Alaska Supreme Court Opinions made Available by Touch N' Go Systems and Bright Solutions

Touch N' Go, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother. Visit Touch N' Go's Website.
  This site is possible because of the following site sponsors. Please support them with your business.
www.gottsteinLaw.com

You can search the entire site. or go to the recent opinions, or the chronological or subject indices. Teseniar v. Spicer (8/1/2003) sp-5720

Teseniar v. Spicer (8/1/2003) sp-5720

     Notice:   This opinion is subject to correction  before
     publication  in  the  Pacific  Reporter.   Readers  are
     requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk
     of  the  Appellate  Courts, 303  K  Street,  Anchorage,
     Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878,
     e-mail corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.


            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


THOMAS TESENIAR,              )
                              )       Supreme   Court   No.    S-
10632/10685/10686
             Appellant,            )
                              )    Superior Court No.
     v.                       )    3AN-98-03116 CI
                              )
LYNDA SPICER, f/k/a           )    O P I N I O N
LYNDA TESENIAR,               )
                              )    [No. 5720 - August 1, 2003]
             Appellee.             )
________________________________)



          Appeal  from the Superior Court of the  State
          of    Alaska,   Third   Judicial    District,
          Anchorage, Brian C. Shortell, Karen L.  Hunt,
          Milton  M.  Souter,  and Sharon  L.  Gleason,
          Judges.

          Appearances:   Thomas A.  Teseniar,  pro  se,
          Jefferson  City,  Missouri,  Appellant.    No
          appearance by Appellee.

          Before:    Fabe,  Chief  Justice,   Matthews,
          Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.

          FABE, Chief Justice.


I.   INTRODUCTION

          Thomas   Teseniar   challenges  the   superior   courts

modification of his child support obligation, claiming  that  the

superior  court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform  Interstate

Family  Support  Act, erred by increasing his obligation  without

applying Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, and erred by making the increase

retroactive  to  April  15,  1999.   Teseniar  also  appeals  the

superior  courts  decision concerning the amount of  unreimbursed

medical  costs for which he is liable, the courts order  that  he

must  deposit funds into his childrens educational accounts,  and

the courts award of attorneys fees to Lynda Spicer.  We hold that

the  superior  court erred in retroactively increasing  Teseniars

obligation to April 15, 1999 and in failing to perform Rule  90.3

calculations  in setting the amount of support.   We  affirm  the

remainder of the challenged rulings.

II.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

          Thomas  Teseniar and Lynda Spicer married in  Anchorage

in  1995.  They had two children: Samantha, born in January 1996,

and  Robert, born in October 1997.  Teseniar and Spicer separated

in August 1997.  Teseniar moved to Missouri in March 1998; Spicer

and  the  children stayed in Alaska.  In November  1998  Superior

Court  Judge  Brian C. Shortell granted the parties a  decree  of

divorce  and  issued  findings of fact  and  conclusions  of  law

incorporating the parties settlement of all disputed issues.  The

parties  agreed  that Spicer would have sole  legal  and  primary

physical  custody of the children and agreed on an initial  child

support arrangement.  In February 1999 the court issued its child

custody  and  support  order, based  on  the  parties  agreement,

decreeing  that  Teseniar  was to pay $257  per  month  in  child

support.  In July 1999 Judge Shortell issued a new child  custody

and  support  order incorporating more clearly the provisions  of

the  parties  settlement agreement.  One  of  the  terms  of  the

settlement  agreement  was that Teseniar  was  to  send  his  tax

returns  to  the Child Support Enforcement Division  (CSED)  each

year by the earlier of his IRS filing or April 15.

          On  March 8, 2000, Spicer moved to modify child support

and  moved  for  a finding of contempt for Teseniars  failure  to

provide  her with his tax returns.  Although Teseniar  eventually

filed  an  opposition  to  this motion, his  opposition  was  not

timely,  and  one  day  before it was  received,  Judge  Shortell

granted  Spicers  motion  to  modify  Teseniars  monthly  support

obligation  retroactive to April 15, 1999.  The exact  amount  of

the  modified  support  obligation was to be  determined  in  the

future.  In August 2000 Superior Court Judge Karen L. Hunt issued

an order increasing Teseniars monthly child support obligation to

$778.91,  basing  the  amount  on  the  Palmer  superior   courts

calculation  of  Teseniars  child  support  obligation  for   two

children  from  a  previous marriage.  Judge Hunt  made  the  new

monthly  support  amount  retroactive based  on  Judge  Shortells

order.

