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Davis v. State (7/23/2010) ap-2271

Davis v. State (7/23/2010) ap-2271

                             NOTICE
     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
     Courts.

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
       E-mail:  corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us


         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

               
CHARLES LEE DAVIS, )
) Court of Appeals No. A-10405/10521
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 3PA-08-7070 MO
) and 3AN-07-12951 MO
)
v. ) O P I N I O N
)
STATE OF ALASKA, ) No. 2271 July 23, 2010
)
Appellee. )
)
Appeals    from    the
          District   Court,  Third  Judicial  District,
          Palmer,  Gregory  Heath,  Judge,  and   Third
          Judicial    District,    Anchorage,    Ronald
          Wielkopolski, Magistrate.

          Appearances:   Charles  Lee  Davis,  pro  se,
          Anchorage, for Appellant.  W. Michael  Perry,
          Assistant District Attorney, Palmer,  Geoffry
          B.  Wildridge,  Assistant  Attorney  General,
          Fairbanks,  and Daniel S. Sullivan,  Attorney
          General, Juneau, for Appellee.

                Before:  Coats, Chief Judge, and  Mannh
          eimer and Bolger, Judges.

          BOLGER, Judge.
          
          In  two separate cases, Charles Lee Davis was convicted
for violating the states commercial motor vehicle regulations  by
operating  a  commercial motor vehicle without  a  valid  medical
examiners  certificate  (Case No. A-10405)  and  by  operating  a
commercial motor vehicle that had been placed out of service  for
safety   violations  (Case  No.  A-10521).1   These  cases   were
consolidated for consideration and decision.
          In  both cases, Davis contends that the State lacks the
authority  to  enforce,  or to adopt as state  law,  the  federal
commercial  motor vehicle regulations.  He also asserts  in  both
cases that he was not operating a commercial motor vehicle,  that
there were discovery violations, and that the traffic stops  were
unlawful.   In  Case  No. A-10405, he asserts that  the  district
court erred when it denied his request to play a videotape during
trial.   Finally,  in  Case No. A-10521, he argues  that  he  was
entitled to a jury trial.  We disagree with Davis on all of these
issues.

     Background
          In  Case  No.  A-10405, on June 16, 2008, Alaska  State
Trooper  Sergeant Jake Covey stopped Davis because Davis did  not
have a license plate on the trailer he was pulling with his semi-
tractor.   Among other things, under the states commercial  motor
vehicle  regulations, people who drive commercial motor  vehicles
are  required  to  carry a valid medical examiners  certificate.2
When  contacted,  Davis was unable to produce  this  certificate.
Consequently, he was given a citation for operating a  commercial
motor vehicle without a valid medical examiners certificate.   At
a  bench  trial, District Court Judge Gregory Heath  found  Davis
guilty of this violation.
          In  Case  No. A-10521, on July 27, 2007, Daviss vehicle
was  ordered  out  of  service by Commercial Enforcement  Officer
Martin  Baston  as  the  result of a routine  commercial  vehicle
inspection  at the Glenn Highway outbound weigh station.   Daviss
vehicle, a tractor-trailer combination, was placed out of service
for  two  reasons.  First, because the trailer had  an  unsecured
load  of five-gallon buckets, one of which was ready to fall  off
the trailer.  Second, because two adjacent tires on the same axle
on  the  semi-tractor had a tread depth of less than 1/32  of  an
inch.   Baston  explained that under the states regulations,  the
tread depth on the tires had to be at least 2/32 of an inch.
          Four hours later, Officer Baston contacted Davis again.
Davis had changed only one of the substandard tires.  Because  he
did  not change the other substandard tire, nor adequately secure
the  load  of  buckets,  his vehicle was still  out  of  service.
Officer Baston issued a citation for operating a commercial motor
vehicle  that had been placed out of service.  At a trial  before
Magistrate  Ronald  Wielkopolski, he was  found  guilty  of  this
violation.

