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You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Squires v. Alaska Board of Architects, Engineers & Land Surveyors (04/17/2009) sp-6364

Squires v. Alaska Board of Architects, Engineers & Land Surveyors (04/17/2009) sp-6364

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

JOHN D. SQUIRES, )
) Supreme Court No. S- 12722
Appellant,)
) Superior Court No. 1JU-06- 849 CI
v. )
) O P I N I O N
)
ALASKA BOARD OF ARCHITECTS,) No. 6364 - April 17, 2009
ENGINEERS & LAND SURVEYORS,)
)
Appellee.)
)
          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of  Alaska, First Judicial District,  Juneau,
          Patricia A. Collins, Judge.

          Appearances:   Douglas K. Mertz,  William  F.
          Cummings, Juneau, for Appellant.  Jenna  Rohr
          Conley, Assistant Attorney General, Talis  J.
          Colberg,   Attorney  General,  Juneau,    for
          Appellee.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Carpeneti, and Winfree, Justices.

          WINFREE, Justice.


I.   INTRODUCTION
          John  D.  Squires  disputes an  agency  denial  of  his
request  for  a  waiver  of  one of  two  examinations  typically
required  to  become a registered engineer.  The  superior  court
affirmed  the  agency  decision.  Squires appeals,  claiming  the
agency  erroneously  concluded he had failed  to  present  enough
verifiable evidence of the twenty years of engineering experience
required  for  an  exam  waiver.   He  asserts  that  the  agency
erroneously  imposed  experience verification  requirements  that
were  not set out in any statute or regulation.  He also  asserts
that  the  agency  denied him due process by imposing  experience
verification  requirements  that  could  not  be   met   and   by
disregarding evidence that he was sufficiently qualified to be  a
registered  engineer.  He finally argues that the  agency  denied
him  equal protection of the law by not treating him like certain
other   applicants  with  the  same  background,  training,   and
experience.
          We  conclude  that  the agency:   (1)  did  not  impose
improper experience verification requirements by denying his exam
waiver  request;  (2)  reasonably found  Squires  had  failed  to
demonstrate  he was entitled to an exam waiver; and (3)  did  not
violate  Squiress  due  process or equal protection  rights.   We
therefore affirm.
II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
     A.   Statutory and Regulatory Background
          Alaska  Statute  08.48  governs engineer  licensing  in
Alaska.  The Board of Registration for Architects, Engineers, and
Land  Surveyors (Board) administers the registration process  and
is statutorily empowered to adopt regulations.1
          Alaska Statute 08.48.171 provides that an applicant for
engineer  registration must be of good character  and  reputation
and  shall  submit  evidence satisfactory to  the  board  of  the
applicants  education, training and experience.2  There  are  two
ways  to  become a registered engineer in Alaska:  by examination
and by comity.3
          Examinations  are administered pursuant to  the  Boards
procedures  and standards regulations; the Boards procedures  and
standards  must meet the requirements of the recognized  national
examining  council for engineers.4  The Board typically  requires
applicants  to  pass  two  exams.  One  is  the  Fundamentals  of
Engineering exam (often called the FE, but referred  to  here  as
the   fundamentals   exam),   testing   materials   covered    in
undergraduate engineering programs.5  The other is the Principles
and  Practices  of  Engineering exam (often called  the  PE,  but
referred  to  here  as the professional exam), testing  practical
applications of engineering theories.6  The Board may  waive  the
fundamentals  exam  for  an  applicant who  submits  satisfactory
evidence . . . to verify 20 years of professional experience.7
          By  comity a registered engineer from another state  or
foreign  country may apply for and obtain Alaska registration  if
in  the opinion of the board the prior registration meets all  of
Alaskas requirements.8  However, a comity applicant need not have
taken a fundamentals exam in the earlier registration process.9
          The  application  instructions for registration  as  an
engineer  are  of  particular importance  to  this  appeal.   The
instructions  provide  that  relevant  work  experience  must  be
verified  by  employers  or supervisors using  the  Boards  work-
experience verification forms.  The instructions further  provide
that  relevant  work  experience must  be  verified  by  a  U.S.-
registered engineer.  These application instructions had been  in
effect  for  at  least  six  years  before  Squires  applied  for
registration as a professional engineer.
     B.   Facts and Proceedings
          A.   Squires graduated from college in 1969 with a degree
unrelated   to   engineering,  but  has  worked  in  construction
engineering since the early 1970s.  He received a masters  degree
in engineering from the University of Washington in 1988.  He has
never been a registered engineer in any jurisdiction.
          Squires  first applied for registration as an  engineer
in  Alaska in December 2003.  The Board approved Squires  to  sit
for  both  the  fundamentals  exam  and  the  professional  exam.
Squires  then applied for a fundamentals exam waiver,  submitting
his  resume  and  a  summary of his engineering  experience.   He
advised  that  third-party  verifications  for  his  professional
experience  would be arriving separately, but that  many  of  the
people who supervised my engineering work 20 years ago are either
deceased  or  cannot  be  located  [and  this]  may  cause   some
difficulties  in  my  meeting  the  boards  waiver  requirements.
Squires took and passed the professional exam in April 2004.
          In August 2004 the Board concluded that Squires had not
adequately  verified  the  240 months of professional  experience
required  for  a  waiver of the fundamentals exam  under  12  AAC
36.090.  The Board advised Squires that he had to verify at least
128 more months of professional experience to be eligible for  an
exam waiver and invited him to submit additional information.
          In  February  2005 Squires resubmitted his exam  waiver
request  with an affidavit and a summary of his experience.   The
Board again concluded that Squires had not verified 240 months of
professional experience.  The Board advised Squires that only 100
months  of  professional experience had been verified  by  third-
party  registered engineers.  The Board reiterated  that  Squires
was still approved to sit for the fundamentals exam.
          Squires  appealed the Boards decision and  requested  a
hearing.   An administrative hearing was held in September  2005.
In  January  2006 the hearing officer issued a proposed  Decision
and   Order  concluding,  based  on  the  Boards  February   2005
calculations,  that  Squires had failed  to  adequately  document
twenty  years  of relevant professional experience  and  was  not
entitled to an exam waiver.
          The  Board did not act on the proposed decision at  its
February   2006  meeting.   Squiress  attorney   asked   for   an
opportunity to present to [the Board] a short, very summary brief
that  says  what  we believe is wrong with [the hearing  officers
proposed] decision.  The Board granted the request, stating  that
it  would not take action until the next Board meeting.  Squiress
attorney   submitted  additional  materials  to  the  Board   and
indicated he had asked Squires to attempt to find more people who
could  verify his work experience.  The Boards executive director
responded  that Squires should submit any additional  information
by May 12, 2006.
          In  May  2006 Squires presented his case to  the  Board
with   additional   evidence,  including  a  spreadsheet   titled
Engineering  Experience and letters of reference associated  with
the  listed  positions.   The Board then  met  with  the  hearing
officer  and  adopted the hearing officers January 2006  proposed
Decision and Order denying Squiress exam waiver request.10
          Squires  appealed to the superior court, which affirmed
the Boards decision.  Squires appeals.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          When  the superior court acts as an intermediate  court
of  appeal  in an administrative matter, we independently  review
and directly scrutinize the merits of the [agency] decision.11


