Made available by Touch N' Go Systems, Inc. and
Law Offices of James B. Gottstein.
406 G Street, Suite 210, Anchorage, AK 99501
(907) 274-7686 fax 333-5869

You can of the Alaska Court of Appeals opinions.

Touch N' Go, the DeskTop In-and-Out Board makes your office run smoother. Visit Touch N' Go's Website to see how.


Charles v. State (6/11/2010) ap-2266

Charles v. State (6/11/2010) ap-2266

                             NOTICE
     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
     Courts.

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
       E-mail:  corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


MARVIN L. CHARLES SR., )
) Court of Appeals No. A-10202
Appellant, ) Trial Court No. 1KE-06-1018 CR
)
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. )
) No. 2266 June 11, 2010
          Appeal  from the District Court, First  Judi
          cial   District,   Ketchikan,   Trevor    N.
          Stephens, Judge.

          Appearances:  Glenda J. Kerry, Law Office of
          Glenda   J.   Kerry,   Girdwood,   for   the
          Appellant.    Stephen  R.   West,   District
          Attorney, Ketchikan, and Daniel S. Sullivan,
          Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

          Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
          and Bolger, Judges.

          BOLGER, Judge.
          MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.

          Marvin  L.  Charles  Sr.  was  convicted  of  violating
several  state hunting regulations related to the taking of  does
on  Prince of Wales Island.  Charles argues that he was  entitled
to  an  evidentiary hearing in district court to  show  that  the
hunting  regulations  were invalid because they  conflicted  with
federal  law  requiring a priority for subsistence  hunting.   We
uphold  the district courts decision to deny the hearing  because
Charles  did not raise any factual dispute about the validity  of
the regulations.

     Facts and proceedings
          Charles  was  convicted  of  five  counts  of  unlawful
possession  or transportation of game,1 four counts  of  unlawful
possession  or  transportation of game that had evidence  of  sex
removed,2  and  hunting  without the  required  harvest  ticket.3
Charless  violations all involved deer shot on  federal  land  on
Prince  of  Wales Island in September 2006.  Only antlered  bucks
could be hunted on Prince of Wales Island at the time.4  However,
Charles admitted that at least three of the deer that were  taken
by his hunting party were does.5
          Before  trial,  Charles  moved  for  dismissal  of  the
charges, arguing that the state regulations  conflicted with  the
subsistence  priority  mandated by the Alaska  National  Interest
Lands  Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA).6  Charles  argued  that
the  state  regulations  were  defective  because  they  did  not
establish  a priority for subsistence use as required by  ANILCA,
and  therefore  encouraged depletion of a resource that  Congress
specifically  directed be used for the primary  purpose  of  non-
wasteful  subsistence.   Charles  asserted  that  non-subsistence
hunters had decreased the population of bucks, exerting an  ever-
increasing  pressure  on  subsistence  users  efforts   to   feed
themselves  and  their  families by means  of  their  traditional
subsistence way of life.
          Charles  also  asked  for  an  evidentiary  hearing  to
establish  that he was entitled to defend against the charges  at
trial  by  showing that (1) the deer were taken  for  subsistence
purposes and (2) the state regulations were unreasonable  because
they  failed  to  provide  him  an  opportunity  to  satisfy  his
subsistence needs.
          Superior  Court  Judge Trevor N. Stephens,  sitting  in
the  district  court, denied the motion to dismiss.   Relying  on
Totemoff  v.  State,7 Judge Stephens ruled that  ANILCA  did  not
preempt  the  state from regulating hunting on federal  lands  in
Alaska  as long as the regulations did not conflict with  federal
law.  He ruled that the state regulation allowing hunting by non-
subsistence  hunters on Prince of Wales Island did  not  conflict
with  federal  law because the responsible federal  agencies  had
also  not restricted non-subsistence hunting in the area.   Judge
Stephens also found that Charles had not offered any evidence  to
show  that  there was a dangerously skewed buck-to-doe  ratio  on
Prince  of Wales Island, or that there was no valid reason  under
ANILCA to limit the hunting of does.
          Charles  filed a motion to reconsider, again requesting
an  evidentiary  hearing.  In his motion to  reconsider,  Charles
conceded that the pertinent federal regulations governing hunting
on  Prince of Wales Island almost mirrored state regulations.  He
clarified  that  his  claim  was  that  the  federal  and   state
          regulations both deprived him of ANILCAs subsistence priority by
placing  him  on equal footing with non-subsistence hunters.   He
asserted that a hearing would show that the pressure put on  game
by  non-subsistence users has, in fact[,] been recognized by  the
Federal  Subsistence Board, but that it has not  been  adequately
addressed to preserve [his] subsistence hunting needs.
          In  denying  the  motion to reconsider, Judge  Stephens
acknowledged that Charles had the right to challenge the validity
of  the regulations he was charged with violating.  But he  noted
that  Charles  appeared to concede that the  Federal  Subsistence
Board  had considered the concerns he was raising and had decided
not  to  further restrict deer hunting on Prince of Wales Island.
He  concluded that Charles was attempting to raise  what  was  in
essence an appeal of an administrative decision.
          At  trial,  Charles raised the affirmative  defense  of
necessity  with respect to all the charges except the  charge  of
hunting  without  a harvest ticket, arguing that  the  deer  were
taken  due to dire emergency.8  He testified that he went  on  an
overnight fishing trip with relatives and friends and was trapped
on  Prince of Wales Island by rough seas. He testified  that  the
deer  were shot when his fishing party ran out of food.  The jury
rejected  that defense and convicted Charles of all  counts.   He
now appeals.
     