          At  a  hearing  in October 2000, Superior  Court  Judge

Milton M. Souter ordered the state to provide copies of Teseniars

tax  returns to Spicer.  Judge Souter also heard arguments  about

child  support  and unpaid medical expenses.  At a November  2000

hearing, the parties presented evidence and further arguments  on

these  issues.   In  April 2001 Superior Court  Judge  Sharon  L.

Gleason  issued an order finding $658.61 in unreimbursed  medical

expenses  for the parties children for 1999 and 2000 and ordering

Teseniar  to  pay  Spicer half this amount.  Judge  Gleason  also

awarded Spicer attorneys fees.

          In September 2001 Judge Gleason denied Teseniars motion

for  Spicer  to reimburse the childrens educational accounts  for

the Permanent Fund Dividends (PFDs) that she was supposed to, but

allegedly  had  not,  deposited; instead, Judge  Gleason  ordered

Teseniar to deposit funds into the accounts.

          In  December 2001 Teseniar moved to vacate Judge  Hunts

support  modification  order and to  strike  Spicers  motion  for

modification,  alleging  that they  were  inconsistent  with  the

Uniform  Interstate  Family Support Act (UIFSA).   Judge  Gleason

denied this motion and then granted Spicer attorneys fees.

          Teseniar  has  filed  three  appeals  which   we   have

consolidated,  challenging:  (1) the child  support  modification

order,  with attorneys fees; (2) the unpaid medical costs  order,

with  attorneys fees; and (3) the order concerning  reimbursement

of the childrens educational accounts.

III. DISCUSSION

     A.   The  Superior Court Had Jurisdiction Under the  Uniform
          Interstate Family Support Act.
          
          Teseniar argues that Judge Gleason erred by denying his

motion   to   vacate  Judge  Hunts  August  2000  child   support

modification  order and to strike Spicers March 2000  motion  for

modification  because  the  superior court  lacked  personal  and

subject matter jurisdiction in accordance with the UIFSA, adopted

in Alaska as AS 25.25.  Teseniar contends that the superior court

did  not  have  personal jurisdiction over him and did  not  have

subject  matter  jurisdiction to modify the child  support  order

after  he moved to Missouri in 1998.  We exercise our independent

judgment  when  reviewing  a superior courts  interpretation  and

application of a statute, adopting the rule of law that  is  most

persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.1

          The  UIFSA defeats Teseniars argument.  Alaska  Statute

25.25.201  provides a variety of alternative bases  for  personal

jurisdiction  over  a non-resident in a proceeding  to  modify  a

support   order;  there  is  jurisdiction  if  the   non-resident

individual  (1)  submits to the jurisdiction  of  this  state  by

consent,  by  entering  a  general appearance,  or  by  filing  a

responsive  document having the effect of waiving any contest  to

personal jurisdiction; (2) resided with the child in this  state;

(3)  resided  in  this  state and provided prenatal  expenses  or

support  for  the child; or (4) engaged in sexual intercourse  in

this  state and the child may have been conceived by that act  of

intercourse[.] Teseniar participated in support proceedings  here

for  several  years, including the period of  more  than  a  year

between the modification order and his motion to vacate it.2   He

lived in Alaska with Samantha, agreed to pay for Spicers expenses

relating  to  her  pregnancy with Robert and Roberts  birth,  and

presumably conceived the children here.  The superior court  thus

had personal jurisdiction over Teseniar.

          Alaska  Statute 25.25.205 makes clear that the superior

court also had jurisdiction over the support order.  That statute

provides  that  a  tribunal of this state will  have  continuing,

          exclusive jurisdiction over a support order it issues as long as

this  state  remains the residence of the obligor, the individual

obligee,  or  the  child for whose benefit the support  order  is

issued  or until each individual party has filed written  consent

with  the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another  state

to   modify   the   order   and  assume   continuing,   exclusive

jurisdiction.3  Spicer and the children still reside  in  Alaska,

and  the  parties filed no written consent for another  state  to

modify  the  order.   The  statute does  state  that  an  Alaskan

tribunal  cannot  modify a support order if the  order  has  been

modified by a tribunal of another state under a law substantially

similar to this chapter.4  But while the order was registered  in

Missouri,  the Missouri court did not modify the support  order.5

Alaska thus maintained jurisdiction.

          Teseniar  relies on section 611 of the UIFSA6  for  his

argument   that   the   Alaska  courts  lacked   subject   matter

jurisdiction because Spicer was required to file her modification

motion in the state of residence of the obligor, namely Missouri.