          We   apply our independent judgment to questions of law
that  do  not  involve agency expertise, including constitutional
questions12 and whether an agency action is a regulation.13   The
reasonable  basis  test applies when we review questions  of  law
involving  agency expertise; under this test,  we  defer  to  the
agencys  statutory  and regulatory interpretation  unless  it  is
unreasonable.14
          We review an administrative agencys factual findings to
ensure they are supported by substantial evidence.15  Substantial
evidence  is  such relevant evidence as a reasonable  mind  might
accept  as  adequate  to  support the  Boards  conclusion.16   We
determine  only whether such evidence exists and  do  not  choose
between  competing  inferences or evaluate the  strength  of  the
evidence.17
IV.  DISCUSSION
     A.   The Boards Third-Party Verification Requirement Is Valid and
          Not a Regulation Required To Be Promulgated in Accordance with
          the Administrative Procedure Act.
          
          A.   An applicant for registration as a licensed engineer must
demonstrate evidence satisfactory to the board of the  applicants
education, training, and
 experience.18  Before being allowed to take the  fundamentals and
professional  exams,  an applicant must demonstrate  satisfactory
evidence   of   minimum  levels  of  education,   training,   and
experience.19    An  applicant  may  obtain  a  waiver   of   the
fundamentals  exam if satisfactory evidence is presented  to  the
Board  verifying twenty years of professional experience.20   The
phrases  evidence  satisfactory to  the  board  and  satisfactory
evidence are not defined by statute or regulation.
          The application instructions explain that an applicants
work  experience  must  be verified by employers  or  supervisors
using  Alaskas work-experience verification forms, and that [t]he
board  will not give credit for work experience without the third
party verification, even if you have listed the experience.   The
instructions  also state that [a]pplicants must have  their  work
experience,  including responsible charge, verified  by  a  U.S.-
registered  engineer.   The provision for  verification  of  work
experience  by a third-party registered engineer does not  appear
in  any regulation or statute, but was in effect for at least six
years before Squires submitted his application.
          Squires  observes that AS 08.48.181 requires the  Board
to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in adopting
standards  and procedures related to professional examinations.21
He  thus  argues that the Board, in determining that satisfactory
evidence  of  his  professional experience  required  independent
          third-party verifications by registered engineers, must comply
with the APA process for adopting new regulations.22  Because the
Board  did not, Squires asserts that the independent verification
requirement   is  invalid.   He  essentially  argues   that   the
independent verification requirement is an additional regulation,
rather  than the kind of routine statutory interpretation  within
the agencys discretion.23
          In  determining whether an agency policy or rule  is  a
regulation  that must be promulgated in compliance with  the  APA
requirements, we examine its character and use.24  [O]ne  of  the
statutory   indicia  of  a  regulation  is  that  it  implements,
interprets or makes specific the law enforced or administered  by
the state agency.25  Alaska Statute 44.62.640(a)(3) provides that
whether a regulation, regardless of name, is covered [by the APA]
depends  in part on whether it affects the public or is  used  by
the  agency  in dealing with the public.26  It also  states  that
regulation  does not include a form prescribed by a state  agency
or instructions relating to the use of the form.27
          Squires  relies primarily on two cases to  support  his
argument.   In  Jerrel v. State Department of Natural  Resources,
the  Jerrels  contested a Department of Natural  Resources  (DNR)
rule  requiring  identifying marks on animals  on  state  grazing
leases  to be visible from at least twenty feet.28  The  relevant
regulation  empowered the director to require that the  livestock
be  tagged,  dyed, or otherwise marked, but did not  specify  any
particular level of visibility.29  DNR first pronounced the twenty-
foot  rule in a letter to the Jerrels and conditioned renewal  of
their  land leases on compliance.30  The Jerrels proposed placing
tags  on  the manes of their animals.31  DNR informed  them  that
plastic  tags  would be insufficiently permanent,  but  retreated
from   its   twenty-foot  visibility  requirement  by   proposing
permanent tattoos.32  When the Jerrels proposed ear tattoos,  DNR
again  reversed its position in response to complaints  from  the
neighboring landowners and insisted on brands that would meet the
twenty-foot visibility requirement.33  The Jerrels argued that DNR
did not interpret its existing regulations in creating the twenty-
foot  rule,  but  instead  established a new  regulation  without
complying with the APA.34
          We  held  that DNRs twenty-foot visibility  requirement
included  core  characteristics of a regulation and  was  invalid
because  the  APAs procedural standards had not been satisfied.35
First,  DNR  created the requirement to interpret, make  specific
and  implement  the statutory requirement that a  mark  or  brand
show[] distinctly. 36  Second, DNR used the requirement as a tool
in dealing with the public, rather than as an internal guideline.37
We  concluded  that DNR actually based its decision to  terminate
the  Jerrels leases upon the fact that the Jerrels did not comply
with its policy. 38
          In  State v. Tanana Valley Sportsmens Assn, the  Alaska
Board  of Game issued verbal instructions to its agents modifying
the  criteria  for re-issuing hunting permits so that  preference
would  go  to persons who relied most heavily on wild  game   for
sustenance.39   We  held  that regulations governing  subsistence
hunting were subject to the APA requirements and that nothing  in
          the APA authorized the board to impose requirements not contained
in written regulations by means of oral instructions to agents.40
We   explained   that  [o]bviously,  such  verbal  additions   to
regulations  involving requirements of substance are unauthorized
and unenforceable.41
          Squires  acknowledges our holding in  Alyeska  Pipeline
Service  Co. v. Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation42
that common sense statutory interpretations do not require formal
rulemaking.   There we concluded that [a]lthough  the  [APA]  may
require rulemaking in cases in which an agencys interpretation of
a  statute is expansive or unforeseeable, or in cases in which an
agency  alters its previous interpretation of a statute, obvious,
commonsense   interpretations  of   statutes   do   not   require
rulemaking.43  We explained:
          Although  the  definition  of  regulation  is
          broad,  it does not encompass every  routine,
          predictable interpretation of a statute by an
          agency.  Nearly every agency action is based,
          implicitly    or    explicitly,     on     an
          interpretation  of  a statute  or  regulation
          authorizing  it  to act.  A requirement  that
          each  such  interpretation  be  preceded   by
          rulemaking    would   result   in    complete
          ossification of the regulatory state.[44]
          
