A
 utility  with  $32.7  million equity is a significant  municipal
 asset.).
 
      17    See Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 61 (Alaska 1996).
 
      18    151 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2006).
 
      19    Id.  at 424.
 
      20    Id.
 
      21    Id.
 
      22     Pullen, 923 P.2d at 61; see also Anchorage  Citizens
 for Taxi Reform, 151 P.3d at 424.
 
      23     Article VIII provides that the legislature  has  the
 authority  to  provide  for  the utilization,  development,  and
 conservation of the waters of the state for the maximum  benefit
 of  the  people, and reserves waters in their natural state  for
 common use by the people.  Alaska Const. art. VIII,  2, 3.
 
      24     Pullen  v.  Ulmer,  923 P.2d 54,  60  (Alaska  1996)
 (quoting  Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing, 763 P.2d 488,  495
 (Alaska 1988)).
 
      25    Id. at 60-61.
 
      26    Pullen, 923 P.2d at 59.
 
      27      See   Anchorage  Citizens  for   Taxi   Reform   v.
 Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418, 424 (Alaska 2006).
 
      28    See id.
 
      29     See Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform, 151 P.3d  at
 423 (citing Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 63 (Alaska 1996)).
 
      30    Id.
 
      31     Id.  (quoting McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762  P.2d
 81,   88  (Alaska  1988))   (emphasis  in  original);  see  also
 Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d  1259,  1262
 (Alaska   2006)   (quoting  City  of  Fairbanks   v.   Fairbanks
 Convention  &  Visitors  Bureau, 818  P.2d  1153,  1156  (Alaska
 1991)).
 
      32     Staudenmaier,  139  P.3d at 1262  (quoting  City  of
 Fairbanks,  818 P.2d at 1157); see also Pullen, 923 P.2d  at  64
 n.15.
 
      33     The Alaska State Legislature, in its brief of amicus
 curiae, does argue that 07WATR gives away public resources.
 
      34     Pullen,  923 P.2d at 63 (quoting City of  Fairbanks,
 818 P.2d at 1157).
 
      35    See id. at 64 n.15.
 
      36     McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 94 (Alaska
 1988).
 
      37     City  of Kenai v. Friends of Recreation Ctr.,  Inc.,
 129  P.3d  452,  459 (Alaska 2006) (quoting Govt Employees  Ins.
 Co. v. Graham-Gonzalez, 107 P.3d 279, 284 (Alaska 2005)).
 
      38     Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v.  Kritz,  170
 P.3d 183, 192-93 (Alaska 2007).
 
      39     State, Dept of Commerce, Cmty. and Econ. Dev.,  Div.
 of  Ins.  v.  Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 165 P.3d  624,  629
 (Alaska  2007)  (quoting Kodiak Island Borough v.  Exxon  Corp.,
 991 P.2d 757, 761 (Alaska 1999)).
 
      40     Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974)
 (quoting   Cope  v.  Toronto, 332 P.2d 977,  979  (Utah  1958)),
 overruled  on other grounds by McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska,  762
 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
 
      41    Id. at 193.
 
      42    Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform, 151 P.3d 418, 422
 (Alaska  2006) (quoting Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 58 (Alaska
 1996)).
 
      43     Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Alaska  1999)
 (We  find  little  support . . . for the  proposition  that  the
 common  use  clause  of  Article  VIII  grants  the  legislature
 exclusive  power  to  make laws dealing  with  natural  resource
 management.).
 
      44    Id. at 1029.
 
      45    See Pullen, 923 P.2d at 63-64.
 
      46    Id.
 
      47     Alaskans for Efficient Govt, Inc. v. State, 153 P.3d
 296,  298 (Alaska 2007) (quoting State v. Trust the People,  113
 P.3d 613, 614 n. 1 (Alaska 2005)).
 
      48    Id.
 
      49    Id.
 
      50    Id.
 
      51    528 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1974) overruled on other grounds
 by McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 84 (Alaska 1988).
 
      52    Id. at 458.
 
      53    Id. at 459, 462.
 
      54    Id. at 459.
 
      55     See  id.  at 461 (If the subject of the statute  may
 apply  to, and affect the people of, every political subdivision
 of  the  state, it is a law of general nature . . . .)  (quoting
 Sutherland  Statutory Construction  40.02, at  139-40  (4th  ed.
 1973)).
 