Teseniars  focus  on  AS  25.25.611 and the  comparable  Missouri

provision  is irrelevant, however, because when a court exercises

personal  jurisdiction over a non-resident, AS 25.25.301-.701  do

not  apply except for two small exceptions that are unrelated  to

this  case.7   Furthermore, this reliance is  misplaced.   Alaska

Statute  25.25.611  and Missouri Statute 454.973  basically  say:

When  a support order issued in another state has been registered

in this state, a tribunal of this state may modify the order only

if  (1)  none of the parties or the children live in the  issuing

state, the petitioner is a non-resident seeking modification, and

a  tribunal  of  this  state has personal jurisdiction  over  the

respondent;  or  if  (2) a tribunal of this  state  has  personal

jurisdiction over the child or one of the parties and all of  the

parties have filed written consent in the issuing tribunal that a

tribunal   of  this  state  may  modify  the  order  and   assume

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over it.  The issuing state in

          this case is Alaska.  Because Spicer and the children live in

Alaska and there has been no written consent, Missouri could  not

modify  the  order under its statute.8  Because Alaska  therefore

retains  continuing, exclusive jurisdiction,9 Judge  Gleason  did

not  err  in  denying  Teseniars motion  to  vacate  Judge  Hunts

modification  order and to strike Spicers motion for modification

due to lack of jurisdiction under the UIFSA.

     B.   The Superior Court Abused Its Discretion When Modifying
          the Child Support Order.
          
          Teseniar contends that the superior court erred both by

increasing  his child support obligation in retaliation  for  his

refusal  to supply Spicer with his tax returns and by making  the

order retroactive to April 15, 1999.  In her March 8, 2000 motion

to modify, Spicer sought to increase Teseniars support obligation

effective  April  15,  1999 because she maintained  that  he  was

supposed  to  provide  tax  documents by  then  for  purposes  of

recalculating  support.  In her memorandum  in  support  of  that

motion,  she  asked in the alternative to make the support  award

effective  as of the filing of the motion on March 8, 2000.   The

proposed  order she submitted contained the April  15  date,  and

despite  striking a proposed finding of contempt for  failure  to

file  tax  returns,  Judge Shortell signed this  order  with  the

retroactive  April 15 date still intact.  When Judge  Hunt  later

presided  over the case, she increased Teseniars obligation  from

$257 a month to $778.91 to conform to the rate calculated by  the

Palmer  superior  court in February 1999 for  Teseniars  children

from a prior marriage, and she made this increase effective April

15, 1999 in conformity with Judge Shortells order.

          We review modifications of child support under an abuse

of  discretion  standard.10  We will find an abuse of  discretion

when  our review of the record leaves us with a definite and firm

conviction based on the record as a whole that a mistake has been

made. 11  We conclude that both the amount of the increase and the

date of retroactivity constituted abuses of discretion.

          1.   Increase in child support obligation

          Judge   Hunt   arrived  at  Teseniars   child   support

obligation by adopting the Palmer courts child support obligation

figure  for Teseniars children from a prior marriage, not  merely

the other courts estimation of Teseniars income.  By adopting the

Palmer  courts monthly obligation figure, Judge Hunt did  not  go

through  the  Rule  90.3 calculations using  Spicers  income  and

allowing  deductions such as the child support Teseniar paid  for

his  prior children as provided in Rule 90.3(a)(1)(B).12   It  is

unlikely  that  Teseniars obligation to  his  two  children  with

Spicer would be identical to his child support obligation to  the

children  from  his  earlier  marriage,  given  that  the   prior

obligation would be factored into the calculation of his  current

obligation.13  Courts must follow the legal standards set forth in

Rule 90.3 in determining awards of child support.14  We therefore

conclude  that  it was an abuse of discretion for Judge  Hunt  to

increase Teseniars obligation to correspond to the Palmer  courts

child support obligation figure.15

          2.   Retroactive modification

          [A]bsent special circumstances . . . , courts  may  not

retroactively modify support orders. 16  Retroactive modification

is  statutorily  permitted only when paternity is  disestablished

and the modification can be implemented without violating federal

law,  or  on  the motion of the obligor when there is a  clerical

mistake  or  the  support order is based on a  default  amount.17

Neither  of those exceptions is applicable here.  Rule 90.3(h)(2)

provides,  however,  that  although retroactive  modification  is

generally prohibited, [a] modification which is effective  on  or

after the date that a motion for modification . . . is served  on

the opposing party is not considered a retroactive modification.18

By  this  standard, and as Spicer was apparently aware given  the

alternative relief she requested, Judge Shortell could  not  have

made  Teseniars  child support obligation effective  any  earlier

than  March  8,  2000, when Spicer filed her  motion  to  modify.