We  thus  held  the  agencys rule allowing  it  to  recoup  costs
incurred   defending   permit  appeals   was   a   common   sense
interpretation of a statute authorizing the agency  to  bill  for
the  cost  of reviewing . . . permits, not a separate  regulation
requiring compliance with the APA.45
          Relying  on  Jerrel and Tanana Valley Sportsmens  Assn,
Squires  asserts that the third-party verifications  required  by
the  application  instructions are not solely  a  matter  of  the
internal management of the agency because they prescribe the only
acceptable  type  of proof to show each month  of  an  applicants
professional   career.    He  concludes  that   the   third-party
verification  requirement  is a substantive  requirement  without
which an applicant [cannot] qualify for a license.  Squires  also
argues  that  unlike the cost recovery rule in  Alyeska  Pipeline
Service Co., the third-party verification requirement here is not
foreseeable  from  the existing authority.  He  claims  that  the
requirement  should have been articulated in regulations  subject
to  the  APA  notice and hearing requirements because the  phrase
satisfactory  evidence,  found  in  12  AAC  36.090,   could   be
interpreted to mean anything from live testimony at a hearing  to
an affidavit from the applicant himself.
          We   conclude   that   the   third-party   verification
requirement  is  not  a  regulation  and  need  not   have   been
promulgated   in  accordance  with  the  APA.   The  verification
requirement  is  not unforeseeable  AS 08.48.201(3)  requires  an
engineers application to contain five references, three  of  whom
must  be . . . engineers . . . having personal knowledge  of  the
applicants  . . . education, training, or experience.   Nor  does
the verification requirement reflect a sudden shift in the Boards
          interpretation of the phrase satisfactory evidence, given that
the  requirement  existed for at least six years before  Squiress
waiver  application.  Finally, because a registered  engineer  is
likely  best  qualified to assess the quality  of  a  prospective
engineers  work,  the third-party verification requirement  is  a
common sense interpretation of the phrase satisfactory evidence.
          We   recognize   that   the  third-party   verification
requirement  has some of the same indicia of a regulation  as  in
Jerrel.   It  does  in  a  sense  interpret,  make  specific  and
implement the statutory requirement of satisfactory evidence, and
it  is a tool for dealing with the public as well as establishing
internal  guidelines  for evaluating applicant  qualifications.46
But  in Jerrel, we were primarily concerned that DNR singled  out
the  Jerrels for enforcement of a new rule and that such  ad  hoc
decision-making  could allow agency action  to  be  motivated  by
improper  influences.47  Squires presented no evidence  that  the
Board  has  applied  its  long-standing third-party  verification
requirements unevenly.48  The third-party verification requirement
applies  to  all applicants for engineer registration in  Alaska,
not just to persons seeking an exam waiver.  Squires was able  to
meet   the   verification  requirements  to  sit  for  both   the
fundamentals  exam and the professional exam.   The  record  also
demonstrates   that  other  individuals  have  used   third-party
verifications to meet the twenty-year requirement for a waiver of
the  fundamentals exam.49  And unlike in Tanana Valley Sportsmens
Assn,  where  substantive changes to hunting permit  requirements
were  verbally issued to Board of Game agents,50 the  third-party
verification  requirement is plainly stated  in  writing  in  the
application instructions.
          The  APA  is  meant  to reduce the  risk  of  arbitrary
application and to inform the public of regulations.  Squires has
not demonstrated that the third-party verification requirement in
the  application instructions is obscure or creates a  meaningful
risk of arbitrary application.  Accordingly we conclude that  the
third-party  verification requirement is  not  a  regulation  and
affirm the superior courts decision on this issue.
     B.   Substantial Evidence Supported the Boards Conclusion that
          Squires Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence that He Had Twenty
          Years of Engineering Experience.
          
          Squires argues that the Board erred by concluding  that
he  failed  to  present adequate evidence to merit a fundamentals
exam  waiver.  Squires claims he submitted evidence  showing  309
months of engineering experience, exceeding the twenty years (240
months)  required by 12 AAC 36.090(a), and that 280  of  the  309
months   were  supported  by  third-party  affidavits.    Squires
acknowledges  that not all of his third-party verifications  were
from   registered   engineers,   contravening   the   application
instructions.   He  also acknowledges that he alone  attested  to
twenty-nine  months of experience.  But Squires  argues  that  he
failed  to  present the requisite third-party verifications  from
registered  engineers  because he was the only  engineer  on  the
project or because the project engineers had died or could not be
found.
          Whether   an  applicant  is  qualified  to   become   a
registered  engineer is a question involving agency  expertise.51
We  therefore  defer  to  the Boards interpretation  of  evidence
satisfactory  to  the  board  or  satisfactory  evidence   unless
unreasonable.  The Board has adopted the position (represented in
the application instructions) that fundamentals exam waivers will
be  granted  to applicants only if they present twenty  years  of
experience  verified  by  third-party registered  engineers.   We
conclude  that  this  is  a  reasonable  interpretation  of   the
satisfactory  evidence requirement in light of the public  safety
issues  involved  and the fact that other individuals  have  been
granted  exam  waivers based on verification of twenty  years  of
experience.
          Substantial   evidence  supports  the  Boards   factual
findings  about the amount of time Squires was credited  for  his
engineering  experience and its ultimate conclusion that  Squires
failed  to  submit  satisfactory  evidence  of  twenty  years  of
relevant   experience.    Based  on  the  verifications   Squires
submitted in February 2005, the Board awarded Squires credit  for
100  months  of professional experience.  Our review of  Squiress
February 2005 summary supports the Boards conclusion that Squires
did not adequately verify the required 240 months of professional
experience.
          The February 2005 summary rarely identifies the name of
the employer or company for whom Squires worked.  For example  it
states  that  between 1974 and 1980, Squires [d]esigned  numerous
concrete mixes for special needs, but it does not say for whom he
designed  the  mixes or where they were used.  Squires  allocated
thirty  months for that work.  Squires also credited himself  ten
months  for   expert witness services performed over  a  ten-year
period.  But he does not identify any cases or specify the  exact
nature of his testimony.  Squires gave himself double credit  for
the  time  he was enrolled in the masters engineering program  at
the   University  of  Washington  and  doing  other   work,   but
regulations provide that [e]ducation and work experience may  not
be  accumulated concurrently and that applicants  may  claim  [a]
maximum of 12 months credit . . . for a calendar year.52  Some of
Squiress  third-party verifications are similarly  inappropriate,
for  example  addressing his good character but not his  work  on
specific projects.
     