      56    Id. at 461 n.17.
 
      57    Id.   We  note  that, in addition to the  legislative
 history  set out in Boucher, constitutional history informs  our
 understanding  of  the meaning of special  legislation:   During
 the  discussion  that  preceded  the  adoption  of  article  XI,
 section  7, delegates to the Constitutional Convention described
 and  gave  examples  of their conception of special  legislation
 that  are  helpful  to our inquiry.  W. O. Smith  expressed  his
 view  that the intent of the ban on special legislation  was  to
 prevent  the  initiation of legislation  affecting  local  areas
 wherein  the people of the state as a whole would be allowed  to
 vote  on  issues which concerned only one locality.   George  W.
 McLaughlin  expanded  on  that idea,  stating  that   local  and
 special  legislation has a specific meaning in the  law  and  in
 fact  it is the expressed intent of the local government article
 that  no  local laws, that is laws of special and  local  effect
 shall  be  passed,  but  only general  laws  applicable  to  all
 communities.   The  delegates,  in  explaining  the  concept  of
 special legislation to their colleagues, used the examples of  a
 law  that  granted a divorce to one couple, an appropriation  of
 funds  for  one specific school, or a prohibition of fish  traps
 in  only  one  particular  cove.  2 Proceedings  of  the  Alaska
 Constitutional Convention 1132-34 (December 19, 1955).
 
      58     This is not to say that such a statute or initiative
 could  not  be challenged on other constitutional grounds,  such
 as  equal protection; however, it will be valid for purposes  of
 article XI, section 7.
 
      59    Boucher v. Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1974).
 
      60     Id.  at 461 (quoting Sutherland, supra note  55,  at
 40.02).
 
      61     Id.  (noting  that the critical element  is  whether
 there is a rational basis for the particular classification .  .
 .  .  the  classification  must bear  a  reasonable  and  proper
 relationship  to the purpose of the act and the  problem  sought
 to be remedied.).
 
      62    559 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1977).
 
      63     Id.   at   643  and  n.44  (modifying  the   special
 legislation  test described in Boucher in order to reflect  more
 stringent  equal  protection standard set forth  in  Isakson  v.
 Rickey,  550 P.2d 359, 361-63 (Alaska 1976)).  It may be  useful
 to  clarify  how  this  test relates to our  recent  opinion  in
 Bridges  v.  Banner Health, 201 P.3d 484 (Alaska 2008).  Bridges
 quotes  with  approval a treatise stating that  [a]  statute  is
 unconstitutional  special legislation  if  (1)  it  creates  [a]
 totally arbitrary and unreasonable method of classification,  or
 (2)  it creates a permanently closed class.  Id. at 494 (quoting
 2  Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction  40.1, at
 213  (6th  ed. 2000)). Due to the use of or rather than  and  in
 that  formulation,  it might create some uncertainty  about  the
 structure  of our special legislation test. Despite  the  quoted
 language,  creation  of  a permanently  closed  class  does  not
 necessarily  constitute prohibited special  legislation  if  the
 legislation  bears  a  fair  and  substantial  relationship   to
 legitimate  public  purposes. Nor does  the  inquiry  reach  the
 question  of a fair and substantial relationship if the  law  in
 question is of general applicability.
           Nevertheless,  the outcome in Bridges  was  consistent
 with  the  two-step analysis we have outlined here. In  Bridges,
 we  found  the statute in question was a general act because  it
 applies  uniformly  to  any entity that seeks  to  construct  an
 independent  diagnostic testing facility . .  .  .  [T]he  class
 covered  by  the  statute  will grow if additional  health  care
 providers  seek  to  construct  independent  diagnostic  testing
 facilities. Bridges, 201 P.3d at 495. In Bridges, we upheld  the
 statute  on that basis, noting that we did not reach  the  issue
 of  a  fair and substantial relationship to legitimate  purposes
 because  the appellant did not raise that issue. Id. at  494-95.
 We  might  have  better  said that this  second  issue  was  not
 reached  because  the  legislation in question  was,  under  our
 threshold test, found to be a law of general applicability.
 
      64     Id.  (overturning  Walters v. Cease,  394  P.2d  670
 (Alaska 1964)).
 
      65    Id. at 462-63 n.22.
 
      66    Id. at 464.
 
      67    559 P.2d at 632-33.
 
      68    Id. at 642.
 
      69    Id. at 643.
 
      70    Id. at 644.
 
      71    958 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998).
 