     Discussion
          Charles  has  not explained how two of the  regulations
he  was convicted of violating  the regulations requiring hunters
to  have  deer  harvest  tickets  and  to  leave  the  deers  sex
identification attached  interfered with his subsistence  rights.
Charles  has  therefore waived his challenge to those regulations
by inadequate briefing.9
          This  leaves  the five counts of unlawfully  possessing
or  transporting game.  The jury was instructed that  those  five
counts  could be proved in two ways:  the State could prove  that
Charles  possessed or transported deer that were taken without  a
deer  harvest  ticket,  or  the State could  prove  that  Charles
possessed or transported does that were taken in violation of the
harvest  limit  that allowed only the taking of  antlered  bucks.
The  jury  did not specify which theory it relied on  to  convict
Charles.    Therefore,  we  are  required  to  reverse   Charless
convictions  on  those  five counts if he  establishes  that  the
harvest limit is invalid.10
          Charles  particularly challenges  the  district  courts
decision to deny his motion without an evidentiary hearing.   The
entitlement to a hearing is generally governed by Alaska Criminal
Rule  42.   A  moving party must include a detailed statement  of
material  facts  and  all documentary evidence  that  supports  a
motion.11   The  court is not required to hold  a  hearing  on  a
motion  if  material  issues of fact are  not  presented  in  the
pleadings.12
     