     The  additional evidence Squires submitted at the  May  2006
Board meeting fails to support his assertion that he verified 240
months  of professional experience.  Squires submitted a  revised
explanation of his engineering experience with annotations to new
verification evidence, but the new evidence did not add up to the
additional  140  months  needed  for  an  exam  waiver.   Several
documents  were  general recommendation letters  not  written  by
registered  engineers.  Others attested to  his  experience  with
some  detail,  but  were not from registered engineers.   Several
third-party  verifications from registered engineers already  had
been  accounted for in the Boards February 2005 calculations.   A
new  letter from one registered engineer stated only that he  had
worked  with Squires for over ten years and gave a single example
     of a project, but was otherwise uninformative.
          In  light  of the Boards interpretation of satisfactory
evidence   and  the  evidence  actually  presented,   the   Board
reasonably concluded that Squires submitted insufficient evidence
of  240  months  of  professional engineering work.   Substantial
evidence supports the Boards conclusion.  We therefore affirm the
superior courts decision on this issue.
     C.   The  Board Did Not Violate Squiress Due Process  Rights
          by Denying Him an Exam Waiver.
          
          Squires  argues that the Board violated his due process
rights  by  denying him an exam waiver.  Specifically  he  argues
that the Board violated his due process rights by:  (1) requiring
third-party  verifications to prove the  professional  experience
needed to obtain an exam waiver; (2) refusing to accept his sworn
statements in lieu of third-party verifications; and (3)  failing
to  account  for evidence he submitted after the hearing  officer
made  findings.   Although Squires asserts he  is  challenging  a
denial  of  substantive  due process,  these  challenges  to  the
procedures  for  obtaining  an exam waiver  are  more  accurately
described  as  procedural  due  process  claims.   Squires   also
contends it was a violation of due process to require him to take
the  fundamentals  exam  even though he had  already  passed  the
professional  exam.   This  challenge  to  the  Boards  licensing
requirements amounts to a substantive due process claim.  Because
we  hold  the Board did not violate Squiress due process  rights,
procedural or substantive, we affirm the superior courts decision
on this issue.
          1.   The Board did not violate Squiress due process rights by
               requiring third-party verifications for work experience.
               
          We  evaluate  procedural due process claims  under  the
balancing  test established in Mathews v. Eldridge,53 considering
several factors:
          First,  the  private interest  that  will  be
          affected by the official action; second,  the
          risk  of  an  erroneous deprivation  of  such
          interest through the procedures used, and the
          probable  value,  if any,  of  additional  or
          substitute    procedural   safeguards;    and
          finally,  the Governments interest, including
          the  function  involved and  the  fiscal  and
          administrative burdens that the additional or
          substitute   procedural   requirement   would
          entail.[54]
          
Squires  characterizes  the third-party verification  requirement
for  an  exam  waiver  as a refusal to grant  him  the  right  to
practice  engineering without verification  of  his  professional
experience  by  registered engineers.  He claims  the  Board,  in
maintaining  this  impossible  requirement,  deprived  him  of  a
fundamental    right   to   practice   his   profession.     This
characterization is inaccurate because Squires is not barred from
obtaining  an  engineering  license  if  he  cannot  produce  the
required  third-party verifications; he still may take  and  pass
the  fundamentals  exam.  At stake here is Squiress  interest  in
obtaining a waiver for that exam.  The Boards refusal to grant  a
waiver  does  not  deprive Squires of his livelihood;  it  merely
requires him to expend time and effort studying basic engineering
concepts.   Although not insignificant, his interest in obtaining
an exam waiver is by no means fundamental.
          Squires    asserts   that   he   provided   third-party
verifications  for  his  experience  except  when  there  was  no
registered  engineer supervising the job, or when the  registered
engineer  had died or was impossible to locate.  He  argues  that
[i]t  is  a clear denial of substantive due process to  deny  his
application  and  his license on the basis of a requirement  that
cannot,  literally,  be  complied with.  He  suggests  the  Board
should,  in  its exam waiver procedures, maintain less  stringent
proof requirements for documenting professional experience,  such
as  crediting  his  sworn  testimony.  Although  past  applicants
successful  attempts  to  obtain  exam  waivers  prove  that  the
requirement  is  not  impossible  to  meet,  it  is   true   that
maintaining the rigorous requirement of third-party verifications
may  deny  exam  waivers to applicants who have the  professional
experience to qualify for them.  However we believe the  risk  of
relaxing  proof requirements for exam waivers outweighs the  risk
of erroneously denying a waiver.  The Boards mission is to ensure
the public health, safety, and welfare by regulating the practice
of  engineering.  The Board therefore has a significant  interest
in  ensuring that registered engineers are qualified.  The third-
party  verification requirement is a reasonable way for the Board
to  determine an applicants experience.  Given the nature of  the
potential  harm   a  collapsed bridge and resulting  injuries  to
persons  and  property,  for example   the  Boards  interests  in
protecting  the  public by verifying professional  qualifications
outweigh Squiress interest in not taking the fundamentals exam.
          Squires quotes State v. Valley Hospital Assn55 for  the
proposition that adherence to a valid regulation can  be  illegal
when  there  are  unusual circumstances that make such  adherence
highly  unreasonable.56   He claims that  his  circumstances  are
unusual   enough   to  warrant  a  waiver  of   the   third-party
verification  requirement given the nature of his specialty,  the
duration of his career, and the fact that many of his prospective
references  are in Washington State.  However we did  not  decide
Valley  Hospital Assn on constitutional grounds,57  so  the  case
provides  no  support for Squiress due process claims.   We  held
adherence  to  the otherwise valid regulation in  that  case  was
erroneous  because  it  produced  a  result  that  both   parties
acknowledged was inaccurate, and because the agencys reasons  for
adhering  to  the  regulation  in  the  circumstances   were   so
insubstantial as to render [it] an abuse of discretion.58   Valid
and  substantial  reasons  support the  third-party  verification
requirements  here, and the Board disputes rather  than  concedes
that  Squiress professional experience entitles him  to  an  exam
waiver.    Squiress   reliance  on  Valley   Hospital   Assn   is
unpersuasive.
          We conclude that the Board did not violate Squiress due
process  rights by requiring him to provide verification  of  his
          professional experience by registered engineers to obtain a
fundamentals exam waiver.
          2.   The Board did not violate Squiress due process rights by
               refusing to accept his sworn statements in lieu of third-party
               affidavits from registered engineers.
               