     Discussion
          The  State is enforcing state regulations, not  federal
regulations
          Davis asserts in both of these cases that the State has
no  authority  to  enforce the federal law regulating  commercial
motor  vehicles.   But the State is enforcing state  regulations,
not   federal.   The  Alaska  Legislature  directed   the   State
Department of Transportation to adopt regulations under AS  44.62
          (the Administrative Procedure Act) that are necessary to
implement  requirements imposed by federal statute or  regulation
that  relate to commercial motor vehicles and that are  necessary
to avoid loss or withholding of federal highway money.3  Based on
this  authority,  the  Department adopted as  state  law  various
portions  of  Title  49  of  the  Code  of  Federal  Regulations.
Consequently, the adopted portions of the federal regulations are
now  state law and are enforced by various state agencies.  Among
the  regulations  adopted as state law are the regulations  Davis
violated   17  AAC  25.210(a)(5) and (b)(5) (medical  certificate
required) and 17 AAC 25.210(a)(8) (moving out of service  vehicle
before repair completed).
          Regulations enacted by state agencies are presumptively
valid,  and  the  burden of proving invalidity is  on  the  party
challenging  the  regulations.4  Generally speaking,  regulations
promulgated  by  an executive department must  be  authorized  by
statute.5   Also,  a  regulation  must  be  consistent  with  and
reasonably  necessary to carry out the purpose of the authorizing
statute.6  A regulation is consistent with a statute if it has  a
reasonable relation to statutory objectives.7
          Here,   AS   19.10.060(c)  specifically   directs   the
Department   to   adopt   regulations  necessary   to   implement
requirements imposed by federal statutes or regulations  relating
to   commercial  motor  vehicles.   By  expressly  adopting   the
pertinent  portions of the federal regulations and revising  them
as  necessary  to apply them to Alaska roadways,  the  Department
acted   consistently  with  its  statutory  authority   and   the
legislatures objective.8
          We  conclude  that Davis has not shown that  the  State
lacked  the  authority  to  adopt and  enforce  commercial  motor
vehicle   regulations  patterned  on  the  corresponding  federal
regulations,  nor  has he shown that the states commercial  motor
vehicle regulations are unconstitutional or otherwise invalid.

          Davis was driving a commercial motor vehicle
          In Case No. A-10405, Davis contends that the vehicle he
was  driving  did  not fall under the definitions  of  commercial
motor vehicle and commercial purpose and that [n]ot one shred  of
evidence  was  presented  that  [he]  was  involved  in  using  a
commercial motor vehicle for commercial purposes.  Meanwhile,  in
Case  A-10521, he asserts that he was not operating a  commercial
motor  vehicle  in  commerce as that term is defined  by  federal
statute; that is, he contends that he was not operating a vehicle
in  interstate  commerce.9   He also contends  that  he  was  not
operating a commercial vehicle because he was not getting paid to
haul property.
          Under  the  state  regulations that Davis  violated,  a
commercial motor vehicle is (1) a self-propelled or towed vehicle
...  used  to  transport  passengers or property  for  commercial
purposes, (2) used upon a highway or vehicular way, and  (3) that
has  a  gross  vehicle weight rating or gross combination  weight
rating  greater  than  10,000 pounds.10   The  phrase  commercial
purposes  means  activities for which a  person  receives  direct
monetary  compensation or activities for which a person  receives
no  direct monetary compensation but that are incidental  to  and
          done in furtherance of the persons business.11  Under this
statute, the only tractor-trailer combinations exempted are those
used exclusively for purposes other than commercial purposes.12