          Was  Charles  entitled  to a  hearing  to  establish  a
subsistence defense?
          Charless  first claim is that he was entitled to  raise
a  subsistence defense to the charges against him, and that Judge
          Stephens should have granted him an evidentiary hearing to
present evidence in support of that defense.  In support of  this
claim, Charles cites the Ninth Circuits decision in United States
v. Alexander.13
          Alexander  involved  defendants  convicted  in  federal
court for  the interstate transport of herring roe taken or  sold
in  violation of Alaska law.14  The government claimed  that  the
defendants had violated the regulation that prohibited  the  sale
of  herring  roe caught for subsistence, and the state regulation
that  set catch limits for herring roe.15  On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the defendants argued that those state regulations  were
invalid   because  they  interfered  with  customary   trade,   a
subsistence  use  protected  by  ANILCA.16   The  Ninth   Circuit
concluded   that  the  sale  of  herring  roe  was  a   protected
subsistence use that fell within ANILCAs definition of  customary
trade,  and  that  Alaskas  blanket  prohibition  on  such  sales
conflicted  with  ANILCA.17  The court did not  strike  down  the
regulation, however, instead holding that the defendants would be
entitled  to acquittal if they proved by a preponderance  of  the
evidence  that  they  were  engaged  in  customary  trade   under
ANILCA.18
          Alexander is not binding on this court.19  But even  if
it  were,  it  would  only control the cases  in  which  a  state
regulation   interfered  with  customary  trade  as  defined   in
ANILCA.20  Charles has not alleged that the regulations at  issue
in  his  case  impeded customary trade, or that state  regulators
failed  to take proper account of customary trade when  they  set
the harvest limit for deer on Prince of Wales Island.
          If  anything, Alexander suggests that Charles  was  not
entitled  to an evidentiary hearing.  The defendants in Alexander
also  challenged the state regulation establishing harvest limits
for  herring  roe,  arguing  that  the  Board  of  Fisheries  had
neglected  to  allow for sales made in customary  trade  when  it
established the harvest limits.21  The Ninth Circuit declined  to
consider  that  claim  because the defendants  had  presented  no
evidence of what was considered by the Board of Fisheries when it
adopted  the  harvest  limits  nor  any  record  of  the   Boards
proceedings.22  Likewise in this case, Charles offered no  record
of  administrative  proceedings  and  no  evidence  of  what  was
considered by the Board of Game when it adopted the harvest limit
that prohibited the taking of does.  We conclude that Charles was
not entitled to a hearing under the reasoning of Alexander.
          Charles  may  be  arguing  more  broadly  that   ANILCA
entitled  him to defend against the criminal charges at trial  by
showing  that (1) the deer were shot for non-wasteful subsistence
purposes  and (2) the harvest limit was unreasonable  because  it
did  not  provide  him an opportunity to satisfy his  subsistence
needs.  But such a defense is precluded by State v. Eluska.23  In
Eluska, the defendant killed a deer out of season and was charged
with  possessing or transporting game taken in violation of state
hunting  laws.24   In  his defense, he claimed  that  the  Boards
regulations  failed to differentiate between subsistence  hunting
and other hunting as required by statute.25
          The  Alaska  Supreme  Court ruled that  Eluska  had  no
right  to  hunt  for subsistence in the absence of  a  regulation
          authorizing such hunting.26  The supreme court rejected the view
that  an  agencys failure to act in accordance with  a  statutory
requirement means that those who are regulated by the agency  may
act  as  though they were not regulated.27  Based on  Eluska,  we
conclude  that  Charles was not entitled to defend against  these
charges  by  asserting  that the does were shot  for  subsistence
purposes.