          Squires  next argues that the Board improperly  refused
to  recognize  his  first-person testimony as  sufficient  for  a
waiver,  in  the  absence of any contradictory  evidence  in  the
record.   He  claims  that by ignoring his  testimony  the  Board
violated his right to due process.  This argument fails  for  the
same   reason   as  his  due  process  challenge  to  third-party
verifications:  Squires has not demonstrated that his interest in
obtaining  an exam waiver outweighs the governments  interest  in
ensuring  the competency of registered engineers.  The  Board  is
not  obliged  to present evidence to rebut Squiress  self-serving
claims  about  his ability and experience.  Rather Squires  bears
the  burden  of  verifying  his  own  experience  to  the  Boards
satisfaction.59   We  agree  with  the  Board  that  first-person
testimony  about  ones  professional  work  experience,   without
independent  confirmation, would cast doubt on  the  professional
qualifications of people whose work can greatly impact the safety
of the public and private industry.  The Boards refusal to credit
this testimony and waive the exam requirement for Squires did not
violate due process.
          3.   The Board did not violate Squiress procedural due process
               rights by failing to account for evidence he submitted after the
               hearing officer made his findings.
               
          Squires argues that the Board denied him due process by
not  considering evidence he submitted after his  September  2005
hearing,  but  before the Board made its final  decision  in  May
2006.   He asserts that the Board erroneously adopted the hearing
officers January 2006 proposed decision, which was drafted before
Squires submitted additional evidence in May 2006.
          We  have  held  that  an  agency must  consider  highly
relevant current evidence.60  Once an agency makes an adjudicative
decision,  it  must articulate its reasons even if  there  is  no
statutory duty to make findings.61
          The  Board did not violate Squiress due process  rights
by  adopting  the  hearing  officers  proposed  decision  without
amending it to address the evidence Squires submitted at the  May
2006  meeting.  Squires had ample opportunity to  be  heard   not
only  at  his hearing in September 2005 but also at two  separate
Board  meetings  in  February and May 2006.  He  also  had  three
chances  to  submit third-party verifications to the  Board:   in
2004  when he first applied, in 2005 when he re-applied,  and  in
2006  when  he  approached the Board after  the  hearing  officer
denied  his  waiver  application.  Because the  evidence  Squires
submitted  at the May 2006 Board meeting was either redundant  or
too  general to adequately support his waiver request, it was not
highly  relevant current evidence that may have had a bearing  on
the outcome of his case.  The Board already had accounted for the
time  covered by many of the letters presented, and the remaining
          letters failed to verify the 100 months of work experience
Squires would need to obtain a waiver.
          In  light of Squiress numerous opportunities to  submit
information  and  the  absence  of  highly  relevant   additional
information, we conclude that the Board did not violate  Squiress
due  process  rights  by adopting the hearing  officers  decision
without additional comment.

          4.   The Board did not violate Squiress substantive due process
               rights by requiring him to take the fundamentals exam even though
               he had already passed the professional exam.
               
          Squires maintains that the Board denied him due process
by  requiring him to pass an elementary exam even though  he  had
already  passed an advanced exam.  Because Squires  challenges  a
substantive requirement for obtaining an engineering license,  he
asserts a denial of substantive due process.
          The  due  process  clause  guarantees  more  than  fair
process  .  .  .  it also includes a substantive  component  that
provides  heightened  protection against government  interference
with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.62  Squires
asserts  that  [t]he right to practice ones own profession  is  a
fundamental  right.63   Although  the  right  to  practice   ones
profession  is  protected by the due process clause,  it  is  not
fundamental, and it may be regulated so long as those regulations
are reasonably related to a legitimate purpose.64
          If  any  conceivable legitimate public policy  for  the
enactment  is  either apparent or offered by those defending  the
enactment,  the  party challenging it must disprove  the  factual
basis   for  the  justification.65   Squires   argues  that   the
fundamentals  exams purpose is to ensure basic  competence  among
new  engineers entering the field.  He contends that  because  he
has   already  demonstrated  basic  competence  by   working   in
construction  for  thirty years, obtaining a  masters  degree  in
engineering,  and  passing  the more  advanced  and  application-
specific  professional  exam,  the fundamentals  exam  serves  no
legitimate purpose.  Even if the examination is redundant for  an
applicant  in  his  position, Squires  does  not  show  that  the
requirement  is  unrelated  to  the  Boards  legitimate  goal  of
minimizing   the  risk  of  public  harm  posed  by   unqualified
engineers.   He  also argues that the only real  connection  with
requiring the [fundamentals exam] for such a person is  the  goal
of   limiting  competition  with  the  senior  engineers  already
licensed,  but such speculation, without more, does not  disprove
that   the  regulation  was  adopted  to  ensure  only  competent
candidates  are  licensed  as engineers  in  Alaska.   The  Board
therefore did not violate Squiress substantive due process rights
by requiring him to take the fundamentals exam.
     D.   A  Different  Waiver Standard for Registered  Engineers
          from  Other  Jurisdictions Does  Not  Violate  Squiress
          Equal Protection Rights.
          