Judge Shortell therefore erred in failing to correct that portion

          of the proposed order making the obligation effective April 15,

1999.

          We note that Judge Shortell struck the proposed finding

of   contempt  from  his  order,  making  it  unlikely  that  the

retroactivity was meant to be a discovery sanction.  However,  to

the extent that it was meant to be a sanction under Civil Rule 37

for Teseniars failure to provide Spicer with his tax returns,  we

observe  that the parties agreement required Teseniar to  provide

his tax return annually only to CSED, not to Spicer.

          C.    The Superior Court Did Not Err in Calculating the
          Amount of Unpaid Medical Costs Teseniar Owed Spicer for
          1999 and 2000.
          
          Teseniar  asserts that Judge Gleason erred in assessing

the  documentary  evidence he submitted  concerning  unreimbursed

medical  costs  and  departed from the  parties  agreement  as  a

result.   We  review  under  the  clearly  erroneous  standard  a

superior courts factual findings.19

          Spicer  moved for Teseniar to pay for his half  of  the

childrens   medical  expenses  that  had  not  been  covered   by

insurance.  Judge Souter directed Teseniar to file with the court

a  print-out from his health insurance company showing all claims

for  the  children submitted in 1999 and 2000.  The documentation

that  the  company  provided  showed that  Spicer  had  submitted

fourteen  claims  in  1999  and  none  in  2000.   Judge  Gleason

concluded  that  the  documentation  was  incomplete  because  it

indicated  that it only included reimbursement regarding  medical

emergency  facilities  but  did  not  include  claims  for  other

expenses  such  as  medications.  Judge Gleason therefore  relied

upon  the documentation Spicer had submitted, which consisted  of

bills,  statements, and receipts, and calculated the total  costs

to be $658.61, for which Teseniar would be liable for half.

          Teseniar  counters that his documentation  is  complete

and accurate and that no documentation exists for medications  or

other  services because Spicer failed to submit any other claims.

Accordingly, he relies on paragraph 19 of the parties  agreement,

          which provides as follows: [Spicer] will be required to apply all

known health care coverage options and submit all known claims to

the care provider.  Coverage benefits sacrificed due to [Spicers]

future  failure to submit claims to known carriers  when  and  as

required  will  be  [Spicers] exclusive  expense.   He  therefore

calculates  that  there  were  only $336.76  of  uncovered  costs

submitted  by  Spicer,  of  which he is  liable  for  half.   The

difference  between  Judge  Gleasons  calculation  of   Teseniars

liability and Teseniars calculation is $160.92.

          It  is  the  function of the trial court, not  of  this

court,  to  judge witnesses credibility and to weigh  conflicting

evidence.20  Because this is a factual question, and because  the

superior  courts resolution was not clearly erroneous, we  affirm

Judge  Gleasons  decision  to  view  Teseniars  documentation  as

incomplete and to instead use Spicers.

     D.   The  Superior  Court Did Not Abuse  Its  Discretion  in
          Ordering    Teseniar   To   Reimburse   the   Childrens
          Educational Accounts.
          
          Teseniar   charges  that  Judge  Gleason   abused   her

discretion  in departing from the divorce decree by ordering  him

to  deposit  $1,924.85  into  each of the  childrens  educational

accounts  when  it  was  Spicer who had  failed  to  deposit  the

childrens permanent fund dividends.  Accepting Spicers claim that

she needed the PFD funds to support the children because Teseniar

was  thousands  of  dollars in arrears on  child  support,  Judge

Gleason determined that having Teseniar deposit the money  as  an

offset against his child support arrearages would serve the  dual

goals  of  getting  the  children the PFDs  to  which  they  were

entitled  and getting Spicer the child support to which  she  was

entitled.   Teseniar maintains that Judge Gleasons  justification

for  letting Spicer keep the childrens PFDs is outside the  scope

of  the specific valid reasons for withdrawals from the childrens

educational  accounts  detailed in paragraph  7  of  the  parties

settlement agreement.

          The agreement dictates that the childrens PFD funds are

          to be deposited in educational accounts with Spicer as custodian.