          Was  Charles  entitled to a hearing  to  challenge  the
validity of the state         regulations?
          The  remaining question is whether Charles was entitled
to  an evidentiary hearing to show that the state regulation  was
inconsistent  with the subsistence priority mandated  by  ANILCA.
In  Totemoff,  the supreme court held that Congress  in  enacting
ANILCA  only  preempted enforcement of state  hunting  laws  when
there was actual conflict between state and federal law.28  There
is  an actual conflict between state and federal law if the state
law  conflicts with the federal law to the extent that (a) it  is
impossible  to comply simultaneously with both or (b)  the  state
regulation obstructs the execution of the purpose of the  federal
regulation.29
          In  Totemoff, the defendant was charged with  violating
a  state  regulation that prohibited hunting with the  aid  of  a
spotlight.30   There  was no direct conflict between  the  states
anti-spotlighting   regulation  and  any   federal   statute   or
regulation because a federal subsistence hunting regulation  also
prohibited taking game with the aid of a spotlight.31
          There  is  likewise no actual conflict with  ANILCA  in
this  case because Charless conduct was illegal under both  state
and  federal hunting regulations.  Alaskas regulation  authorized
deer  hunting  on  Prince  of  Wales  Island  for  residents  and
nonresidents from August 1 to December 31 and set a harvest limit
of  four  bucks.32   Federal subsistence  regulations  authorized
rural  Alaska  residents to hunt deer on Prince of  Wales  Island
from  July  24 to December 31 and set a limit of five  deer,  but
only  one  of  those deer could be an antlerless  deer,  and  the
antlerless  deer had to be taken between October 15 and  December
31.33   Charless conduct took place in September 2006, at a  time
when both state and federal regulations prohibited the hunting of
does.
          Charles  nevertheless claims that the state  regulation
conflicts with ANILCA because nonresidents have depleted the buck
population, leaving too few bucks to meet his subsistence hunting
needs.   He  asserts that pressure put on game by non-subsistence
users  has, in fact[,] been recognized by the Federal Subsistence
Board,  but that it has not been adequately addressed to preserve
Mr.  Charless subsistence needs.  He argues that these assertions
created  disputed  issues of material fact with  respect  to  the
validity  of  the state and federal regulations and that  he  was
entitled to a hearing to resolve this dispute.
           In  Totemoff, the supreme court clarified that  Eluska
did  not  prevent  a  subsistence hunter from  arguing  that  the
regulation he was charged with violating was invalid.34  In  this
case, Charles asserted in general terms that the regulation  gave
inadequate  priority to subsistence needs, and that  the  Federal
Subsistence Board was aware of the pressure put on game  by  non-
subsistence  users but had not adequately addressed the  problem.
But  Charles  did  not  provide the  court  with  any  record  of
administrative  proceedings  to  show  that  state   or   federal
regulators  failed to follow required procedures in enacting  the
regulation, or that the regulation at its inception was otherwise
arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion.35   In  other
words, Charless assertions, without more, did not establish  that
he could be entitled to relief.36  And after Judge Stephens found
that  Charless  offer  of proof was deficient,  Charles  made  no
effort  to  correct that deficiency when he filed his  motion  to
reconsider.   In  the absence of any proof to the  contrary,  the
district  court was obliged to presume that the regulations  were
valid.37
          Our  conclusion  is  consistent  with  other  decisions
holding  that  individuals  are not free  to  break  laws  simply
because they believe their conduct should be legal. For instance,
a  person  cannot  defend against a charge of driving  without  a
license  by  asserting  that the government  wrongly  denied  the
license;  the defendant must challenge the denial of the  license
in appropriate civil or administrative proceedings.38  Similarly,
a   person  cannot  defend  against  a  charge  of  violating   a
restraining  order  by  asserting that  there  were  insufficient
grounds for the court to issue the order.39  And a person  cannot
defend  against  a  charge of illegal hunting by  asserting  that
state  or  federal regulators made the wrong judgments when  they
set harvest limits for game.
          Managing game for subsistence and other competing  uses
is  a  complex  task that requires considerable  expertise.   The
district  court correctly recognized that it had no authority  to
substitute  its judgment for that of the agencies  involved  with
respect to the wisdom or efficacy of these regulations.40

     Conclusion
          We therefore AFFIRM the district court judgment.















     



MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring.