          By  comity  a registered engineer in another  state  or
Canada  who has been practicing for five years or more may obtain
an  Alaska  license  if the Board decides the prior  registration
          meets Alaskas requirements,66 excepting the fundamentals exam.67
          Squires argues that the comity regulations violate  his
equal  protection  rights because together with  12  AAC  36.090,
which  governs exam waivers, they permit the Board to  waive  the
fundamentals  exam for Canadian engineers who  were  educated  in
Canada,  have worked only five years, and have passed the  Alaska
professional  exam.68   Squires  asserts  that  Canadian-educated
engineers  need not take a fundamentals exam to become registered
engineers in Canada.  Squires then contends that his situation is
identical to that of a Canadian engineer seeking registration  by
comity  under 12 AAC 36.105(c)(3) and that there is no  practical
difference between Canadian engineers situation and his own.
          The  Alaska Constitution provides that all persons  are
entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the
law.69  This command requires state and local governments to treat
similarly  situated  individuals alike.70   In  equal  protection
cases,  the  question is whether two groups  of  people  who  are
treated  differently  are similarly situated  and  therefore  are
entitled  to  equal  treatment  under  the  constitution.71    To
determine   whether  differently  treated  groups  are  similarly
situated,  we examine the states reasons for treating the  groups
differently.72
          The portion of a law treating two groups differently is
a  classification.73  A law based on a non-suspect classification
will  survive  as long as a legitimate reason for  the  disparate
treatment exists and the law creating the classification bears  a
fair  and substantial relationship to that reason.74  A law based
on  a  suspect classification  such as race, national origin,  or
alienage   or  that infringes on fundamental rights will  survive
only if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.75
          Squiress equal protection argument fails because he  is
not  similarly  situated to licensed Canadian  engineers  seeking
registration by comity.  The  classification at issue here is not
national  origin,  but registration status.  A Canadian  engineer
may   seek  registration  by  comity  only  after  already  being
registered  for at least five years in Canada.76   Under  12  AAC
36.105(b)  a  comity  applicant must verify current  registration
based  upon  education, experience, and examination  requirements
that,  in  the opinion of the board, were at least equivalent  to
the  requirements of AS 08.48 [governing licensing for engineers]
and  this  chapter at the time that the applicants out  of  state
registration was issued.  Although Canadian-educated engineers do
not  have to take a fundamentals exam in Canada, they still  must
obtain  an  undergraduate degree in engineering,  work  for  four
years,  and  then  take a professional exam to become  registered
there.77
          Both  Canadian  and  American engineers  registered  in
other   jurisdictions  must  meet  the  same   requirements   for
registration  by comity in Alaska.78  Squires has  never  been  a
registered  engineer in any jurisdiction, so he is not  similarly
situated  to  either American or Canadian engineers  who  already
have  been  registered in another jurisdiction, even though  they
may  have less work experience.  And as the superior court  noted
in  its  order,  the  twenty-year waiver rule  applies  the  same
          standard to both unregistered American and Canadian applicants.
          We  therefore  affirm the superior courts  decision  on
this issue.
V.   CONCLUSION
          We AFFIRM the superior courts decision in its entirety.
_______________________________
     1    AS 08.48.011, .101.

     2      AS  08.48.201  further  provides  that  a  registered
engineer application shall:

          (1) be on a form prescribed and furnished  by
          the board;
          
          (2)   contain  statements  made  under  oath,
          showing  the  applicants  education   and   a
          detailed  summary of the applicants technical
          experience; and
          
          (3)  contain five references, three  of  whom
          must be . . . engineers . . . having personal
          knowledge  of the applicants . . . education,
          training, or experience.
          
          12  Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 36.010(b),  (c)  &
(i)   (2005)  collectively  require  that  an  applicant  provide
documentation  of the applicants education, work experience,  and
responsible  charge experience, as required by AS 08.48  and  [12
AAC  36] and provide that an applicant will not be . . . approved
for registration until the applicants qualifications are accepted
by the board.

     3     See  AS  08.48.181 & 12 AAC 36.063 (registration  upon
examination);  AS  08.48.191(b) & 12 AAC 36.105 (registration  by
comity or endorsement).

     4    AS 08.48.011, .181; 12 AAC 36.100(c).

     5     See  12 AAC 36.062.  An applicant may qualify for  the
fundamentals  exam with either (1) successful  completion  of  at
least  75  percent of the required credit hours for an accredited
undergraduate  degree in engineering, or (2) a  demonstration  of
satisfactory  evidence that the applicants educational  and  work
experience meet  requirements detailed in the regulation.  12 AAC
36.062(a)(1)-(2).   Education and  work  experience  may  not  be
accumulated concurrently.  A maximum of 12 months credit  may  be
claimed for a calendar year.  12 AAC 36.062(b).

     6     See  12 AAC 36.063.  An applicant may qualify for  the
professional exam by (1) either passing or obtaining a waiver for
the   fundamentals  exam,  and  (2)  demonstrating   satisfactory
evidence  of  the  applicants  educational  and  work  experience
sufficient  to  meet requirements set out in the regulation.   12
AAC  36.063(a)-(c).   Education and work experience  may  not  be
accumulated concurrently.  A maximum of 12 months credit  may  be
claimed for a calendar year.  12 AAC 36.063(e).

     7    12 AAC 36.090(a).

     8    AS 08.48.191(b).

     9    12 AAC 36.090(b), .105(b).

     10    AS 44.62.500(a) provides that [i]f a contested case is
heard before an agency . . . the hearing officer who presided  at
the hearing shall be present during the consideration of the case
and, if requested, shall assist and advise the agency.

     11     Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. DeShong, 77 P.3d  1227,
1231 (Alaska 2003).

     12     Church v. State, Dept of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1127
(Alaska 1999) (citing  Madison v. Alaska Dep't of Fish and  Game,
696 P.2d 168, 173 (Alaska 1985)).

     13     Alaska Ctr. for the Envt v. State, 80 P.3d  231,  243
(Alaska  2003); Jerrel v. State, Dept of Natural Res.,  999  P.2d
138, 141 (Alaska 2000).

