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Vickers v. State (1/18/2008) ap-2142

Vickers v. State (1/18/2008) ap-2142

                             NOTICE
     The  text  of this opinion can be corrected before  the
     opinion  is published in the Pacific Reporter.  Readers
     are  encouraged to bring typographical or other  formal
     errors  to  the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate
     Courts.

             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska  99501
                      Fax:  (907) 264-0878
       E-mail:  corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA


NATHANIEL VICKERS, )
) Court of Appeals Nos. A-9501/9502
Appellant, ) Trial Court Nos. 3AN-04-10110 CR
) 3AN- 05-3637 CR
v. )
) O P I N I O N
STATE OF ALASKA, )
)
Appellee. ) No. 2142 January 18, 2008
)
Appeal    from    the
          District  Court,  Third  Judicial  District,
          Anchorage, John R. Lohff, Judge.

          Appearances:   Christi A. Pavia,  Pavia  Law
          Office  LLC,  Anchorage, for the  Appellant.
          Blair  M.  Christensen,  Assistant  Attorney
          General, Office of Special Prosecutions  and
          Appeals,  Anchorage, and Craig  J.  Tillery,
          Acting  Attorney  General, Juneau,  for  the
          Appellee.

          Before:   Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer
          and Stewart, Judges.

          STEWART, Judge.

          Nathaniel   Vickers  was  convicted  of   violating   a
condition of his bail release by having contact with his domestic
companion, Annette Jamestown.1  During trial, Vickers argued that
he  was  not  guilty  because he reasonably,  though  mistakenly,
believed  his  conditions of release allowed him to have  contact
with  Jamestown.   The jury rejected that defense  and  convicted
Vickers.
          On   appeal,   Vickers   claims  the   district   court
impermissibly limited his mistake defense.  He also  argues  that
the  court violated his due process rights by allowing the  State
to  use  evidence  of his earlier conviction  for  violating  his
conditions  of release to show that he was not mistaken  when  he
committed  the present offense.  And he argues that the  district
court  erred by not instructing the jury to consider only written
conditions of release and to disregard any evidence of  oral  no-
contact  orders.   For the reasons discussed below,  we  conclude
that there is no merit to these claims.
          Vickers  also  argues  that the  district  court  judge
erred  by  not recusing himself when he realized he had  presided
over  Vickerss  first  bail hearing and  therefore  had  personal
knowledge  that Vickers had been ordered to have no contact  with
Jamestown.   But the trial judge did not have personal  knowledge
of  any  fact  that was disputed in this case, and there  was  no
significant  possibility that the judge  would  be  called  as  a
witness.   We therefore conclude that the judge did  not  err  by
failing to recuse himself sua sponte.
          Vickers   other   claims  are  waived  for   inadequate
briefing.