          I  write  separately to emphasize a key aspect  of  our
analysis of this case:  our interpretation of the Alaska  Supreme
Courts decision in Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995).
          In  the  final portion of its opinion in Totemoff,  905
P.2d  at  969-973, the supreme court addressed  the  question  of
whether  a  defendant  who is charged with  violating  a  hunting
regulation  can  defend  against  the  charge  by  attacking  the
validity of the regulation.  The supreme court concluded  that  a
defendant can properly assert that the regulation is procedurally
invalid   i.e., that the proceedings leading up to the  enactment
of  the  regulation were irregular in one or more respects.   905
P.2d  at  969,  972-73.  But at the same time, the supreme  court
reaffirmed its earlier decision in State v. Eluska, 724 P.2d 514,
516  (Alaska  1986), that a defendant is not entitled  to  defend
against  a  charge  of  illegal hunting  by  asserting  that  the
unlawful  act of hunting was done for subsistence purposes.   905
P.2d at 969-971.
          See  also AS 16.05.259, which states:  In a prosecution
for  the  taking  of fish or game in violation of  a  statute  or
regulation,  it  is not a defense that the taking  was  done  for
subsistence  uses.   In Totemoff, the supreme  court  interpreted
this  statute  as codifying the courts decision  in  Eluska  that
unauthorized  hunting  does  not  become  lawful  because  it  is
subsistence hunting.  905 P.2d at 970.
          In  Totemoff, the defendant argued that the  regulation
he  was charged with violating (a regulation that prohibited  the
hunting  of  deer  with the aid of a spotlight) was  procedurally
invalid  because  the Board of Game held no separate  hearing  to
determine whether the prohibition on the use of spotlights should
apply  to subsistence hunting.  905 P.2d at 971-72.  The  supreme
court rejected the contention that the Board was required to hold
a  separate  hearing on subsistence issues, and  the  court  then
noted  that  Totemoff had offered no evidence that the  Board  of
Game   failed   to   consider   subsistence   uses   during   the
administrative  proceedings leading up to  the  adoption  of  the
regulation.   905 P.2d at 972-73.  Given the lack of evidence  on
this  point, and given the presumption of regularity, the supreme
court  held  that Totemoff had failed to establish even  a  prima
facie case that the regulation was procedurally invalid.  Ibid.
          Returning  to  the  facts  of  Charless  case,  Charles
offered  no evidence that the Alaska Board of Game or the Federal
Subsistence Board failed to consider subsistence uses  when  they
set  the  limits  on  deer  hunting on Prince  of  Wales  Island.
Rather,  as  Judge  Bolgers  lead  opinion  points  out,  Charles
apparently   concedes  the  opposite.   In  his  district   court
pleadings,  Charles declared that [even though] the pressure  put
on  game by non-subsistence [hunters] has ... been recognized  by
the Federal Subsistence Board, [the Board] has not ... adequately
... preserve[d] Mr. Charles subsistence hunting needs.
          In  other words, Charles did not assert that the  Board
of Games adoption of the deer-hunting regulation was procedurally
invalid, or that the regulation lacked any reasonable relation to
the  Boards areas of regulatory authority defined in AS 16.05.255
270.   Instead, Charles argued that the Board reached  the  wrong
conclusion  when  it  weighed the needs  of  subsistence  hunters
against the need to husband the deer population.  Charles  wanted
the  district  court to hold a hearing, not for  the  purpose  of
showing  that  there  was any legal irregularity  in  the  Boards
enactment of the regulation, but rather for the purpose of second-
guessing  the  Boards  decision on  issues  of  game  management.
Totemoff  and  Eluska  hold that this  proposed  defense  is  not
allowed.
_______________________________
     1    5 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 92.140(a) provides:
       
          No   person   may  possess,  transport,   give,
       receive, or barter game or parts of game that  the
       person   knows  or  should  know  were  taken   in
       violation  of AS 16 or a regulation adopted  under
       AS 16.
       
     2    5 AAC 92.150(b) provides:

          If  the  taking  of a big game  animal,  except
       sheep, is restricted to one sex, a person may  not
       possess  or  transport the carcass  of  an  animal
       unless  sufficient portions of  the  external  sex
       organs  remain  attached to indicate  conclusively
       the  sex  of  the animal, except that antlers  are
       considered proof of sex for a deer if the  antlers
       are  naturally attached to an entire carcass, with
       or without the viscera; however, this section does
       not apply to the carcass of a big game animal that
       has  been  cut and placed in storage or  otherwise
       prepared  for  consumption  upon  arrival  at  the
       location where it is to be consumed.
       
     3    5 AAC 92.010(f) provides in pertinent part:
     
          [A]  person  may  not hunt deer,  except  in  a
       permit hunt, unless the person has in possession a
       deer harvest ticket[.]
       
     4     5 AAC 85.030(a)(2) provides that, between August 1 and
December  31, the bag limit for Prince of Wales Island (Southeast
Region  Game  Management  Unit 2)  is  four  bucks.   See  5  AAC
92.450(2)   (describing  Game  Management   Unit   2).    Federal
regulations  provide  that only bucks may  be  taken  in  Unit  2
between  July  24  and  October 15. 36 C.F.R.   242.26(n)(2);  50
C.F.R.  100.26(n)(2).

     5     See  AS  16.05.920(a) (a person may not take any  game
unless permitted by statute or regulation).

     6     Congress intended to provide the opportunity for rural
residents  engaged in a subsistence way of life  to  do  so.   16
U.S.C.   3112(1).   Subsistence harvest of fish and  wildlife  on
public  lands must be accorded priority over the taking  of  fish
and   wildlife  for  other  purposes.   16  U.S.C.   3114.    The
Secretaries   of  Interior  and  Agriculture  are   required   to
promulgate regulations necessary to implement this priority.   16
U.S.C.  3124.