          Sufficiency of the evidence
          As  just  explained, in Case No. A-10405, Davis asserts
that  he  was  outside  of the definitions  of  commercial  motor
vehicle  and commercial purposes, and that there was no  evidence
that  his  tractor-trailer combination  was  a  commercial  motor
vehicle used for commercial purposes.
          When  a  person  challenges  the  sufficiency  of   the
evidence supporting a conviction, this court must view the record
in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict.13
          Viewing the evidence in this fashion, the record  shows
that  Alaska State Trooper Covey saw Davis driving a semi-tractor
pulling  a  trailer  that was not properly registered.   Sergeant
Covey  testified  that based on his experience,  Daviss  tractor-
trailer combination met the weight standard for commercial  motor
vehicles, and that the trailer was carrying a full load of dirt.
          After  Coveys testimony, Officer Baston testified  that
Davis  operated  his vehicle under the name of  Davis  Transport,
had  a  state business license under the name of Davis Transport,
and  that the semi-tractor was registered to Davis.  Baston  said
that it was not unusual for drivers to subcontract their services
and  trucks  to other companies.  Baston further testified  that,
based on receipts from the scale house at a local sand and gravel
company, Davis was hauling rock and gravel for two projects,  and
so  he  was in business for purposes of commercial motor  vehicle
enforcement.
          Baston  explained that scale tickets are used to record
how much product a driver was transporting, and the scale tickets
showed that Daviss truck had been used to transport material  for
an  excavating company.  Davis had been hauling, as  recently  as
November 2008, up to 50,000 pounds for the projects.  There  were
approximately  fifty  pages of these scale  house  tickets.   The
scale tickets were signed Chuck (Daviss first name is Charles).
          For his part, Davis testified that he was not operating
a  commercial motor vehicle hired for monetary compensation.  But
he  admitted  that he was hauling multiple loads of dirt  from  a
friends place in his trailer and taking it to another friend  who
needed  it for landscaping.  Davis also testified that he had  no
occupation, but admitted that he would get compensation for [his]
labor.
          Davis  asserted   that  he only  worked  intrastate  as
opposed  to  interstate.  He argued that the federal  regulations
applied  only  to  those  driving commercial  motor  vehicles  in
interstate commerce and his case involved intrastate commerce.
          But  Davis  was cited for violating a state  regulation
that   expressly  applies  to  both  interstate  and   intrastate
commerce:  A person may not drive a [commercial] motor vehicle in
interstate  or intrastate commerce unless the person ...  has  in
the  persons  actual possession the original [or  a  copy  of  a]
medical  examiners  certificate that  the  person  is  physically
qualified to drive a motor vehicle.14
          The  definition of commercial purposes is broad  enough
          to include Daviss work even though he claimed he did not receive
money  compensation  for  his  services.  As  explained  earlier,
commercial  purposes  includes  activities  for  which  a  person
receives  no direct monetary compensation but that are incidental
to  and  done  in  furtherance of the persons business.15   Davis
presented no evidence that his vehicle was exempt from the  state
regulations  because it was used exclusively  for  non-commercial
purposes.
          Viewing  this  evidence in the light most favorable  to
upholding  the verdict, we conclude that the evidence shows  that
Davis was operating a commercial motor vehicle.
           To  the  extent  that Davis meant  to  raise  a  claim
involving  statutory  interpretation, he has  not  presented  any
evidence suggesting that the legislature intended to exempt  from
the definition of commercial motor vehicle vehicles like his that
are  used  occasionally,  as opposed  to  exclusively,  for  non-
commercial purposes.  Under AS 19.10.399(1)(D), semi-tractors and
trailers like Daviss are exempt from the commercial motor vehicle
regulations only if they are used exclusively for purposes  other
than  commercial  purposes.  Based on this, it is  reasonable  to
conclude  that  the legislature intended that even vehicles  used
only  occasionally for commercial purposes are still  subject  to
the states commercial motor vehicle regulations.
          Similarly,  in Case No. A-10521, Davis argues  that  he
could not be guilty of operating a commercial motor vehicle  that
had  been  placed out of service because he was  not  subject  to
federal  regulations.  He also claims that he was  not  paid  for
hauling the property.
          But  Daviss vehicle was placed out of service based  on
state  regulations,16 and he was convicted of violating  a  state
regulation  that  provides that no person  may  operate  a  motor
vehicle  declared  out  of service until all  repairs  have  been
satisfactorily completed.17  In addition, state regulations define
a  commercial motor vehicle as one used upon a state  highway  or
vehicular way.18
          At trial, the evidence showed that early in the morning
on  July  27,  2007,  Daviss vehicle was placed  out  of  service
because  of an unsecured load and because of two adjacent  unsafe
tires.   He  was  stopped  later in the morning  because  he  was
driving  the vehicle but had not completely corrected the out-of-
service violations.
          When  Davis  testified,  he  described  himself  as   a
professional  driver  who had hauled all  types  of  cargo,  some
upwards  of 200,000 pounds on his trailer.  He admitted  that  on
July  27,  he was hauling used oil in buckets for a  friend.   He
also  admitted  that in addition to the buckets, he  was  hauling
another  persons  generator  to  a  friends  house.   There   was
testimony that Davis had a business license and operated as Davis
Transport,  but  he  asserted that he  was  not  subject  to  the
commercial  motor vehicles regulations because the  friends  were
not paying him money for hauling these items.
          Although  Davis argues that he was not paid  money  for
hauling  other peoples property, the evidence supports Magistrate
Wielkopolskis  conclusion  that Daviss  vehicle  fell  under  the
commercial motor vehicle regulations.  Those regulations  do  not
          depend upon whether an operator receives actual monetary
compensation  for  hauling property, and the regulations  include
vehicles that are used for activities ... that are incidental  to
and  done in furtherance of the persons business.19  Here,  Davis
was  using  his  tractor-trailer to haul  property  belonging  to
another  person  or  persons.  Even  if  Davis  did  not  receive
monetary  compensation for this activity, Magistrate Wielkopolski
could  reasonably conclude that Davis was engaged  in  activities
that were incidental to and done in furtherance of his business.
          Finally,    as   previously   discussed,    under    AS
19.10.399(1)(D)(v), only semi-tractor-trailers like  Daviss  that
are  used exclusively for purposes other than commercial purposes
would  be  exempt from the commercial motor vehicle  regulations.
Here, Magistrate Wielkopolski could find that Daviss vehicle  did
not  fall under this exemption.          Viewing the evidence  in
the  light  most favorable to upholding the verdict, we  conclude
that  the  evidence shows that Davis was operating  a  commercial
motor vehicle.
          In  a  related  claim,  Davis asserts  that  Magistrate
Wielkopolski  erred by not finding that Baston committed  perjury
at  trial  when he testified that some of the buckets  Davis  was
hauling  were  unsecured.  Davis points out that  he  showed  the
magistrate a photograph and also testified that the buckets could
not have been positioned the way that Baston claimed.  But when a
magistrate  sits  as the fact finder, it is the province  of  the
magistrate  to  judge the credibility of the witnesses.20   Here,
Magistrate  Wielkopolski credited the States  witnesses  when  he
found  that  a  number  of  five gallon pails  were  inadequately
secured from moving forward, back or up and down.
          In  summary,  we  conclude that  there  was  sufficient
evidence to sustain both convictions.