          Facts and proceedings
          On  July  21,  2004,  Vickers was indicted  for,  among
other   crimes,  assaulting  and  attempting  to  murder  Annette
Jamestown.   Vickers  was  released on  bail  to  a  third  party
custodian on July 19, 2004.  One of the conditions of his release
prohibited   him  from  any  direct  or  indirect  contact   with
Jamestown.
          Less  than  three  months later, on  October  9,  2004,
Vickers  was charged with violating the conditions of his release
by  having  contact  with Jamestown.  He was  convicted  of  that
misdemeanor  offense on January 14, 2005.  Vickerss  sentence  in
that  case  included  5  years  of  probation,  and  one  of  the
conditions  of  that probation prohibited him from  contact  with
Jamestown  unless  Jamestown  wrote  a  letter  to  the  district
attorney consenting to contact.  Jamestown wrote such a letter on
March 25, 2005.
          When   Vickers  was  released  from  custody  on   that
conviction  he had another bail hearing in his felony  case.   At
that  March 2, 2005, hearing, Superior Court Judge Larry D.  Card
stated  that  Vickers  was  to have no  contact  with  Jamestown.
Although  Judge  Cards remarks appear to have been  directed,  at
least in part, to Vickerss third-party custodians, they were made
in Vickerss presence:
          There will be no contact between Mr. Vickers
          and  the  alleged victim. Do you folks  know
          who she is?  All right.  There will
          be no contact.
          However,  when the court issued its written  order  and
conditions of release, the no contact box on the form  order  was
inadvertently left blank.  According to testimony in  this  case,
form orders for conditions of release are normally filled out  by
defense counsel and given to the judge for his or her signature.
          Some  six weeks later, on April 15, 2005, another  bail
hearing  was held in Vickerss felony case to consider his request
to  travel  to Angoon to attend a memorial service.   Judge  Card
granted  that  request.  At that hearing, the  district  attorney
asked Judge Card to advise Vickers again that he was not to  have
any contact with Jamestown, because the State was getting reports
that  Vickers  was having contact with her.  The  judge  did  not
directly  respond to that request, although the judge stated,  in
the context of a discussion about Vickerss ankle monitoring, that
I  have  a  problem  with  contact with  the  victim,  direct  or
indirect.  But again, the written order and conditions of release
left  the  relevant box unchecked  although the order  did  state
that all other conditions remain in effect.
          On  April  23,  2005, Anchorage Detective Steve  Lyons,
the  investigating officer in Vickerss felony case,  saw  Vickers
and Jamestown together, apparently en route to the airport to fly
to Angoon.  Based on this conduct, Vickers was again charged with
violating  his  conditions  of release  by  having  contact  with
Jamestown.
          At  trial  on  that  charge,  Vickers  argued  that  he
reasonably believed, given the absence of check marks in  the  no
contact  boxes on the March and April orders, that his conditions
of  release allowed him to have contact with Jamestown.  The jury
rejected that defense and convicted Vickers.  He appeals.