     7    905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995).

8     See  AS  16.05.930(b) (This chapter  does  not  prohibit  a
person from taking fish or game during the closed season, in case
of  dire  emergency,  as  defined by regulation  adopted  by  the
appropriate board.); 5 AAC 92.990(a)(13) (defining dire emergency
to  mean a situation in which the person is (A) in a remote area;
(B)  involuntarily experiencing an absence of  food  required  to
sustain  life;  (C) facing a high risk of death  or  serious  and
permanent  health problems if wild game food is  not  immediately
taken;  and  (D)  cannot expect to obtain other food  sources  in
time).

     9    See Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 803 P.2d 406, 410
(Alaska 1990).

     10        See Vigne v. State, 987 P.2d 204, 210 (Alaska app.
1999).

     11        Alaska R. Crim. P. 42(b)(1) & (2).

     12        Alaska R. Crim. P. 42(e)(3).

13        938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991).

     14        Id. at 945.

     15        Id. at 945-46.

     16        Id. at 945.

     17        Id. at 946.

     18        Id. at 948.

     19         Totemoff,  905  P.2d at 963 (noting  that  Alaska
courts  are  not bound by decisions of federal courts other  than
the  United  States Supreme Court on questions  of  federal  law)
(citing In re F.P., 843 P.2d 1214, 1215 n.1 (Alaska 1992)).

     20        See Alexander, 938 F.2d at 948.

     21        Id. at 946-47.

     22        Id.

     23        724 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1986).

     24        Id. at 514.

     25        Id.

26        Id. at 516.

     27        Id.

     28        905 P.2d at 960-61.

     29         State, Dept of Commerce v. Progressive Cas.  Ins.
Co., 165 P.3d 624, 632 (Alaska 2007).

     30        905 P.2d at 957 (citing 5 AAC 92.080(7)).

     31         Id.  at  960 (citing 36 C.F.R.  242.23(b)(1)(vii)
(1990)).

     32         AS  16.05.920(a) (prohibiting the taking of  game
absent  a  regulation authorizing the taking); 5 AAC 85.030(a)(1)
(setting bag limit in Game Unit 2).

     33         36 C.F.R.  242.26(n)(2); 50 C.F.R.  100.26(n)(2);
see Subsistence Taking of Fish and Wildlife Regulations,  71 Fed.
Reg.  37642-01, 37662 (June 30, 2006).

     34        Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 969.

     35         State  v. Morry, 836 P.2d 358, 362-64 &  362  n.3
(Alaska 1992); see also Alexander, 938 F.2d at 947 (rejecting the
claim  that  a  state regulation establishing  catch  limits  for
herring  roe  interfered with ANILCA because the  defendants  had
presented  no evidence of what was or was not considered  by  the
Board  of  Fisheries when it adopted the catch  limits,  and  had
provided no record of the Boards proceedings).

     36         See  Marshall  v.  State, 198  P.3d  567,  572-73
(Alaska App. 2008) (explaining that an evidentiary hearing is not
required  unless  the  moving party  files  affidavits  or  other
evidence showing that he may be entitled to relief).

     37         See  State  v. First Natl Bank of Anchorage,  660
P.2d  406,  425  (Alaska  1982) (AS  44.62.100(a)  establishes  a
rebuttable presumption that the procedural requirements  for  the
promulgation of administrative regulations have been satisfied.).

     38         See  Tenison v. State, 38 P.3d 535,  538  (Alaska
App. 2001).

     39         See  Jacko v. State, 981 P.2d 1075, 1077  (Alaska
App. 1999).

     40        See Eagle v. State, Dept of Revenue, 153 P.3d 976,
978  (Alaska  2007); Meier v. State, Bd. of Fisheries,  739  P.2d
172, 174 (Alaska 1987).

Case Law
Statutes, Regs & Rules
Constitutions
Miscellaneous


IT Advice, Support, Data Recovery & Computer Forensics.
(907) 338-8188

Please help us support these and other worthy organizations:
Law Project for Psychiatraic Rights
Soteria-alaska
Choices
AWAIC