No  funds  can  be withdrawn before the children  reach  majority

except  for: (1) payment of dividends or capital gains  tax;  (2)

any reason with Teseniars consent; or (3) uncovered major medical

or  other  similar  emergency uses, in  which  case  Spicer  must

provide  Teseniar  with  proof of the  expenses.   Judge  Gleason

recognized  this limitation when rejecting Spicers later  attempt

to  use  the PFD funds for the everyday care and support  of  the

children, noting that such a use falls outside the bounds of  the

agreement  but  that  good cause could also be  established  upon

proof  of current outstanding arrears on child support and  other

necessary expenses of the children.

          Certainly  superior courts have authority to  modify  a

child  support  order.  Alaska Statute  25.24.170  confers  broad

authority to do so.21  That statute provides for modification  of

child  support, child custody, and alimony.22  An  order  may  be

modified  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  was  based  on  a

separation agreement or stipulation signed by the parties.23   It

was  within Judge Gleasons discretion to depart from the  parties

settlement  agreement,  as incorporated in  the  courts  original

custody  findings, to ensure that both Spicer  and  the  children

received the benefits intended for them by those findings.24   We

therefore  affirm Judge Gleasons order concerning  the  childrens

educational accounts.

     E.   The  Superior  Court Did Not Abuse  Its  Discretion  by
          Ordering Awards of Attorneys Fees to Spicer.
          
          Teseniar  contends that Judge Gleasons  attorneys  fees

awards  are  unfair  because he has  the  right  under  the  U.S.

Constitution to due process and thus should not be penalized  for

seeking  review of lower court orders.  We review  for  abuse  of

discretion  a  superior  courts  order  to  pay  another   partys

attorneys  fees.25   The  trial  courts  discretion  in  awarding

attorneys fees is broad and its decision will not be disturbed on

appeal   unless   it   is   arbitrary,   capricious,   manifestly

unreasonable, or stems from an improper motive. 26

          There  is  no  indication that  Judge  Gleason  awarded

attorneys fees as a penalty for appealing to this court;  rather,

it  appears the award was meant to compensate Spicer for some  of

her  expenses incurred in responding to only some of the numerous

motions filed by both sides in this case.  Teseniars right to due

process was in no way infringed by the attorneys fees awards, and

those  awards  were  not  arbitrary or capricious.   Accordingly,

Judge  Gleason  did not abuse her discretion by  awarding  Spicer

attorneys fees.

IV.  CONCLUSION

          Because  the superior court did not undertake  its  own

Rule  90.3  calculations when modifying Teseniars  child  support

obligation,  and  because it impermissibly  made  the  obligation

retroactive to a date preceding the date of the motion to modify,

we   REVERSE  the  superior  courts  order  increasing  Teseniars

obligation effective April 15, 1999 and REMAND for calculation of

Teseniars  obligation under Rule 90.3 to be effective no  earlier

than  March  8, 2000.  We AFFIRM the remainder of the  challenged

rulings.

_______________________________
     1     Fleegel  v.  Estate of Boyles, 61 P.3d  1267,  1270-71
(Alaska 2002) (internal quotations omitted).

     2     Teseniars submission to Alaskan jurisdiction can  also
be  found  in his opposition to Spicers motion to modify support,
in  which  he  noted  that  he was fighting  Spicers  attempt  to
register  the  decree  in Missouri.  Teseniar  described  Spicers
attempt  as  inappropriate and wrong, said there was  no  logical
reason  to  move  enforcement to Missouri,  and  maintained  that
Spicer  should  be ordered to work with Teseniar  through  Alaska
CSED to solve any disputes on support.

     3     AS 25.25.205(a)(1), (2); see also State, Child Support
Enforcement Div. v. Bromley, 987 P.2d 183, 188-89 (Alaska 1999).

     4    AS 25.25.205(b).

     5     See  Mo.  Rev.  Stat.  454.946-.953, .971-.973  (1997)
(explaining   registration   of   order   for   enforcement   and
restrictions  on  modification, which  have  not  been  satisfied
here).

     6     AS 25.25.611 in Alaska, Mo. Rev. Stat.  454.973 (1997)
in Missouri.

     7     AS  25.25.202 (allowing tribunal to apply AS 25.25.316
to receive evidence from another state and AS 25.25.318 to obtain
discovery through a tribunal of another state).

     8     State, Dept of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div.
ex  rel.  Wallace v. Delaney, 962 P.2d 187, 191-92 (Alaska  1998)
(concluding  that  Alaska  retained exclusive  jurisdiction  over
support  order and that CSED could collect interest from  obligor
because  obligors  child  still resides in  Alaska,  the  issuing
state;  thus,  Washington  could not have  modified  the  support
order); cf. State, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Bromley, 987
P.2d  183, 188-89 (Alaska 1999) (holding that Alaska court  could
modify  Maine support order because parents and child  no  longer
resided  in Maine, obligee was not resident of Alaska and  sought
modification   here,   and  obligor  was  subject   to   personal
jurisdiction of Alaska tribunal).