          Discussion
          The  district  court did not improperly limit  Vickerss
          mistake defense
          Vickerss  primary  claim on appeal is  that  the  court
improperly  limited his argument to the jury that he  reasonably,
if mistakenly, believed he could have contact with Jamestown.
          As  noted earlier, at the time of this offense  Vickers
was  on probation for violating the conditions of his release  by
having  contact with Jamestown.  One of his probation  conditions
barred him from contact with Jamestown  unless she wrote a letter
to  the district attorney permitting such contact, which she did.
Vickers argues that the district court should have allowed him to
argue  to  the  jury that he reasonably relied on the  sentencing
order in that prior case, and the letter Jamestown wrote pursuant
to  that order, to believe he was permitted to have contact  with
Jamestown.   The court disallowed that argument, ruling  that  it
was an impermissible mistake-of-law defense.
          In  making  this ruling, the district court  relied  on
the  Alaska  Supreme Courts decision in State v.  Strane.2   That
case involved facts similar to those presented here.  Strane  was
convicted  of violating a domestic violence protective  order  by
contacting  the  woman  who  had obtained  the  protective  order
against  him.3   At trial, Strane sought to defend  against  that
charge  by claiming that he honestly, albeit mistakenly, believed
          the no-contact order did not apply if the woman consented to the
contact.4  The trial court ruled that even if Strane had a  good-
faith  belief that his conduct did not violate the terms  of  the
protective order, that belief did not entitle him to a mistake-of-
law defense.5
          We  reversed  that decision, ruling that Strane  had  a
right  to  defend  against  the charge of  violating  a  domestic
violence  protective order by showing that he had an  honest  but
mistaken belief that his conduct did not violate the order.6  But
the  supreme court disagreed with our analysis.  The  court  held
that  Stranes subjective understanding of the effect or scope  of
the  no-contact  order  was irrelevant.   As  the  supreme  court
explained:    It  does  not  matter  whether  Strane   mistakenly
concluded   for  whatever reason  that the no-contact  order  was
inapplicable to his conduct; what matters ... is Stranes admitted
awareness of the restraining orders existence and contents.7  The
court concluded that Stranes admitted awareness of the protective
orders existence and contents  which included the orders facially
clear   and   unqualified  no-contact  provisions   sufficed   to
establish  the  circumstances element of  his  offense:  that  he
recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk  that
his conduct was prohibited by the order.8
          Vickers  argues that Strane is not controlling  in  his
case.   He  notes  that  Strane  was  convicted  of  violating  a
protective  order, not of violating conditions  of  release,  and
that  different statutory schemes govern those crimes.   He  also
notes  that  the  order  at  issue in Strane  clearly  prohibited
contact,  while the bail orders in his case were ambiguous.   But
these  distinctions have no bearing on the pertinent  holding  in
Strane that a defendant cannot ask a jury to acquit him based  on
his  honest  subjective belief as to the meaning  of  a  judicial
order.   The  applicable  culpable mental  state  is  recklessly.
Thus,  an  honest  belief  is  not sufficient  to  exculpate  the
defendant   if  the  defendant  understood  that  there   was   a
substantial and unjustifiable possibility that his conduct  would
violate  the  order  that is, if the defendants decision  to  run
this  risk  was  a gross deviation from what a reasonable  person
would do under the circumstances.9
          Applying    that   rule   here,   Vickerss   subjective
understanding  of the legal effect or scope of the conditions  of
his  release  was  not particularly relevant.   But  Vickers  was
entitled  to  challenge the States proof that  he  was  reckless,
either  by  showing  that he was unaware of  the  risk  that  his
conduct  would violate the order, or by showing that his decision
to run that risk was not a gross deviation from what a reasonable
person  would  do  in  the situation.  And  Judge  Lohff  allowed
Vickers to do this.
          The  judge  admitted all of the evidence on this  point
that Vickers offered.  Furthermore, the judge allowed Vickers  to
argue that he reasonably believed the March 2 and April 15 orders
allowed  him to contact Jamestown.  Vickers was also  allowed  to
argue that the sentencing order and letter in his prior case gave
him  reason to look carefully at the bail orders in this case and
to conclude that they did not prohibit contact with Jamestown.
          The  only  restriction  the court  placed  on  Vickerss
          litigation of this point was to barVickers from arguing that he
was  entitled  to  an acquittal based on his subjective  mistaken
belief   that   the  sentencing  order  issued  in  his   earlier
misdemeanor case (and the letter that Jamestown wrote pursuant to
that  order consenting to contact) waived or superseded  the  no-
contact provision of release in his felony case.
          Judge  Lohff  was  not  mistaken in  limiting  Vickerss
defense in this manner.  In Busby v. State,10 we upheld a similar
restriction on the presentation of a defense case.  The issue  in
Busby was whether the defendant could defend against a charge  of
driving  with  a revoked license by claiming that  he  mistakenly
believed,  based  on  his  own research, that  his  international
driving permit gave him the right to drive in Alaska even  though
his  Alaska  drivers  license was revoked.   We  held  that  this
argument  constituted an impermissible mistake-of-law  defense.11
Likewise, in Clark v. State,12 we ruled that the defendant  could
not  defend  against  a  charge  of  felon  in  possession  of  a
concealable firearm by relying on his erroneous belief  that  the
probation  condition  barring him from  possessing  firearms  was
suspended while his conviction was on appeal.13  We observed that
Clarks  mistake-of-law  claim amount[ed]  only  to  his  personal
belief  that  he was not convicted for purposes of the  felon  in
possession  statute while his case was on appeal.   This  is  far
from  the  type  of  claim  where a  reasonable  mistake  of  law
constitutes a defense.14
          Vickerss  case is governed by this same rule.   Vickers
was not entitled to argue to the jury that he should be acquitted
based  on  a  mistaken personal belief that the letter  Jamestown
wrote  (the letter consenting to contact with Vickers) superseded
the  no-contact  provision of the conditions of  release  in  his
felony case.  We therefore conclude that Judge Lohff did not  err
in limiting Vickerss defense in this manner.