          Discovery and evidentiary issues
          In  both  cases,  Davis  makes cursory  single-sentence
claims  that  the  State failed to provide him  with  exculpatory
evidence.   Davis generally does not identify what  evidence  the
State  withheld.  Davis does identify the videotapes  related  to
each  traffic  stop.  But he does not explain how the  videotapes
would have been exculpatory or how he was prejudiced.
          In  both  cases, it appears that Davis did not know  of
the  videotapes until trial. He pointed out this lack  of  notice
during  each trial, but he did not ask for a continuance or  show
how the lack of notice prejudiced him.
          In Case No. A-10405, Judge Heath initially, over Daviss
objection,  allowed the State to play a portion  of  a  videotape
showing  the  traffic  stop, then later  reversed  his  decision.
Davis  also  sought to introduce the videotape, but  Judge  Heath
denied  the  request, ultimately ruling that the  evidence  Davis
wanted to admit was irrelevant.
          On  appeal, Davis claims that the videotape would  have
shown  that  Covey had made threats and would have also  included
the  audio of Davis talking [to] a friend on a cell phone  during
the  traffic stop.  But Davis does not explain how this  evidence
would  have  been  relevant,  let  alone  exculpatory.   Even  an
expansive reading of his claims of error does not show  any  that
          involve threats made by Covey.  Nor does Davis expressly explain
what  relevant  evidence the tape would have shown regarding  the
phone  conversation  he had with his friend  during  the  traffic
stop.
          That  said,  it  appears that Davis believed  that  the
videotape  would  show  that he had a  cell  phone  conversation,
conducted  on the cells speaker phone, during which a  friend  of
his  told  the  troopers who stopped Davis that they  lacked  the
authority to enforce the federal regulations.
          But  as  Judge Heath recognized, this evidence was  not
relevant  to Daviss case.  The trooper was not enforcing  federal
regulations,  he was enforcing state regulations.   The  evidence
Davis  wanted to introduce had no impact on the troopers  ability
to  enforce state law.  Davis has not shown that the State failed
to  turn  over exculpatory evidence or that Judge Heath erred  by
excluding the videotape.
          During trial in Case No. A-10521, Davis told Magistrate
Wielkopolski  that  he had asked the State to  provide  him  with
various  cooperative agreements between the State and the federal
government  because  he  wanted to  know  how  much  the  federal
government  paid the State for each inspection.  He  argued  that
this  evidence  would show that the State had an ulterior  motive
for conducting inspections.
          But  Davis apparently sought this information by filing
a  freedom of information request for the cooperative agreements,
and  at trial it was not clear where he had filed those requests.
Magistrate  Wielkopolski explained that a freedom of  information
request  was  not  a  motion to compel  discovery.   During  this
discussion  with the magistrate, Davis did not show that  he  had
actually  served  a  discovery request  on  the  State  for  this
information.  Nor did he ask for more time to do so.
          Davis  also told the magistrate that he had  asked  the
State  for  exculpatory evidence but that none had been provided.
He  did  not identify at trial the evidence he was referring  to,
nor does he provide much explanation on appeal.
          That said, at page 17 of his brief, he cites to page 53
of  the trial transcript, where he asked Baston about a videotape
that   Baston  referred  to  during  his  testimony.  This   tape
apparently  showed that Davis had only changed one of his  unsafe
tires.   Davis  asked if Baston had preserved the videotape,  and
Baston   replied  that  the  videotape  only  lasted   24   hours
(presumably  because  it  is  reused  constantly  at  the   weigh
station).
          But  Davis did not then ask for any relief, or  explain
how  he  had been prejudiced by the absence of this videotape  at
trial.   He  did not claim that the tape would show that  he  had
changed  both  of  the unsafe tires.  Rather, Davis  admitted  at
trial  that  he  had only changed one of the unsafe  tires.   His
defense  was that he had changed only one tire because  according
to  Davis  Baston had said that was all he had to do to  fix  the
deficiency.
          Davis has not shown that the State failed to turn  over
exculpatory evidence, nor has he shown that he was prejudiced  in
any way.