     14    Rose v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commn, 647 P.2d 154,
161  (Alaska  1982) (citing United States v. RCA Alaska  Commcns,
Inc.,  597 P.2d 489, 498 (Alaska 1978) ); Weaver Bros.,  Inc.  v.
Alaska  Transp.  Commn, 588 P.2d 819, 821 (Alaska  1978)  (giving
agency  interpretation deference if it has a reasonable basis  in
law and in fact).

     15    DeShong, 77 P.3d at 1231.

     16     Lopez v. Admr, Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 20 P.3d 568,
570   (Alaska  2001)  (internal  quotation  marks  and   brackets
omitted).

     17    Id. at 570.

     18    AS 08.48.171.

     19    12 AAC 36.062(a)(2), .063(a)(3).

     20    12 AAC 36.090(a).

     21    AS 08.48.181 provides:

          Except  as  provided  in  AS  08.48.191,  for
          registration  as  a  professional  architect,
          professional   engineer,  professional   land
          surveyor,     or    professional    landscape
          architect, a person shall be examined in this
          state  in accordance with the regulations  of
          procedure and standards adopted by the  board
          under   AS  44.62  (Administrative  Procedure
          Act).  The procedure and standards  shall  at
          least   meet  the  requirements  adopted   by
          recognized  national examining  councils  for
          these professions. (Emphasis added.)
          
     22    AS 44.62.190-.215; see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v.  State, Dept of Envtl. Conservation, 145 P.3d 561, 573 (Alaska
2006).

     23    AS 44.62.640(a)(3) defines a regulation:

          [E]very  rule, regulation, order, or standard
          of  general  application  or  the  amendment,
          supplement,   or   revision   of   a    rule,
          regulation, order, or standard adopted  by  a
          state agency to implement, interpret, or make
          specific the law enforced or administered  by
          it,  or  to govern its procedure, except  one
          that  relates only to the internal management
          of   a  state  agency;  regulation  does  not
          include  a form prescribed by a state  agency
          or  instructions relating to the use  of  the
          form,  but this provision is not a limitation
          upon  a  requirement  that  a  regulation  be
          adopted under this chapter when one is needed
          to  implement the law under which the form is
          issued;    regulation    includes    manuals,
          policies,     instructions,     guides     to
          enforcement,    interpretative     bulletins,
          interpretations, and the like, that have  the
          effect  of  rules,  orders,  regulations,  or
          standards  of general application,  and  this
          and  similar phraseology may not be  used  to
          avoid  or circumvent this chapter; whether  a
          regulation, regardless of name, is covered by
          this  chapter depends in part on  whether  it
          affects  the public or is used by the  agency
          in dealing with the public.
          
     24    Jerrel, 999 P.2d at 143.

     25    Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

     26    AS 44.62.640(a)(3); see also Jerrel, 999 P.2d at 143.

     27    AS 44.62.640(a)(3).

     28    999 P.2d at 139.

     29    Id. at 140 n.3.

     30    Id. at 140, 142.

     31    Id. at 142-43.

     32    Id. at 143.

     33    Id.

     34    Id. at 143.

     35    Id. at 143-44.

     36    Id. at 143.

     37    Id. at 143-44.

     38    Id. at 144.

     39    583 P.2d 854, 855 (Alaska 1978).

     40    Id. at 858.

     41    Id.

     42    Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 145 P.3d 561.

     43    Id. at 573; see also Alaska Ctr. for the Envt, 80 P.3d
at   243-44.   In  the  latter  case,  we  held  that  an  agency
interpretation of a regulation defining major energy facility was
not   a   regulation  because  it  was  merely  a  common   sense
interpretation of the regulations applicability.  Alaska Ctr. for
the Envt, 80 P.3d at 243-44.  We distinguished Jerrel, explaining
that  the  rule at issue there was a new substantive  requirement
that   made  that  regulation  more  specific  and  thus  a   new
regulation, necessitating compliance with the [APA].  Id. at  244
n.40.

     44    Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 145 P.3d at 573.

     45    Id. at 566, 573.

     46    Jerrel, 999 P.2d at 143-44.

     47    Id.

     48    Squires argued that the Board irregularly enforced the
third-party requirement because Ms. Vinson, a licensing  examiner
handling  engineering applications, told him that the third-party
verification need not be from a supervisor.  This argument  lacks
merit.   Ms.  Vinson testified before the Board she told  Squires
that if he could not find a supervisor, the Board sometimes would
accept  verification of a registered engineer who also worked  on
the  project  but did not supervise the applicant.  Although  the
Board  may  have made concessions on the supervisor  requirement,
third-party  verification from a registered  engineer  was  still
required.

     49     The Board receives only about six waiver applications
per  year.   Of  that small group, it approves  some  and  denies
others.  The Boards current licensing examiner testified that  in
the  two  years she held the position, she personally  worked  on
four other waiver applications, and those applicants successfully
verified twenty years of professional experience.

     50    Tanana Valley Sportsmens Assn, 583 P.2d at 858.

     51     See  AS  08.48.171  (requiring  applicant  to  submit
evidence  satisfactory to the board of the applicants  education,
training  and  experience);  AS  08.48.191(b)  (allowing   comity
registration based on verified evidence if in the opinion of  the
board  the earlier registration meets requirements of AS  08.48);
12  AAC  36.010(b) (An applicant will not be . . .  approved  for
registration until the applicants qualifications are accepted  by
the board.).

     52      12   AAC   36.062(b)  (eligibility   standards   for
fundamentals  exam); 12 AAC 36.063(e) (eligibility standards  for
professional exam).

     53    424 U.S. 319 (1976).

     54    Id. at 335.

     55    116 P.3d 580 (Alaska 2005).