          There  is  no  merit to Vickerss claim that  the  court
          should have instructed
          the  jury that only written conditions of release  were
relevant
          In  this  case,  Judge Lohff instructed the  jury  that
oral  and written conditions of bail carry equal weight.  Vickers
argues  that the district court should have instructed  the  jury
that  the written orders and conditions of release were the  only
relevant orders in his case.  In support of this claim, he points
to  AS  12.30.027(c), the statute that requires  courts  imposing
release conditions in cases involving domestic violence to  issue
a written order specifying a defendants conditions of release and
to  provide  a  copy  of  the  order to  the  defendant.15   This
provision  is similar to AS 12.30.020(d), which requires  in  any
criminal  case  that  the  court  issue  an  order  containing  a
statement  of  the conditions imposed.  Both of these  provisions
promote notice of the conditions imposed.
          To  prove  that  Vickers violated a  condition  of  his
release,  AS  11.56.757 requires the State to prove that  Vickers
violated  a  condition of release imposed by a  judicial  officer
under  AS  12.30.   The statute does not exclude a  condition  of
release  imposed  orally  by  a  judicial  officer  but,  through
          oversight or error, not included in a written order.
          
          The  court did not violate Vickerss due process  rights
          by  allowing the State to rely on his prior  conviction
          to show absence of mistake
          Vickers  argues that the court violated his due process
rights  by  allowing the State to use the evidence of  his  prior
conviction for violating his conditions of release to  show  that
he  was  not  mistaken  when  he committed  this  offense   while
preventing  him  from  using the same evidence  to  show  he  was
mistaken.
          Vickers  raised  this  same  argument  at  trial.    In
response,  Judge  Lohff  outlined the permissible  arguments  the
parties  could make based on this evidence: He ruled that Vickers
could  argue  that the earlier conviction put him on notice  that
bail  conditions are important, and led him to look carefully  at
the  conditions in this case and to infer that they did  not  bar
contact  with Jamestown.  Conversely, Judge Lohff ruled that  the
State could rely on the prior conviction to show that Vickers was
aware  of  his bail conditions.  Vickers did not object  to  this
resolution.
          Based  on  the courts ruling, the prosecutor argued  as
follows:
          I  told  you that you cannot use this  prior
          [violating conditions of release] conviction
          for  the  proposition that he  that  Annette
          [Jamestown]  can  consent to  contact.   You
          cant do that, its improper use, a mistake of
          law defense.  What you can use it for is  to
          show  that the defendant has been previously
          convicted   of   [violating  conditions   of
          release],  which means that  he  knows  that
          violating  his  bail  conditions  leads   to
          criminal  liability.  He knows  that  if  he
          doesnt follow his bail conditions he may end
          up  being  charged and ultimately convicted.
          Thats   what   you   can  use   this   prior
          [conviction  for  violating  conditions   of
          release]  for.  You can use it to show  that
          he  had  the knowledge, he knew that he  had
          bail conditions.  He knew that if he had any
          question of what his bail conditions were  a
          reasonable person would have asked and would
          have sought clarification from the judge.
Thus,  the State did not argue, as Vickers asserts, that  Vickers
could  not  have been mistaken about his ability to have  contact
with Ms. Jamestown because hed already gotten in trouble for that
before.   Rather,  the State relied on the evidence  of  Vickerss
prior  conviction simply to show that Vickers knew  that  he  had
bail conditions.
          Vickerss attorney argued in turn:
          [Vickers]  chose to ... tell you  about  the
          fact  that he had been convicted in January,
          why  he was convicted, and it made an impact
          on  his life and he wasnt going to make that
          mistake  again,  so  he wanted  to  be  very
          careful  about  his  contact.   He  believed
          fully in his mind that he could have contact
          with ...  Annette, and the reason he did was
          because  of the documents in his possession.
          He  had  the  March 2nd and the  April  15th
          court orders that were very clear.