          Davis was not entitled to a jury trial
          In  Case No. A-10521, Davis claims that he was entitled
to  a  jury trial because he risked losing his commercial drivers
license.   But  Davis has not shown that the magistrate  had  any
authority  to  take any action against Daviss commercial  drivers
license.  In this case, Davis was convicted of violating  17  AAC
25.210(a)(8),   a   regulation  that   was   adopted   under   AS
19.10.060(c).   Under  AS  45.75.380(a)(11),  a  violation  of  a
regulation  adopted  under AS 19.10.060 is a  violation,  subject
solely  to  a  $500 fine.21  Under the pertinent penalty  statute
there  is  no provision for incarceration or for the  loss  of  a
valuable license.22
          The  Alaska Supreme Court has held that a defendant  is
entitled  to a jury trial when the conviction can result  in  the
loss  of  a valuable license.23  But the supreme court  has  also
explained  that there is no right to a jury trial for  relatively
innocuous  offenses as wrongful parking of motor  vehicles  [and]
minor traffic violations.24  Under District Court Criminal Rule 8,
Daviss case involved a minor offense.25  That is, his offense was
one  that  was  classified  by statute  as  an  infraction  or  a
violation;26  or an offense under statute for which a  conviction
cannot result in incarceration, a fine greater than $500, or  the
loss  of  a  valuable license;27 or an offense for which  a  bail
forfeiture  amount has been authorized by statute and established
by supreme court order.28
          Although  Magistrate Wielkopolski did  not,  and  could
not,  take any action against Daviss commercial drivers  license,
an  administrative agency suspended Daviss license based  on  his
conviction for driving a commercial motor vehicle that  had  been
placed out of service.29  The Alaska Supreme Court addressed this
situation  in  Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 30 where it  explained
that  the  right  to a jury trial would apply  only  to  criminal
prosecutions, not to administrative proceedings.31   The  supreme
court  noted  that the right to a jury trial did  not  extend  to
administrative proceedings because an agencys decision to suspend
or  revoke a license is focused on whether the individual is  fit
to drive, not whether the person has committed a crime.32
          We  relied on Baker in State v. District Court when  we
held  that  a  person is entitled to a jury trial  when  the  law
requires the court, as opposed to an agency, to suspend or revoke
a  persons license upon conviction of certain offenses.33   Here,
Davis  has  not identified any statute that requires a  court  to
suspend  or revoke a commercial drivers license if the driver  is
convicted of violating 17 AAC 25.210.34
          Because  Magistrate Wielkopolski had  no  authority  to
take  or  limit  Daviss  commercial drivers  license,  Davis  was
properly  tried  in  the  district  court  under  the  procedures
established in Rule 8.  Davis was not entitled to a jury trial.
          In  a  related claim, Davis asserts in Case No. A-10521
that   Magistrate  Wielkopolski  did  not  have  subject   matter
jurisdiction over the Alaska Administrative Code.  But Davis  was
charged  with  a  minor  offense as  defined  in  District  Court
Criminal  Rule 8, and the legislature has authorized  magistrates
to  preside  over cases involving minor offenses.35  Accordingly,
          the district court had jurisdiction over Daviss offense, and the
magistrate had the authority to preside over Daviss trial.