     9     The cases and commentary Teseniar cites in support  of
his  argument concern only situations in which the issuing  State
no longer has an interest in exercising its continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction to modify its order, such as when both  parties  and
the children have moved out of the issuing state.  See, e.g.,  In
re  Marriage  of Abplanalp, 7 P.3d 1269, 1270 (Kan.  App.  2000);
Groseth  v.  Groseth,  600  N.W.2d  159,  166  (Neb.  1999).   As
explained  above  and  as  elaborated  in  the  sections  of  the
commentary  to  UIFSA  611 that precede the  sections  quoted  by
Teseniar in his brief, Alaska still has an interest in exercising
its  continuing,  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  modify  its  order
because  Spicer  and the children reside in  Alaska.   See  Unif.
Interstate Family Support Act  611 (amended 2001), 9 I.B.  U.L.A.
96, cmt. at 97-98 (Supp. 2003).

     10    Flannery v. Flannery, 950 P.2d 126, 129 (Alaska 1997).

     11     Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 24 P.3d 523, 526 (Alaska  2001)
(quoting  Kowalski  v.  Kowalski, 806  P.2d  1368,  1370  (Alaska
1991)).

     12     Rule  90.3(a)(1)(B) provides for a deduction  from  a
parents  total  income  for child support  and  alimony  payments
arising  from  prior relationships which are  required  by  other
court or administrative proceedings and actually paid.

     13      While  not  ruling  on  the  correctness  of   CSEDs
calculation,  we  note  in  passing  that  CSED  calculated  that
Teseniars  child support obligation based on his 1999 tax  return
should be modified to be $639 per month.

     14    Marine v. Marine, 957 P.2d 314, 316 (Alaska 1998).

     15     See Monette v. Hoff, 958 P.2d 434, 437 (Alaska  1998)
(remanding  because  unclear  if  superior  court  adopted  CSEDs
calculation or conducted required de novo determination of  child
support  obligation); Keating v. Traynor, 833  P.2d  695,  696-97
(Alaska  1992)  (holding  that court erred  by  adopting  parties
original privately stipulated support amount instead of modifying
support  award  based on current income in accordance  with  Rule
90.3).

     16     State, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Bromley, 987
P.2d  183, 188 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Hendren v. State,  Dept  of
Revenue,  Child  Support Enforcement Div., 957  P.2d  1350,  1352
(Alaska 1998); Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3(h)(2).

     17     Hendren, 957 P.2d at 1352 (citing AS 25.27.166(d) and
AS 25.27.195).

     18     Alaska  R.  Civ. P. 90.3(h)(2); see  also  Wright  v.
Wright, 22 P.3d 875, 878-79 (Alaska 2001).

     19    Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 19-20 (Alaska 2001).

     20     Knutson  v.  Knutson, 973 P.2d 596,  599-600  (Alaska
1999).

     21    Flannery v. Flannery, 950 P.2d 126, 130 (Alaska 1997).

     22    See Allen v. Allen, 645 P.2d 774, 776 n.4 (Alaska 1982)
(referring  to AS 25.24.170s predecessor, AS 09.55.220).   Alaska
Statute 25.24.170(a) states:

          Subject  to  AS  25.20.110,  any  time  after
          judgment the court, upon the motion of either
          party,  may  set aside, alter, or  modify  so
          much  of  the  judgment as  may  provide  for
          alimony, for the appointment of trustees  for
          the care and custody of the minor children or
          for their nurture and education, . . . or for
          the   maintenance  of  either  party  to  the
          action.
          
     23    Curley v. Curley, 588 P.2d 289, 291-92 (Alaska 1979).

     24    See Hayes v. Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 900-01 (Alaska 1996)
(holding  that  superior court did not err in  rejecting  fathers
motion  that mother repay money borrowed from childrens  PFDs  in
part because of courts explanation that mother paid more of child
care costs due to fathers underpayment of child support).

     25     Nicholson v. Wolfe, 974 P.2d 417, 427 (Alaska  1999);
Virgin v. Virgin, 990 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Alaska 1999).

     26     Zimin  v.  Zimin,  837 P.2d 118,  124  (Alaska  1992)
(quoting Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873, 878 (Alaska 1979)).