          This  is  exactly the argument that Vickers  claims  in
his  brief on appeal that he was prohibited from making at trial.
Vickers  is  thus wrong when he asserts that the court  prevented
him from rebutting the States argument about the relevance of his
prior  conviction  to his mental state.  The court  allowed  both
parties to argue this issue, within the constraints of the courts
ruling   disallowing  a  mistake-of-law  defense.    Furthermore,
Vickers  waived any claim of error because he did not  object  to
the  courts resolution of this issue at trial, and because he did
not  cite or discuss the courts ruling on this issue in his brief
on appeal.16

          Did Judge Lohff err in failing to recuse himself?
          During  sentencing, Judge Lohff remarked  that  he  had
presided over Vickerss first bail hearing and that he had clearly
ordered  Vickers,  as  a condition of his  release,  to  have  no
contact with Jamestown.  Based on this statement, Vickers  argues
that  Judge Lohff should have sua sponte recused himself  because
he  had personal knowledge of a disputed evidentiary fact in this
case   whether Vickers knew he could have contact with  Jamestown
and  was  therefore a material witness.  He claims  Judge  Lohffs
failure  to  recuse  himself tainted the entire  proceedings  and
quite  clearly  the  sentencing, when  Judge  Lohff  specifically
relied on his prior knowledge.
          A  judge  is  not  required to  recuse  himself  simply
because  he previously presided over a case involving  the  party
seeking  recusal.17   As the supreme court has  explained,  every
judge,  when  he hears a case or writes an opinion must  form  an
opinion on the merits and ... [often] an opinion relative to  the
parties  involved.  But this does not mean that the judge  has  a
personal  bias or prejudice.18  Furthermore, a party  seeking  to
disqualify  a  judge for bias must show that the  judges  actions
were  the  result of personal bias developed from  a  nonjudicial
source.19  Thus, to the extent that Vickers is arguing that Judge
Lohff  had  a duty of disclosure or recusal based solely  on  the
fact that he presided over Vickerss first bail hearing, there  is
no merit to his claim.  Vickers was present at that bail hearing,
and  if  he  did not remember who the judge was, he could  easily
have obtained that information.  Moreover, Vickers has offered no
persuasive  argument  that  he was  prejudiced  by  Judge  Lohffs
personal knowledge of his case.
          Vickers  next  argues that Judge Lohff had  a  duty  to
disqualify himself because he had personal knowledge of  disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.20  This  claim  also
fails.   The  parties actively disputed whether it was reasonable
for  Vickers  to  believe he could have contact  with  Jamestown,
given  the  March  2  and  April 15 bail orders  (which  did  not
          expressly bar contact) and the January 2005 sentencing order and
letter in his prior misdemeanor case (which permitted contact  if
Jamestown  wrote  a letter consenting to contact).   But  Vickers
never  argued that the order issued by Judge Lohff in  July  2004
allowed  contact  with Jamestown (clearly, on its  face,  it  did
not).  Rather, he argued that the order had no relevance to  this
case.
          Vickers  also  argues that Judge Lohff was  a  material
witness, and that he was therefore obliged to disqualify  himself
under  AS 22.20.020(a)(3).  This claim fails for the same reason.
There  was no significant possibility that Judge Lohff  would  be
called  as a witness.21  Vickerss position at trial was that  the
March  2  and April 15 orders and conditions of release were  the
only relevant orders in this case.  He therefore had no reason to
call  Judge Lohff to testify about an order the judge issued some
eight months earlier  especially an order that stated on its face
that  Vickers  was to have no contact with Jamestown.   The  only
additional  evidence  Judge  Lohff could  have  offered  was  his
recollection, if any, that he verbally told Vickers  to  have  no
contact  with Jamestown. Given these circumstances,  Judge  Lohff
had no duty to disqualify himself as a material witness under  AS
22.20.020(a)(3).   Nor was Judge Lohff obliged  to  disclose  his
involvement  because AS 22.20.020 imposes a  duty  of  disclosure
only if the judge has some basis to disqualify himself under  the
statute.22