     56    Id. at 586.

     57    Id. at 584.

     58     Id. at 587 (quoting Bellsouth Corp. v. FCC, 162  F.3d
1215,  1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In  Valley Hospital Assn, we considered whether the Department of
Health and Social Services (DHSS) was required to recalculate the
reimbursement  rate  for the cost of treating Medicaid  patients.
Valley  Hospital under-reported its costs because  of  antiquated
bookkeeping, but ultimately identified the error.  DHSS attempted
to  strictly  enforce  a  change in  the  method  of  calculating
reimbursement  rates that would have resulted in an approximately
$700,000  detriment  to  Valley Hospital without  giving  it  the
opportunity  to submit updated, corrected costs.   We  held  that
[u]nder the unusual circumstances of this case, we think DHSS was
required  to make an exception to [the regulation],  and  to  use
some  more  reasonable  method of calculating  Valleys  ancillary
charges.   Id.  at  586.   We  explained  that  we  reached  this
conclusion because:  (1) it was unclear whether the regulation at
issue  was  validly  promulgated; (2)  DHSS  did  not  provide  a
compelling  reason  to  prefer  using  the  hospitals  old  data;
(3) there was an inherent risk of error because the agency relied
on data that had been submitted without notice of how it might be
used; and (4) DHSSs staff knew at the time the hospital submitted
the   data  that  the  older  data  would  result  in   a   lower
reimbursement  rate.  Under the circumstances we  concluded  that
the  hospital  suffered  a substantial injustice,  offset  by  no
compelling justification.  Id. at 587.

     59     See  AS  08.48.171  (requiring applicants  to  submit
evidence  satisfactory to the board of the applicants  education,
training  and experience); 12 AAC 36.090(a) (requiring applicants
for  exam waiver to submit satisfactory evidence of relevant work
experience).  These provisions put the burden on the applicant to
present evidence of qualification.

     60    State, Dept of Commerce & Econ. Dev. v. Schnell, 8 P.3d
351, 360 (Alaska 2000).

     61    City of Nome v. Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska, 707 P.2d
870, 875 (Alaska 1985) (Such findings facilitate judicial review,
insure careful administrative deliberation, assist the parties in
preparing for review, and restrain agencies within the bounds  of
their jurisdiction.).

     62    Treacy v. Muni. of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 268 (Alaska
2004)  (quoting  Troxel v. Granville, 530  U.S.  57,  65  (2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

     63    Squires points out that the right to earn a living is a
fundamental right under the federal constitutions privileges  and
immunities clause.  Sheley v. Alaska Bar Assn, 620 P.2d 640,  643
(Alaska  1980);  U.S. Const. art. IV,  2, cl. 2.   The  right  to
engage in an economic endeavor within a particular industry is an
important  right for state equal protection purposes.   State  v.
Enserch,  787 P.2d 624, 632 (Alaska 1989) (citing Comml Fisheries
Entry  Commn  v.  Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1266  (Alaska  1980));
Alaska  Const. art. I,  1.  However the privileges and immunities
and  equal  protection  clauses are inapposite  to  Squiress  due
process claims.

     64     See  Conn  v.  Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286,  291-92  (1999)
([T]his  Court  has indicated that the liberty component  of  the
Fourteenth   Amendments   Due  Process   Clause   includes   some
generalized  due  process right to choose ones field  of  private
employment,  but  a  right  which  is  nevertheless  subject   to
reasonable government regulation.); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examrs,
353  U.S. 232, 239 (1957) (A State can require high standards  of
qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its
law,  before  it  admits  an  applicant  to  the  bar,  but   any
qualification must have a rational connection with the applicants
fitness or capacity to practice law.); Dittman v. California, 191
F.3d  1020,  1030-32  (9th Cir. 1999) (holding  requirement  that
applicant  provide  social  security number  in  order  to  renew
acupuncturists license was rationally related to legitimate state
interest and did not violate due process).

     65     Anderson v. State ex rel. Cent. Bering Sea Fishermens
Assn, 78 P.3d 710, 716 (Alaska 2003) (quoting Gonzales v. Safeway
Stores, 882 P.2d 389, 397-98 (Alaska 1988)).

     66     AS 08.48.191(b); 12 AAC 36.105.  In relevant part  12
AAC 36.105 states:

          Engineer registration by comity[.]
          
          . . . .
          
          (b) An applicant for engineering registration
          by   comity  shall  submit  verification   of
          current  registration to practice engineering
          in  another licensing jurisdiction  that  was
          based   upon   education,   experience,   and
          examination requirements that, in the opinion
          of the board, were at least equivalent to the
          requirements of AS 08.48 and this chapter  at
          the   time   the  applicants  out  of   state
          registration  was issued.  An  applicant  who
          otherwise  meets  the  requirements  of  this
          section is not required to demonstrate having
          passed   the   fundamentals  of   engineering
          examination.
          
          (c) An applicant for engineering registration
          by comity shall
          
          . . . .
          
          (2)  if  the  applicant has  been  practicing
          engineering as a registered engineer for five
          years  or more in a state . . . of the United
          States  . . . provide two current letters  of
          reference     from    registered    engineers
          practicing the specific branch of engineering
          for which the applicant has applied; or
          
          (3)  if the applicant has been practicing for
          five years or more as a professional engineer
          in  Canada,  under  a  license  issued  by  a
          provincial    or   territorial    engineering
          association or order,
          
          (A)  provide two current letters of reference
          from   engineers  registered  in   a   state,
          territory,   or  possession  of  the   United
          States,  the  District  of  Columbia,  or   a
          province or territory of Canada; and
          
          (B)  if  the  applicant  has  not  taken   an
          examination  that meets the  requirements  of
          (b)  of  this  section, pass the  examination
          listed  in 12 AAC 36.100(c) in the branch  of
          engineering  for  which  the  applicant   has
          applied.
          
     67    12 AAC 36.090(b); 12 AAC 36.105(b).

     68    Squiress brief also alleges that the comity regulations
violate  his  due  process rights, but  he  fails  to  offer  any
argument  or  analysis  to  support this  claim.   We  deem  this
argument  waived  for  lack  of adequate  briefing.   See,  e.g.,
Adamson  v. Univ. of Alaska, 819 P.2d 886, 889 n.3 (Alaska  1991)
(concluding  that an issue will not be considered on appeal  when
it is only cursorily addressed in the opening brief).

     69    Alaska Const. art. I,  1.

     70     Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 882 P.2d  389,  396
(Alaska 1994).

     71    Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Gallant, 153 P.3d 346, 349
(Alaska 2007).

     72    Id.

     73    Id.

     74    Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

     75    Id. at 350.

     76    12 AAC 36.105(c)(3).

     77     Canadian Engineering Qualifications Bd., Guideline on
Admission  to  the Practice of Engineering in Canada  5,  15,  20
(2001).

     78    Compare 12 AAC 36.105(c)(2) with subsection .105(c)(3).

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