      72    Id. at 424.
 
      73     Id. at 430 (noting that relevant inquiry was the one
 required  when  the  legislature has  singled  out  an  area  or
 group).
 
      74    Id. at 431.
 
      75    Id.
 
      76    528 P.2d 456, 464 (Alaska 1974).
 
      77     Katzenbach  v.  Morgan, 384  U.S.  641,  657  (1966)
 (internal citations omitted).
 
      78     Commercial  Fisheries Entry Commn v.  Apokedak,  606
 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Alaska 1980).
 
      79    National Research Council, Hardrock Mining on Federal
 Lands,          67         (1999),         available          at
 http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=9682,  (follow   Full
 Text  hyperlink).   The  report notes that  [i]f  not  mitigated
 through  regulation and prevention strategies,  hardrock  mining
 can  have  long-term  impacts on . . . water chemistry,  aquatic
 biota,  and  aquatic habitat.  Id. at 153.  Problems  associated
 with  metallic  hardrock  mining include  discharge  of  metals,
 cyanide, and acid drainage.  Id. at 153-56.  It notes that  even
 very  low concentrations of metals can be harmful to fish.   Id.
 at 159.
 
      80    The superior court recognized that [i]n practice, the
 lieutenant governor uses the same summary for both the  petition
 and  the  ballot.  The standards for the adequacy of the summary
 apply  equally  whether  it  is a  ballot  summary  or  petition
 summary.
 
      81    52 P.3d 732 (Alaska 2002).
 
      82     Id. at 735-36 (holding that the petition summary  at
 issue  fails to adequately describe the actual changes that  the
 relocation   initiative  proposes  to   make   and   casts   the
 initiatives purpose in an unnecessarily negative light).
 
      83     Id.  at  734  (quoting Burgess v. Alaska  Lieutenant
 Governor, 654 P.2d 273, 275 (Alaska 1982)).
 
      84     Id.  at  736.   See also Burgess, 654  P.2d  at  276
 (holding  that Alaska Constitution and state law do not  require
 the  lieutenant governor to give special reminders to the voters
 regarding the scope of a state initiative).
 
      85     Alaskans for Efficient Govt Inc. v. State,  52  P.3d
 732,  736  (Alaska 2002) (quoting Gaines v. McCuen,  758  S.W.2d
 403, 406 (Ark. 1988)).
 
      86     Id.  at  735  (quoting Faipeas  v.  Municipality  of
 Anchorage, 860 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Alaska 1993)).
 
      87    Burgess, 654 P.2d at 276.
 
      88     See  Still v. Cunningham, 94 P.3d 1104, 1111 (Alaska
 2004)  (Issues  that  are not raised in the superior  court  are
 waived  and  cannot  be  asserted  on  appeal  as  grounds   for
 overturning  a  judgment.).  The Councils  argument  before  the
 superior  court was that the summary was misleading  because  it
 did  not  state that the initiative would end all  LSMM  mining.
 The  superior  court correctly rejected this  original  argument
 because,  by  its terms, the initiative does not  ban  all  LSMM
 mining:  (1)  existing mines with all required permits  are  not
 affected,  and  (2) new mines will also be able  to  operate  if
 they  can do so without adversely affecting human drinking water
 or salmon life cycles.
 
      89    Alaskans for Efficient Govt, 52 P.3d at 736.
 
      90     See,  e.g., Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General
 re  Referenda Required for Adoption, 963 So. 2d 210,  214  (Fla.
 2007)   (In   deciding  the  validity  of  a  financial   impact
 statement, the Court has limited itself only to address  whether
 the  statement is clear, unambiguous, consists of no  more  than
 seventy-five  words,  and is limited to  address  the  estimated
 increase  or decrease in any revenues or costs to the  state  or
 local  governments.); Stop Over Spending Montana v.  State,  139
 P.3d  788,  793  (Mont.  2006) (upholding  cost  statement  even
 though  [t]he  fiscal note says that the fiscal  impact  of  the
 measure  is  unknown); Bassien v. Buchanan, 798  P.2d  667,  669
 (Or.  1990)  (holding  that failure of government  officials  to
 file   statutorily-required   fiscal   impact   estimates    for
 initiatives did not prevent a valid vote on the measures).
 
      91    See Still, 94 P.3d at 1111.
 
      92    Id.
 
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