          Vickerss other claims are inadequately briefed
          Vickers  argues that the court improperly  limited  his
cross-examination  of  Detective Lyons  about  Jamestowns  letter
giving him permission to contact her.  But the State objected  to
admission  of  that letter on the grounds that it  had  not  been
authenticated  and its relevance had not been shown.   The  court
ruled  that Vickers could not question Detective Lyons about  the
letter  until  it  was  authenticated and until  he  had  offered
evidence to show that it was the letter Vickers referred to  when
he told Detective Lyons he had permission to contact Jamestown.
          Vickers  later  called Jamestown to  testify  that  she
wrote  the  letter,  and the letter was admitted  into  evidence.
Vickers  testified that his son gave him a copy  of  the  letter.
But Vickers never recalled Detective Lyons as a witness.
          Vickers  has  not discussed the courts ruling  on  this
issue or shown how it was wrong.  Nor has he explained why he did
not  recall  Detective  Lyons, or how he was  prejudiced  by  the
limitations  the court placed on the order of proof.   For  these
reasons, Vickerss claim is waived for inadequate briefing.23
          Vickers   also   claims  that  the  court   erroneously
excluded  a  temporary order note that failed to  contain  a  no-
contact  provision.  He cites to the page of  the  transcript  at
which the court excluded Vickerss March 2, 2005, Instructions  to
Jail.   But  Vickers gives no insight into why he  believes  this
evidence was wrongly excluded.  His claim is therefore waived for
inadequate briefing.24
          Vickers argues that the court abused its discretion  by
allowing  evidence of his prior conviction to come in by  way  of
his  recorded statement to Detective Lyons that he had  paperwork
          from two courts.  He also argues that the court erred by not
granting a mistrial on this basis.
          During  trial  the  State  played  an  audio  tape   of
Detective Lyonss interview with Vickers in which Vickers asserted
that  he  had  paperwork from two courts permitting him  to  have
contact with Jamestown.  Vickers moved for a mistrial after  this
statement  was  admitted, arguing that  it  violated  the  courts
protective order.  The court denied the mistrial motion.   Later,
the  evidence  of  Vickerss  prior  conviction  was  admitted  at
Vickerss request.
          Judge  Lohff  made no ruling admitting  this  evidence.
Rather, the State failed to redact it from the audio tape.  Judge
Lohff   concluded  that  the admission of Vickerss  reference  to
paperwork  from  two courts did not violate the protective  order
because  it was difficult to hear and did not necessarily support
an  inference that Vickers had a prior conviction.   Judge  Lohff
also  offered  to  give  a  curative instruction,  which  Vickers
declined.   Vickers does not discuss the courts  findings,  point
out  why  he  thinks they were wrong, or cite  any  authority  to
support  his  claims.   His  claims  are  therefore  waived   for
inadequate briefing.25
          Vickers  argues  that the court,  the  State,  and  the
States witnesses, wrongly instructed the jury that it was unheard
of  to allow contact between a defendant and an alleged victim of
domestic  violence.  But in support of this claim, Vickers   with
one  exception  cites to discussions that took place outside  the
presence  of  the  jury.  The exception involved  a  witness  who
testified  that during the eight and a half years she had  worked
with  Judge  Card,  she could not remember him  ever  allowing  a
defendant to contact a victim in a case with allegations  similar
to  those in Vickerss case.  But Vickers did not object  to  this
testimony,  nor  does  he explain on appeal  how  this  testimony
equates  to an improper jury instruction.  His claim is therefore
waived for inadequate briefing.26
          Vickers  also  appears to argue that the court  usurped
the jurys role in judging Vickerss credibility by stating that it
would be disingenuous of Vickers to assert that he was unaware of
a  condition  of  release  he had previously  been  convicted  of
violating.   Vickers takes this statement out of context.   Judge
Lohff  made this statement outside the presence of the jury  when
he  initially  ruled that the State could not offer  evidence  of
Vickerss  prior  conviction.  The court warned  Vickers  that  it
might  reconsider  its  ruling if Vickers made  the  disingenuous
argument that he was unaware of the condition of release.   After
the  evidence  of  Vickerss  prior  conviction  was  admitted  at
Vickerss  request, the court heard additional argument  and  made
more  precise  rulings  on how evidence of the  prior  conviction
could  be  used.   Viewing  Judge Lohffs  remark  in  the  proper
context, there is no merit to Vickerss claim that he usurped  the
jurys role in judging credibility.
          Lastly,  Vickers argues that his sentence of  150  days
to  serve  is  excessive because Judge Lohff should have  recused
himself  and because Judge Lohff erroneously limited his  mistake
defense.  Vickers is apparently arguing that even if we  fail  to
find  reversible  error on these grounds, we  should  reduce  his
          sentence to 120 days.  But Vickers does not explain his rationale
or  cite  any  authority  to support  his  claim.   Moreover,  as
discussed  above,  Judge Lohff did not err in  limiting  Vickerss
mistake  defense  or  in  failingto recuse  himself  sua  sponte.
Vickers  has therefore given us no reason to conclude that  Judge
Lohffs sentence was clearly mistaken.27