          Other claims
          Davis  contends that the traffic stops  in  both  cases
were unlawful.  But he did not raise these claims in the district
court and so has not preserved them for appeal.36
          Daviss  briefs  and  their  attachments  are  sometimes
difficult to understand, and he may have intended to raise  other
claims  in  addition  to those we have discussed  here.   To  the
extent  that Davis attempted to raise other claims in his briefs,
we conclude that these claims are inadequately briefed.37

     Conclusion
          We therefore AFFIRM the district court judgments.
         In the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska

Charles Lee Davis,              )
                                )       Court of Appeals  Nos.  A
-10405/10521
                                     Appellant,)
                   v.           )            Order
                                )
State of Alaska,                )
                                )
                                      Appellee. )        Date  of
Order: 7/23/2010
Trial Court Case #s  3AN-07-12951MO and
                                 3PA-08-07070MO

     Before:      Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and  Bolger,
Judges.

     On  consideration of the states motion to publish  filed  on
6/24/2010 and the opposition filed on 7/2/2010,
     It is Ordered: the motion to publish is Granted.  Memorandum
Opinion and Judgment No. 5595, issued on 5/26/ 2010, is withdrawn
and Opinion No 2271 is issued in its place.
     Entered at the direction of the court.

                                   Clerk of the Appellate Courts
     
                                   
                                   Lori  A.  Wade,  Chief  Deputy
Clerk
cc:  Court of Appeals Judges
     Judge Gregory Heath
     Magistrate Ronald Wielkopolski
     Central Staff
     Trial Court Appeals
     Other Publishers

Distribution:

     W. Michael Perry
     Assistant        District
Attorney
     11921 Palmer Wasilla  Hwy
Suite 100
     Palmer AK 99645
     Charles Davis
     6300 OMalley Road
     Anchorage AK 99507
_______________________________
     1  17 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 25.210(a)(5) & (b)(5)
and 17 AAC 25.210(a)(8).

     2 17 AAC 25.210(a)(5) & (b)(5).

     3 AS 19.10.060(c).

     4  State  v.  Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 723  P.2d  76,  78
(Alaska 1986).

     5 See AS 44.62.020 (To be effective, each regulation adopted
must be within the scope of authority conferred and in accordance
with standards prescribed by ... law.).