          Conclusion
          Vickerss conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
          
_______________________________
     1 AS 11.56.757(a).

2 State v. Strane (Strane II), 61 P.3d 1284 (Alaska 2003).

     3 Id. at 1285.

4 Id.

     5 Id.

     6  Strane  v. State (Strane I), 16 P.3d 745, 748-49  (Alaska
App. 2001).

     7 Strane II, 61 P.3d at 1290.

     8 Id. at 1292.

     9  Id.  at 1290.  See AS 11.81.900(a)(3) (the definition  of
recklessly).

10   40 P.3d 807 (Alaska App. 2002).

     11   Id. at 816-17.

     12   739 P.2d 777 (Alaska App. 1987).

     13   Id. at 779.

     14   Id.

     15   AS 12.30.027(c)(1), (2).

16     Tenala,  Ltd.  v.  Fowler,  921  P.2d  1114,   1121   n.10
(Alaska  1996); McCormick v. Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 166 (Alaska
App. 2000).

     17    Pride v. Harris, 882 P.2d 381, 385 (Alaska 1994);  see
Hanson v. Hanson, 36 P.3d 1181, 1184 (Alaska 2001).

     18   Pride, 882 P.2d at 385 (quoting State v. Anchorage, 513
P.2d  1104,  1113  (Alaska 1973), disavowed on other  grounds  in
State  v.  Alex,  646  P.2d 203, 208 n.4 (Alaska  1982)  (quoting
Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79, 84 (7th Cir. 1950))).

     19   Hanson, 36 P.3d at 1184.

     20   Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 E(1)(A).

21    See  Vaska  v.  State, 955 P.2d 943,  946-47  (Alaska  App.
1998) (disqualifying judge under AS 22.20.020(a)(3) because there
was  a  significant  possibility that he would  be  called  as  a
material witness on remand).

     22   AS 22.20.020(b).

     23   Petersen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 803 P.2d 406,
410 (Alaska 1990) (Where a point is not given more than a cursory
statement in the argument portion of a brief, the point will  not
be considered on appeal.).

     24   Id.

25   Id.

     26   Id.

     27    See AS 11.56.757(b)(1) (providing that a violation  of
conditions of release is a class A misdemeanor if the  person  is
released  from  a felony charge); AS 12.55.135(a) (authorizing  a
term  of imprisonment of up to 1 year for a class A misdemeanor).
See  also  McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14  (Alaska  1974)
(holding  that  an  appellate court is  to  uphold  a  sentencing
decision unless the sentence is clearly mistaken).

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