     6 AS 44.62.030.

     7 Rollins v. State, Dept. of Rev., 991 P.2d 202, 207 (Alaska
1999).

     8  See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 723 P.2d at 78 (The state
has  a  statutory  duty to control the state highway  system,  AS
19.05.010,  AS  19.05.030(1),  and is  authorized  to  promulgate
necessary regulations, AS 19.05.020.).

     9  See  49  U.S.C.  31301(2) (Commerce means trade, traffic,
and transportation:
  (A) in the jurisdiction of the United States between a place in
a State and a place outside that State (including a place outside
the  United  States);  or (B) in the United States  that  affects
trade, traffic, and transportation described in subclause (A)  of
this clause.).

     10 AS 19.10.399(1)(A)  (C)(i).  17 AAC 25.250(1) adopts this
definition by reference.

     11 AS 19.10.399(2).

     12 AS 19.10.399(1)(D)(v) (emphasis added).

     13  Ross v. State, 586 P.2d 616, 618 (Alaska 1978);  Beck v.
State, 408 P.2d 996, 997 (Alaska 1965).

     14 17 AAC 25.210(b)(5).

     15 AS 19.10.399(2).

     16 17 AAC 25.210(a)(7) (adopting 49 CFR 393.75(c) (requiring
non-front  tires to have a minimum tread of 2/32 of an inch)  and
49  CFR  393.106(b)  (requiring cargo be  firmly  immobilized  or
secured)).

     17  17 AAC 25.210(a)(8) (adopting 49 CFR 396.9).  See 17 AAC
25.240(c).

     18 AS 19.10.399(1), (7), (13).

     19 AS 19.10.399(2).

     20  Gilley  v. City of Anchorage, 376 P.2d 484, 484  (Alaska
1962).

     21 See AS 12.55.035(b)(7).

     22 AS 12.55.035(b)(7); AS 45.75.380(a).

     23  Baker  v.  City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402  (Alaska
1970).

     24 Id.

     25  See  District Court Criminal Rule 8, which  defines  and
governs the procedure in cases involving minor offenses.

     26 Alaska Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 8(b)(1).

     27 Alaska Dist. Ct. R. Crim. P. 8(b)(5).

     28  Alaska  Dist.  Ct.  R.  Crim. P.  8(b)(2).   See  Alaska
Administrative   Rule  43.1,  establishing   the   Traffic   Bail
Forfeiture Schedule and listing the offense of operation  of  out
of  service  vehicle as a violation appropriate  for  disposition
without  court  appearance. This particular offense  has  a  bail
forfeiture amount of $300.

     29 AS 28.33.140(a)(6).

     30 471 P.2d 386.

     31 Id. at 402.

     32  Baker, 471 P.2d at 402 n.28; see also Alaska Bd.of  Fish
and  Game v. Loesche, 537 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Alaska 1975) (loss  of
license to guide hunts); In re Cornelius, 520 P.2d 76, 83 (Alaska
1974) (loss of license to practice law).

     33  State v. District Court, 927 P.2d 1295, 1296-97  (Alaska
App. 1996) (discussing Baker).

     34  Cf.,  AS  28.15.181 and 28.15.185 (both requiring  trial
courts to revoke drivers licenses after drivers are convicted  of
certain offenses).

     35   AS   22.15.120(a)(7),  (c);  see  also   AS   22.15.010
(establishing  district courts) and Alaska Const.,  art.  IV,   1
(The judicial power of the State is vested in a supreme court,  a
superior court, and the courts established by the legislature.).

     36  See  Mahan  v. State, 51 P.3d 962, 965-66  (Alaska  App.
2002).

     37 See Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 803 P.2d
406,  410  (Alaska 1990) (issues that are only cursorily  briefed
are  deemed  abandoned); Wilkerson v. Alaska Dept of  Health  and
Soc.  Servs., 993 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Alaska 1999) (the fact that
a  litigant is appearing pro se does not relieve the litigant  of
the obligation to brief the issues they have raised).

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